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Abstract
This study examines the rhetorical methods that eighteenth-century biographers use to
produce selfhood and to educate readers in behaviors that promote sociability. The interventions
of the New Science’s inductive epistemology in rhetoric and conceptualizations of selfhood, as
well as the rise of print culture, offer a foundation for exploring the emergence of the modern
biographical form in the eighteenth century. In its development, eighteenth-century biography
utilizes various rhetorical techniques to create a rhetoric of self, which arranges documented,
lived experience into a print selfhood that readers can observe empirically and sympathetically,
an engagement with the print person through which they teach themselves right social practice.
Fundamentally, the effect of these rhetorical techniques is a selfhood that can act as a substitute
for a person, which readers can observe empirically and sympathetically. In its emergence, the
biographical rhetoric of self teaches readers to apply a new ethics of reading in order to improve
themselves and to engage the larger community of readers.
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Introduction

Critical Positioning
Since it relies so conspicuously on research and a chronological apparatus, modern
biography can seem too formulaic or too easy, a simplistic arrangement of self-evident facts.
Whether the modern reader takes up one of Claire Tomalin’s literary biographies or just a single
volume of Michael Reynolds’ five volume treatment of Ernest Hemingway’s life, the familiar
markers of the form are all there: chapter headings divide the life into years or noteworthy
periods, citations and footnotes credential documentary evidence, and a series of plates
reproduces portraits of the subject’s social network. Even Stephen Greenblatt acknowledges the
significance of these biographical considerations in his Will in the World. Since he lacks the
usual amount of documentation associated with the form, he locates the most shadowy details of
William Shakespeare’s life in the reader’s own imagination, yet he seeks to create the same
biographical effects in the shift from hard fact to imaginative speculation. This apparent, formal
regularity in modern biography belies its complexity and hides the social function that can be
traced back to the genre’s eighteenth-century origins.
My aim is to position the emergent, eighteenth-century biographical form within the
representational framework provided by the advent of the New Science, its epistemology and
rhetorical mandate; the rise of print culture and its standards for documentation and credit; and
the ongoing development of the form toward an increasingly intimate representation of the self.
From this framework emerges a genre centered on the formulation of the rhetoric of self for the
eighteenth-century subject. The biographical rhetoric of self comprises the variable and
adaptable strategies biographers use to represent selfhood in the eighteenth century. I argue that
1

the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self arranges documented, lived experience into a print
selfhood, which readers can observe empirically and sympathetically, like a living person, in
order to teach themselves right social practice. This autodidactic quality furnishes readers with a
private, print means for self-improvement, which has the potential to resituate and stabilize the
destabilized situation of the self after the seventeenth century. Biography offers an alternative to
a strictly Foucaultian subject formation through a discursive ordering. Foucault’s construction
hinges on a formation comprised of “‘[w]ords and things’ . . . a work that modifies its own form,
displaces its own data, and reveals . . . practices that systematically form the objects of which
they speak” (Archeology 49). While biography does hail the reader as agent within a set of
formative cultural practices, it establishes a model for the self who can also act rightly within a
system of practice. The rhetoric of self moves a Foucaultian emphasis on the discursive “words
and things” of social practice that define the subject back to the reader who can choose to act
within these practices. Given such agency, the reader can also be taught to choose right action.
The rhetoric of self’s didacticism gives public significance to the private reader: selfhood
develops through engagement with the biographical form, in turn developing the individual
reader into a community of mutual readers, a larger society, and a more stable nation.
While the novel emerged alongside biography, it provided imaginative engagement with
fictitious characters, but biography promised a scientific, instructive account of a real modern
self. My intervention into the conversation posits the biographical rhetoric of self as a didactic
form emerging from dual contexts of the New Science and print culture. I focus on the scientific
epistemology and rhetoric that emerged with the Royal Society, giving particular attention to
Thomas Sprat, the early historian of the Society, and John Locke, the Society member whose
theories of selfhood dominated eighteenth-century conceptualizations of the self. Biographically,

2

I will focus on the theory of selfhood put forward in manuscript by Roger North, a contemporary
of Sprat and Locke, and the later rhetorics of self arranged by Samuel Johnson, whose approach
is particularly mediated by developing print standards. His biography combined the science and
the print standards in an early form that would make Oliver Goldsmith’s and James Boswell’s
biographies possible.

Eighteenth-Century Notions of Biography
With his Life of Johnson, James Boswell offers the most comprehensive example of an
eighteenth-century print self substituted biographically for the lived self. He arranges details
from Samuel Johnson’s everyday life—the crucial, “minute particulars” which “are frequently
characteristic . . . when they relate to a distinguished man” (Life i.23)—into a representation that
privileges Johnson’s personal experiences over his established persona. In Boswell’s biography,
Johnson is as much a man as an author and social philosopher. This biographical organization
structures Johnson’s life as a rhetorical pattern of accessible social practices with didactic
promise. He invites readers not only to observe Johnson, but to engage his selfhood and his ideas
in conversation. Readers of the Life of Johnson, Boswell could boldly claim, “will not only talk,
but think Johnson,” an ambitious rhetorical effect, which Boswell claimed his biography had
accomplished by its second edition: his Life of Johnson had “Johnsonised the land” (Life i.8).
Boswell’s biography is an assertion that cultural values could be written on or translated through
an experiential, embodied account of that person’s life, which readers could observe empirically
and sympathetically. The assertion is, moreover, an exertion of a socially conservative energy
that addresses an exigence of instability in identity and authority that the eighteenth century
inherited from the English Civil Wars and the Restoration. Subjects had an agency that was not
3

determined by the religious and socio-economic discourses that blatantly sought to prescribe
seventeenth-century identities.
Recognizing eighteenth-century biographical didacticism, however, is complicated by the
challenge of defining the form in its moment. The OED cites the first instance of biography as
1671, around the beginning of the Royal Society, and it cites the first instance of biographer in
1644. In the first instance, biography is synonymous with autobiography and drafting the
character of a literary figure; in the second, with a larger, national scope that eighteenth-century
biographers narrow to the single self, eschewing larger national figures or nations in favor of a
didactic selfhood. Scholars of the eighteenth-century novel are quick to note the growing
influence of the biographical genre, but never offer more than a slim outline of the form as such,
and only in the service of arguments about the novel. Michael McKeon argues that the paradox
of early biography, “the tension between the individual life and overarching pattern,”
necessitated the need for specific detail that would later come to characterize the realism of the
eighteenth-century novel (91). J. Paul Hunter, similarly, notes that biography’s “status as a
respectable literary and didactic species” validated the emerging novel form, since both forms, to
some degree, employ similar structures for representing human experience (351). Like
biography, the novel form often promises the improvement of the reader. Novels like Clarissa
claim to be “a work which is designed to inculcate upon the human mind, under the guise of an
amusement, the great lessons of Christianity” (Richardson 1495). Even the comic Tristram
Shandy seeks to improve the quality of life, since the “mirth” that the novel promises can provide
a “fence against the infirmities of ill health, and the other evils of life” because “every time a
man smiles,—but much more so, when he laughs, . . . it adds something to this Fragment of Life”
(Sterne xv). The similarities and borrowings between eighteenth-century biographies and novels,
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especially their didactic import, gives novel scholars a convenient counterpoint for theorizing the
novel, suggesting that the conventions of biography are so self-evident they require no
articulation. They can be cited as an established, nonfiction form, which contrasts and thus
clarifies the complexities of the novel form. But a closer critical focus on biography reveals
generic differences that lend themselves to distinct analytical methods, most notably their
rhetorical approaches to didacticism.
Like scholars of the novel, scholars of modern biographical form are challenged to tease
a definition from its complexity. William Epstein and Paula Backscheider both allow that the
form defies easy definition now as much it did for its eighteenth-century predecessors. Each
looks first to the reader’s engagement with biographical writing as one of the form’s more
definitive features. Since biography “has never really had a generally accepted terminology . . .
[or] a poetics that could be upheld and resisted,” William Epstein proposes a focus on “generic
frames,” whereby a modern audience organizes its understanding through the form and the form
itself is reorganized as a means of understanding (6, 2). Epstein’s generic frames offer some
potential for examining the characteristic didactic effect of eighteenth-century biography. After
all, the rhetoric of self invites readers to shape their self-understanding through an understanding
of a print self. Although his particular attention to generic recognition emphasizes the reader’s
interaction with the biography,1 Epstein ultimately downplays the moralizing impetus of
eighteenth-century biography. Backsheider, on the other hand, more productively emphasizes the
social potential written into the form. Her description of biography foregrounds the interplay
between the biographer, the audience, and common experience to convey an individuality

1

Epstein focuses on prominent, emergent biographies, two from the eighteenth century, and organizes his chapters
and the generic frames they seek to interrogate around like primarily Restoration and eighteenth-century biographies
like Izaak Walton’s Life of Donne, Johnson’s Life of Savage, and Boswell’s Life of Johnson, as well as Lytton
Strachey’s Eminent Victorians.
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particular to the biographical subject. She characterizes this interplay as a “three-way dynamic”:
“[j]ust as biographers bring themselves to biography and find personal meaning, so do readers,
and what they bring and find validate truths about biography and about life,” so that, “[e]ven
better than the novel, biography can be discussed and defined by the ‘work’ it does in society”
(227). The “work” that the genre “does in society” ultimately becomes the most important
marker of biography. Its social potential is its definitive feature.
The rigors of eighteenth-century biography differed from medieval hagiography,
reflecting different social work it did to a much smaller, much specific body of readers, medieval
clergy. Medieval hagiography, as a form of life writing, existed in relationship to a religious
institution sprawling across continents and, thus, requiring greater self-definition, a manuscript
culture with limited distribution, and an audience accountable to the Christian standards
prescribed by the medieval Catholic Church. The manuscript culture that produced lives of
Catholic saints, a genre which Thomas Heffernan labels sacred biography rather than
hagiography, demonstrated a rhetorical emphasis on “dramatized action over complex argument”
within a rhetoric of selfhood dependent on “sacred stories designed to teach the faithful to
imitate actions which the community had decided were paradigmatic” (Heffernan 5). The
constraints of the social situation require a “presentation of what the community has
acknowledged as normative behavior” in “dramatic moments . . . [which] are conventionalized
and thus exist as paradigms for the community” (Heffernan 20). By dramatizing the standards for
right social action, these sacred biographies illustrated how Christian principles might be
practiced within the medieval culture. Simply put, these were saintly models of perfection for
emulation by the less saintly reader, who was most likely a cleric in medieval society. The
constraints presented by an eighteenth-century culture, on the other hand, merited a different
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biographical rhetoric that answered the need of a more socially stratified audience than the needs
of a religious institution stabilizing its paradigmatic standards for an international cohort of
medieval clerics.
Boswell’s biographical approach to writing Johnson and to “Johnsonising the land”
indicates that the emerging form of eighteenth-century biography was three-part, an eighteenthcentury update to Aristotle’s three appeals, derived from the intervention of the new science and
print culture. Biography depends on an appeal to logos, the verifiable, nonfictional, minute facts
about a person’s experiences and a compelling arrangement of these facts that lends continuity to
the life’s representation; an appeal to pathos, a reader’s didactic sympathy with the print person;
and an appeal to ethos, the biographer’s claim to arrange an authentic rhetoric of self. In his
Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson defines a “biographer” as a “writer of
lives” who records “the actions of particular persons.” He does not, however, bother delineating
how the biographer might structure the record, perhaps confident that his own biographical
output might address formal considerations. Rather than explicitly define “biography,” Johnson
cites a definition from Isaac Watts’ Logick (1725).2 Watt’s definition stresses the relationship
between the materials available to the biographer and the rhetorical arrangements these materials
make possible, noting that,
in writing the Lives of Men, which is called Biography, some Authors follow the
Track of their Years, and place every thing in the precise Order of Time when it
occurr’d: Others throw the Temper and Character of the Persons, the private Life,
2

Johnson’s citation is faulty, but he acknowledges the possibility of such inaccuracy in the Preface to his
Dictionary. To keep the Dictionary accessible and as brief as possible, Johnson found it necessary to shorten the
examples he included to demonstrate usage; as a result, “[t]he examples are often injudiciously truncated, and
perhaps sometimes, I hope rarely, alleged in a mistaken sense; for in making this collection, I trusted more to
memory, than, in a state of disquiet and embarrassment, memory can contain, and purposed to supply at the review
what was left incomplete in the first transcription.” A truncated citation in the Dictionary does not compromise the
expertise Johnson’s opinions as a biographer in the eighteenth century.
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their public Stations, their personal Occurrences, their domestic Conduct, their
Speeches, their Books or Writings, their Sickness and Death, into so many distinct
Chapters. (347)
For a culture increasingly coming to imagine itself and personal selfhood through print,
verification of such facts would have depended on documentation. An undocumented life, a self
that leaves no evidence of its actions, is an unlived life with no didactic potential. The
eighteenth-century biographer’s task was to take all the information that Watts suggested for
biography—the speeches, books, writing, experiences, public jobs, records of sickness and death
and so on—and arrange a rhetoric of self in the rhetorical practices of the time. Wilbur Samuel
Howell notes that these rhetorical practices would “in content . . . be fully relevant to the fact of
the given situation and in form would be simple and easy to grasp,” written in “the middle and
the plain style” accessible to all readers who read, view, and learn from the rhetoric of self
(Eighteenth-Century 446). The print person of the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self could only
be accessible, compelling, and instructive if it could be fully credentialed as accurate and true.
In representing a rhetoric of self, emergent biographers felt a closer formal affinity to the
historian than the poet, novelist, dramatist, medieval hagiography, or seventeenth-century
character writer. The specifics that mark a private life, which few people see, are more
challenging to credential than a history that a nation witnesses, yet they are of a kind. Scottish
rhetorician Hugh Blair classes biography specifically as a distinct construction of history, subject
to the common attributes of historical rhetoric. He notes that “History is a species of Writing
designed for the instruction of mankind, [so] sound morality should always reign in it,” and he
also argues that the biographical form “or the Writing of Lives, is a very useful kind of
Composition; less formal and stately than History; but to the bulk of readers, perhaps, no less
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instructive; as it affords them the opportunity of seeing the characters and tempers, the virtues
and failings of eminent men fully displayed; and admits them into a more thorough and intimate
acquaintance than History generally allows” (411). Blair’s notion of biography emphasizes the
form’s appeal to readers. In drawing on common experience and human nature to relay the
events of the life, the biographer leads readers to draw their own conclusions about the self and
sociability. The emergent biographical form facilitated a crucial understanding of the multiple,
shifting codes in social behavior that eighteenth-century readers had to navigate. The immediacy
of personal histories presents a self for public scrutiny, and their capacity to excite audience
sympathy indicates their didactic potential.

The Situation of the Eighteenth-Century Self
While every age has its own stake in defining the human condition, the emergence of
biography in the eighteenth century suggests a self-awareness about representing selfhood that is
unique to the period. What might seem foundational to modern biography—incorporating as
many relevant, minute details as possible, however unflattering, for a fuller representation of the
biographical subject—must have seemed like a dredging of the potentially invasive, offensive,
and inappropriate. The form’s didactic commitment to a more thorough representation of human
experience implies a need, if not for improvement, at least a new way for recognizing selfhood.
Backscheider asserts that an instructive potential is implicit in the biographical form in
particular, because it holds up a mirror up to its audience that has “the power to define how a
person, a nation and its history will be judged, to contribute to maintaining, revising, or shaking
its self-image” (Backscheider 227-8). Her reading conflates the distinction that Blair draws
between the grand sweep of human experience that history depicts and the common account of
9

lived experience that a biographical subject presents in order to argue that selfhood embodies
what is significant about “a nation and its history.”
Eighteenth-century biography is a discourse determined by a rhetorical situation charged
with a particular urgency that the rhetoric of self must addresses. In modeling the rhetorical
situation, modern rhetorician Lloyd Bitzer emphasizes the interplay between rhetoric and world
which “presents imperfections to be modified by means of discourse” (Bitzer 14): the rhetorical
situation is the “complex of persons, objects, events and relations . . . . located in reality, [which]
are objective and publicly observable historical facts in the world we experience, [and] are
therefore readily available for scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them” (11). Bitzer
argues that the function of a rhetoric or rhetorical discourse is always determined by an exigence,
“an imperfection marked by urgency,” that is present only when a situation presents a “defect, an
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” that can be
changed positively and only through a rhetorical discourse that fits the specific needs of the
observable situation (Bitzer 6-7). The sense of urgency drives and shapes the discourse to
operate with the specific constraints of the imperfection it addresses.
In the broad, eighteenth-century context of shifting economic mobility, reconfigurations
of civil authority, and developments in print culture, the discursive potential for biography was
tremendous and urgent, resituating selfhood and making possible the emergence of a new form
that could teach readers how to reimagine themselves in the jarring wake of the seventeenthcentury civil and religious wars. Years of internecine struggle destabilized the relationship
between social authority, political and religious, and its subjects, who took their cues for
adopting a selfhood from the florid, vitriolic harangues in pulpits and pamphlets. As
Backscheider argues, the roles of the nation and its history are written into selfhood. Royalists,
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parliamentarians, Catholics, republicans, Puritans engaged in a war of identities that culminated
in the execution of the monarch, Charles I, God’s own appointee. If the British could position
themselves to axe the highest representative of religiously-sanctioned, social authority, then they
must certainly assume the responsibility of defining their new roles and the authority in relation
to their new world. Subjects faced the daunting task of reimagining themselves, a task more
daunting when a new king took the throne and monarchy was restored to England. The old selves
were out of joint with those times. Biography’s emergence addressed the urgency of this postRestoration problem, offering a rhetoric of self that would teach readers how to redefine
selfhood. Biography simultaneously problematizes extant Civil War and Restoration identities,
and it becomes a conservative social force in this period, smoothing out the potentially
destabilizing energies that threatened the prevailing social order, which resulted from the
beheading of Charles I and Bloodless Revolution that ushered James II from the throne. The
adversarial political and religious relationship between the revolutionary, anti-monarchical
Protestant roundhead and the Cavalier monarchist had little gripe and less place in the peaceful,
Augustan golden age of Queen Anne’s reign.
In the early eighteenth century, Thomas Birch puts forward a biography of Robert Boyle
that invites readers to consider the tensions between the Anglican Church and the Royal Society,
His Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle connects Boyle’s life, scientific endeavors, and
religious integrity to model how the culture itself might settle the differences between science
and faith: “Religion, as well as Philosophy, has received . . . important service from the excellent
Writings and excessive Labours of the celebrated Mr. BOYLE,” so that the biography should
appeal to those “who have the truest Zeal for the Promotion of Piety, and, it’s best Support,
useful Science” (Dedication). The rhetoric of self arranged Boyle’s resolve to be a Christian and
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a scientist into an image of how the culture might resolve itself: faith first, augmented by a
science that proves itself to be useful.3 The biographical form posited a rhetoric of self to answer
a specific exigence, the instability of selfhood at the outset of the century, by attempting to
stabilize it, teaching readers the proper action for the public self.
Notions of identity destabilized by the upheaval of the civil wars and the subsequent
Restoration were stabilized by private readers in a society defining itself through print. Earlier
notions of self were not being replaced entirely, but rather re-envisioned and rewritten through
biographical form’s gradual emergence. Although he does not attribute these shifts solely to the
influence of biography, Dror Wahrman traces a pattern of selfhood that moves from a vaguer to a
more fixed understanding of selfhood, a shift from an earlier, “ancien régime of identity” that
was characteristically unstable, “mutable, assumable, divisible, or actively malleable,” to a later,
modern regime that stressed a fixed selfhood with an “innate, fixed, determined core,”
categorically identifiable “as gender, race, class, and the human/animal divide” (275). Wahrman
argues that “[l]ike any other historically specific phenomenon, the ancien régime off identity had
a beginning and an end. . . some aspects of the ancien régime emerged in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries,” followed by “the sea change in the last two decades of the
eighteenth century in which this distinctive configuration lost its cultural ground and was rapidly
superseded by another . . . new, alternative identity regime . . . defined by a fundamental
emphasis on self” (xiii). This solidification of self-understanding, the emergence of a less
flexible, “alternative identity regime” suggests how biographical rhetoric met the exigency of a

3

Naturally, Birch’s rhetoric of self ultimately failed to resolve the disconnect between religion and science in the
eighteenth century, but Bitzer notes that “rhetorical situations come into existence, then either mature or decay or
mature and persist - conceivably some persist indefinitely” (12). Such is the case with regard to religion’s
relationship to science—it continues to resonate.
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society seeking to stabilize the mutable, ancient régime of its identity. And by the end of
eighteenth century, Wahrman argues, the society largely had (274-8).
One of the crucial models for establishing a rationale to resituate selfhood and assigning a
function to the biographical form is closely John Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood in his
Inquiry into Human Understanding. While the boundaries of selfhood might have been set by
external institutions or historical events, as Michel Foucault’s account of modernity suggests, the
staggering responsibility of the millions of choices that comprise selfhood resides with
individuals themselves.4 For Locke, the responsibility of selfhood and the ability define it for
oneself are innate. He asserted that,
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes ever
one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a
rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to
any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now
reflects on it, that that Action was done. (2.335.21-8)
Charles Taylor characterizes such philosophical understandings of the eighteenth-century self as
an attempt to stabilize identity. He points to the philosophical construction of selfhood
articulated by John Locke late in the seventeenth century that allowed people, through the
rational thought and empirical disengagement, to engage in a “radical disengagement [that]
opens the prospect of self-remaking,” a self that Taylor dubs the “‘punctual’ self” (171). The
4

Foucault suggests that modern individuality is at odds with the commonwealth individuality, “the distillation of a
single will—a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty—from the particular wills of a
multiplicity of individuals” that Thomas Hobbes outlines in the Leviathan ( “Lectures” 97). Instead, the “individual
is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, or precisely to the
extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation” (Foucault, “Lectures” 98).
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empirical commitments of the rhetorical situation characterized by an unstable selfhood
demanded a more objectified and classifiable representation of the self. For Taylor, the punctual
self was situated to “practise a kind of radical reflexivity . . . [which would] fix experience in
order to deprive it of its power, a source of bewitchment and error” (163). It was a self that could
self-evaluate and self-correct its imperfections. The notion of the punctual self opens the
possibility of self perfection, through a disengaged self-consciousness: Taylor argues that “[t]he
perfectly detachable consciousness is an illusion . . . but it is a shadow cast by the punctual self”
(172). The biographical form circumvents readers’ fundamental inability to fully detach their
consciousness and self-reflexively reconstruct themselves by giving them the illusion of another
consciousness brought into full view. Dynamic readers could view a static selfhood in the
rhetorical project of biography and instruct themselves from the perspective of the “shadow cast
by the punctual self,” which is only possible through the self-reflexive detachment that Locke
believed to be innate. New philosophical models for self-examination such as Locke’s were just
as emergent, developmental, and unperfected as the biographical form. Yet for a society
understanding and mediating itself through print more than any previous period, the autodidactic
potential of biography within this philosophical context allowed readers to discern and adopt
these lessons they found in the print selves that biography presented.

Private Readers, Social Subjects
The didactic advantage of eighteenth-century biography was how it positioned the reader
in relation to the biographical subject. Translator Henry Gally asserted that “[e]ach Man contains
a little World within himself, and every Heart is a new World. We cannot therefore attain to a
perfect Knowledge of human Nature, by studying others or our selves alone, but by studying
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both” (32). In Gally’s construction, selfhood is expansive, a “world” large enough to contain a
personal “knowledge of human nature” observation and self-reflexivity. Biography offers a
means of studying others to understand personal selfhood better. Gally seems to prefer such
means over social interaction. He argues that didactic studies of selfhood—for him, character
writing—is “the most agreeable, most instructive Entertainment that can possibly be desir’d; [to]
transport . . . [the reader] with the greatest Ease imaginable, from the solitude of his Chamber to
places of the greatest Concourse; there to see and learn the Virtues of men; there to see and shun
their Vices, without being corrupted by the Contagion of a real Commerce” (Gally 33). Unlike
actual sociality, modern biography guaranteed good company; unlike the novel, it did not
encourage readers to identify with unethical characters that were often necessary to complicate
the plot; and unlike Puritan or evangelical autobiography, it did not seek religious conversion. A
rhetoric of self could locate the private details of a person’s life within an established, characterbased framework for public understandings of virtue and vice, with all the advantages of
observing a living person and none of the danger of “corruption.”
Reading the didactic rhetoric of self becomes a social engagement, a communication
between the person as print and the almost voyeuristic reader hungry for intimate details. But,
together, the effect of the intimate print person on the empirical, sympathetic reader is didactic.
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith describes such communication between living
people as a “fellow feeling,” in which one person is moved to sympathize with another by
substituting his or her own feelings to construct an imagined understanding of the other person’s
situation and feelings (10). Sympathy, as a product of the imagination, can only be elicited by
observing other people, empirically, to understand their situation, experiences, and feelings. The
observer or spectator is guided by “principles” characteristic of human “nature, which interest
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him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith, Theory 9). Smith’s theory of moral
sentiments hinges on a spectator witnessing first-hand the suffering or success of another,
identifying with that other person’s opinions or sentiments and, in the process, coming to
espouse them: “[t]o approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt
them is approve of them” (Smith, Theory 17). Biography authenticates this experience as real, a
textual version of “first-hand” that readers observe like witnessing a living person, which is
distinct from the novel’s imagined experiences. The rhetorical arrangement of these first-hand
facts also brings them into clearer, more comprehensive view, so that a reader might consider the
rhetoric of self more sympathetically than a living person.
But a good reader, situated to approve and adopt the sentiments of others, must assume
an objective understanding of their own spectatorial self, the punctual self that enables a rational
comparison and critique. This self-objectification allows the spectator to identify the traits for
evaluating others: “[e]very faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like
faculty in another” (Smith, Theory 19). It is a self-reflexive sensibility informed by set of moral
standards—Smith gestures to the Golden Rule and Christian charity without naming them
explicitly (Theory 25)—that ultimately places the responsibility for virtuous behavior on a
spectator who can judge the vices and virtues of others. The spectator is trained to choose right
social behavior by observation, imagination, and reflection on the propriety of another’s
behavior. Evaluating the social practices of another self in a biographical format provided
practical standards readers could use to reflect on and correct themselves. Walter Ong argues that
every author writes for an “audience [that] is a fiction,” which requires the “author to imagine an
audience cast in some sort of role,” and the audience must correspondingly “fictionalize itself . . .

16

to play the role in which the author has cast” it (Interfaces 60-1). The rhetorical situation of an
eighteenth century biography required a rhetoric of self that invited the reader to cast an “I” in
relation to representation of the biographical “I”; the fictional role in which biographers cast their
audience was that of friend or acquaintance to the person whose life they arranged
biographically. The biographical form made it possible for eighteenth-century readers to
fictionalize a spectatorial relationship between themselves and biographical subjects safely, as
Gally would assert, so that they could recognize and adopt the moral tropes embodied there.
Engaging the didacticism of a biographical print self obligates readers to apply their
private self-improvement to their social practices. Walter J. Ong has observed these obligations
in all writing, arguing that print closes off human consciousness by situating readers in relation
to text and away from other readers (Interfaces 305).5 Ong suggests that the effect of this
interaction between the audience and the material object makes it an agent of change: “print
encouraged human beings to think of their own interior conscious and unconscious resources as
more and more thing-like . . . Print encouraged the mind to sense that its possessions were held
in some sort of inert mental space,” and it implies a finality “suggesting [a] self-containment
[that] encloses thought” (Orality 132). Although print has an alienating effect, it functions by
regularizing knowledge and has, thus, a profoundly unifying effect, too (Orality 82). The
selfhood a reader meets in a biography is a selfhood that other readers meet as well. The personal
interaction between reader and print thus becomes a social interaction in its repeatability. Ong
argues that print structures a “[h]uman consciousness [that] is open closure,” a consciousness
5

Ong cites numerous examples from the eighteenth century to emphasize this point. As opposed to a live audience
responsive to the rhetoric of a live rhetorician, “[t]he reader, using his eyes to assimilate a text, is essentially a
spectator, outside the action, however interested. His reaction to one page has no effect on what appears on the next.
Inviting readers to fill in blank pages, as in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy . . . essentially alters nothing: what the author
has written, he has written. The live audience is not so necessarily passive” (Interfaces 222). The responsive reader
is an active agent who can make choices within the context of cultural practices that the embodied biographical
selfhood presents.
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that separates readers while opening them to the ideas conveyed in print, rendering it into the “‘I’
[that] interfaces with everything” (Interfaces 337). Print and the biographical rhetoric of self in
particular play a crucial role in mediating a sense of self, a self-contained “I” and a sense of that
“I” in relation to others in a manner particularly amenable to understandings of self and
sensibility in the eighteenth century.
Some theorists link the development of print culture in the eighteenth century to social
shifts that defined eighteenth-century publics, since the larger society is comprised of individual
readers. Benedict Anderson attributes two effects of print culture to the development of a society
in which readers imagined themselves united as a public community. He notes that newspapers
and novels in particular created a sense of both “temporal coincidence,” simultaneity of
happening events (24), and a “social organism” acting within this simultaneity (26). From this
perspective, eighteenth-century print culture and especially “print capitalism . . . made it possible
for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, to relate themselves to others,
in profoundly new ways” (Anderson 36). Similarly, Jürgen Habermas credited print with
mediating a “rational-critical debate” which initiated a “public sphere” from the republic of
letters: “by communicating with itself, [the public sphere] attained clarity about itself” (51). Like
Anderson, Habermas gave particular attention to novels and newspapers, but Habermas linked
the significance of print to its effect on material culture at large, citing in particular the role of
Addison and Steele’s Spectator papers in shaping the site of public self-construction, the
eighteenth-century coffee house (58-9). Habermas more deliberately theorizes the role of the
individual participant within a public made possible by print culture, arguing that it “was based
on the fictitious identity of . . . privatized individuals who came together to form a public . . .
[which] usually combined the characteristic attributes of ownership and education” (56). These
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private participants came to imagine themselves as a public, however fictitious the identity it
adopted for itself.6
The distinction between the imagined “I” of the reader, the fictitious identity that the
author projected and the reader adopted, and the imagined public of a reading community does
not necessarily lend themselves to an easy participation for all, as the religious and political rifts
of the seventeenth century illustrated. A personal notion of self can easily be at odds with
oppositional notions. Johnson biographically invited his readers to broach this issue in his life of
Addison. Addison, whose Spectator papers were an attempt to answer the questions posed by the
seventeenth century with a new social civility, acted as secretary to the newly appointed lord
lieutenant of Ireland, a man whose attitudes and opinions Johnson describes as diametrically
opposed to Addison’s own. In this conflict, Johnson demonstrates a place for social authority,
however repugnant to the private person, and for individual ideas of selfhood: “[i]t is not
necessary to refuse benefits from a bad man, when the acceptance implies no approbation of his
crimes; nor has the subordinate officer any obligation to examine the opinions or conduct of
those under whom he acts, except that he may not be made the instrument of wickedness” (Lives
XXII.609). Johnson’s overt commentary argues that differences between public authority and
private conscience are not fundamentally irreconcilable; authority that does not require
“wickedness” or an “approbation of crimes” from the private person does not violate the private
person’s selfhood. Addison’s life, as the rhetoric of self Johnson arranges, illustrates biography’s
“power to define how a person, a nation and its history will be judged, to contribute to
6

Likewise, Adam Smith recognizes in both the historical and biographical forms stylistic attributes with didactic
implications. Smith makes no particular mention of biography as a form, suggesting that historical writing entirely
encompasses it. Historical writing, for Smith, implies a sort of biographical stylistics, but ultimately, “[t]he design of
history . . . is to state the remarkable transactions that pass in different nations, and the designs, motions, and views
of the most remarkable men of those times, so far as they are necessary to explain the great changes and revolutions
of states” (Lectures 59). The general didactic effect is to train an audience to act within the larger movements of the
state, to participate responsibly in a general, social rhetorical situation.
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maintaining, revising, or shaking its self-image” (Backscheider 227-8). The biography of
Addison embodies the social concerns that Johnson writes on it and didactically invites readers
to discover.
The rhetoric of self produces meaning in the absence of a self’s lived experiences by
substituting text for life, a principle often evident in the very titles of eighteenth-century
biographies. Johnson rendered the experiences of a Dutch scientist into “The Life of Herman
Boerhaave”; Goldsmith substituted a rhetoric of self for Beau Nash in The Life of Richard Nash,
and Boswell’s biography of Johnson stands in for the man as The Life of Johnson. Text becomes
life in eighteenth-century biography, and the biographical experience is didactic, engaging
another selfhood personally at a reader’s private leisure. Since biographical writing substitutes
the facts of a life for the immediacy of a lived experience, they become the embodied print
practices of selfhood that allow for sociability that can shape personal selfhood and stabilize
society’s larger self-fashioning.

Chapter Outline
Chapter 1
This chapter focuses on Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society and John Locke’s
Inquiry into Human Understanding to examine the role of science in situating a model for
stabilizing selfhood. I argue that the rise of the new inductive science within the
institutionalization of the Royal Society and Locke’s influential theory of the self is a point of
emergence for the eighteenth-century model of selfhood and biographical representation. This
scientific context was dominated by an inductive scientific practice that privileged cycles of
experimentation, observation, and documentation. It was the model that Thomas Sprat and, to
20

varying degrees, the members of the newly inaugurated Royal Society endorsed. This inductive
epistemology depended on cyclical observations to generate facts from which scientific truths
could be induced, tested and observed, and revised. Epistemologically, when the significance of
observation is applied to the self, a reasoning person develops through a reflexive selfconsciousness, becoming a spectating self-observer who, as a consequence of observing multiple
details and facts, generates a distinctive selfhood, as Locke postulated. The emergent biography
itself also put the person in view, like a print experiment in selfhood, and developed a rhetoric of
self that would allow readers to induce selfhood from the facts the biographer presents. The
principles are evident in Roger North’s theory of biography. Although it went unpublished until
the nineteenth century, North’s model of life writing suggests the influence of the period’s
scientific theories. North, Sprat, the Royal Society, and Locke are at the center of the new
science; their models of understanding allowed the biographer to create choices for the reader,
rhetorical effects that would come to shape selfhood and self-awareness.

Chapter 2
This chapter focuses on two biographical selfhoods, Johnson’s treatments of Richard
Savage and Goldsmith’s biography of Richard Nash. Both biographers make particular appeals
to logos, locating the materials for a life and arranging them in a compelling fashion, that mark
advances in the form, which appeal to pathos, exciting readers’ sympathies in turn. I argue that
their development in the context of eighteenth-century print culture advanced a new ethics of
reading for the biographical form that forces readers observe the print self and make active
choices for understanding it, like scientists, observing and drawing conclusions from the details
they see. Eighteenth-century biographers discovered the details for the lives they wrote from
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sources that were credited by public assent. These biographers arrange the rhetoric of self by
locating contrasts and contrarieties that create tensions within the character, which could only be
resolved by the reader’s sympathies. Readers could observe those rhetorics of self as living
people and learn by reconciling what they saw with what they could conclude. The didactic
effect of such conclusions identifies and defines right social action for the reader and the larger
community of readers. Their role as readers was to play the acquaintance of the biographical
selves they read.

Chapter 3
This chapter explores the role of the ethos in establishing an intimate rhetoric of self with
specific attention to the ethos James Boswell fashions for himself in order to write the Life of
Johnson. By developing the importance of the biographical ethos, Boswell will make a more
compelling, sympathetic biographical appeal with greater didactic potential for readers. The
intimate understanding of Johnson that Boswell demonstrates is singular in its scope and
development throughout this emergent period in biography’s formation. Building a credible
ethos to play biographer to the great Samuel Johnson was more important to Boswell than to
earlier biographers because Boswell understood that his claim would be more contested by
Johnson’s other friends and authors, the profusion of the Grub Street hacks and periodical
writers, and a reading public with set expectations established through public familiarity. By
proving himself as a biographer and journalist, Boswell could play interlocutor to Johnson and
translate his selfhood to a wide range of readers. By establishing an ethos whose biographical
undertaking would be apropos, Boswell situated himself to arrange Johnson’s selfhood
rhetorically within it history and character, but most importantly, Boswell’s ethos made possible
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his most unique contribution to the canon of eighteenth-century biography: an approach that put
the audience directly in conversation with the rhetoric of self and established a more intimate
relationship. Boswell’s ethos would come to arrange a rhetoric of self that would locate Johnson
in print and experience, but it would also bend these eighteenth-century biographical patterns to
deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic reader to view Johnson’s print life
ethically, making a spectacle of a rhetorical selfhood that invited all readers to learn about
sociability and values from the Life of Johnson.

Chapter 4
The rhetoric of self that James Boswell writes for Samuel Johnson builds on earlier
strengths of eighteenth-century biographical models. Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of
print and manuscript culture to arrange the experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood
bound in time against specific characteristics that transcend the moments of Johnson’s life,
connecting them all. But ultimately Boswell sought to exhibit Johnson’s lived experience and his
character in his conversation, through which he strove to “Johnsonise the land.” As a biographer,
Boswell meditates Johnson’s selfhood. Observing this selfhood, the reader participates in
conversations with Johnson and his circle to engage Johnson’s selfhood actively. The larger
consequence of this intimate biography is a larger social shift in which readers will not just talk
Johnson, but also “think Johnson.” Conversation informs social intercourse, but shapes the
discursive practices of the larger society. The reader who comes to talk and think Johnson by
meeting the man in print recognizes him over the course of his life within an intimate rhetoric of
self and understanding Johnson by discerning his character from a matrix of experiences, events,
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and especially conversations. In the conversational locus, Johnson’s selfhood is less a thing to be
observed than it is a presence, a person, a more intimate biographical subject than any prior.
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Chapter 1—Situating the Self:
The Emergence of the New Science and the Rhetorics of Self

The set of practices of selfhood which came to define biography for the eighteenth
century developed from a conceptual foundation in the larger civil and religious anxieties of the
seventeenth century. A king could be executed, a commonwealth instituted, and monarchy
ultimately restored, but succeeding to what? Which Christianity would be sanctioned as a state
church to reform and persecute aberrant dogmatics? Warring views of state authority and
sparring sectarian factions essentially became identities in conflict—Roundheads versus
Cavaliers, the Presbyter, the Puritan, the Papist—types that vied for primacy as normative
models for the religious and governmental practices they would impose on other selves.7 The
fights between proponents of different ideologies ranged from the Midlands battlefields to the
streets of London, Parliament, the court, and across the printed page. A robust and often virulent
print culture exacerbated these conflicts in polemic that shaped the clashing ideologies and their
corresponding identities with bombast and florid, impassioned rhetoric.
During the mid-1640s, in the midst of these struggles, another model for selfhood
gradually emerged from secret meetings at Oxford, in Gresham College. The men who met there
identified themselves as natural philosophers, a community of scientists who came to imagine
7

I use the term “identity” narrowly here to signify the distinctions that different groups established to distinguish
themselves and their particular political or religious ideological perspective from other groups. My use follows Dror
Wahrman’s explanation of identity the Preface of The Making of the Modern Self as a “productive tension between
two contradictory impulses” (xii). It is a balance between identity understood as the “unique individuality of a
person” and, especially, “a common denominator that places an individual within a group (as in ‘identity politics’),”
whereby “identity is the obverse or erasure of difference: it is what allows me to ignore particular differences as I
recognize myself in a collective grouping” (xii). Identities like Roundhead and Cavalier, by broad strokes, gave
continuity to groups as diverse as Catholics, moderate constitutionalists, and soldiers, in the case of royalist
Cavaliers; the Roundhead comprised groups that challenged monarchy such as the Puritans and Republicans. As
direct identification with the “collective groupings” in Civil Wars and Restoration, the “common” ideological
“denominators” overrode the markers of unique selfhoods. These markers came to the fore in the emergence of
eighteenth-century biography, which sought to push past these broad identities into a specific, intimate selfhood.
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themselves and their practices as, not only an alternative to the anxieties of the seventeenth
century, but as a remedy to them. These men met secretly to develop a new scientific model;
they proposed various experiments and, by way of demonstration, related their findings to the
scrutiny and discussion of the group. The first historian of the Royal Society, Thomas Sprat,
records some of these varied, early scientific investigations, like Dr. Goddard’s “Experiments of
a Stone called Oculus Mundi,” Lord Brouncker’s “Experiments of the Weight of Bodies
increased in the FIRE: Made at the Tower,” and Sir William Petty’s “Apparatus to the History of
the Common Practices of Dying” (228-231, 284-306). 8 Sprat proposes these practices, the
gatherings and their scientific bent, as a direct answer to the civil and political uproar of the
period: “[f]or such a candid, and unpassionate company, as that was, and for such a gloomy
season, what could have been a fitter subject to pitch upon, then Natural Philosophy?” (55). The
“candid and unpassionate” character of the private scientist steadied the disquiet that dogged the
public, at least for the small group of men engaged in scientific inquiry: “[t]o have been always
tossing about some Theological question, would have been, to have made that their private
diversion, the excess of which they themselves dislik’d in publick: To have been eternally
musing on Civil business, and the distresses of their Country, was too melancholy a reflexion: It
was Nature alone, which could pleasantly entertain them, in that estate” (55-6). The focus of the
private scientist on “Nature alone,” even on matters as seemingly mundane as dying cloth or the
increased mass of heated matter, offered to refocus seventeenth-century England from the
“melancholy distresses” of the period and balance the “excesses” of theological discussion or

8

Goddard’s experiments tested physical properties to gauge whether correspond with a occulis mundi or opal: he
weighed the stone dry and wet, after soaking in cold or boiling to record changes in weight, since it he observed that
it “became transparent” wet (Sprat 230). His scientific report is less a modern report of scientific findings that draws
conclusions than a narrative of the events he witnessed as he tested the weight of the opal in heat and water.
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political warfare because these scientific endeavors held the possibility of neutrality and clarity
(Sprat 56).9
Diverting attention from the turmoil that dominated the politics, religion, and print
culture of the mid-century Civil Wars toward a scientific methodology substituted the practices
of the new scientist for the identity of the Royalist or Republican. The shift redefined how
selfhood could be identified and examined. A scientific methodology promised to define a
standard for selfhood with the potential to refocus the infighting of opposing groups on natural
philosophy: since “contemplation . . . Focused on the natural world and natural philosophy,
draws our minds off from past, or present misfortunes, and makes them conquerers over things,
in the greatest publick unhappiness,” the private scientist could better endure the conflicts in
identity and ideology of the period (Sprat 56). Sprat asserts, moreover, that the development of
this scientific identity and its focus on nature could accommodate and thereby resolve the
divisions that had set other ideological identities at war during the period: “while the
consideration of Men, and humane affairs, may affect us, with a thousand various disquiets; that
[inquiry into the natural world] never separates us into mortal Factions; that gives us room to
differ, without animosity; and permits us, to raise contrary imaginations upon it, without any
danger of Civil War” (56). For Sprat, the shift away from larger, divisive, warring public

9

The move toward regularity had implications beyond the Society—its practices had stakes in establishing a social
and worldview. Michael Hunter has argued that the Society itself was not uniform in its opinions or practices, but
through a common experimental goal, achieved some degree of unification that held promise for English society
(41). J. Ereck Jarvis has argued that Sprat’s vision of uniform practices for the Society matched his goals for the
Royal Society’s role in English society, that Sprat and his History sought a create a stabilizing social authority: he
“forwards a discursive model for the blending of civility, philosophy, and publication,” which was bound to print
culture for “mediating an authority that moves through yet exists beyond print, an authority manifest in social
process” (69). William Bynum notes that, beyond the implications for the Society and society at large, the Isaac
Newton’s own laws of the motion reflect Sprat’s earlier commitment to uniformity in a regularized model of the
universe: one Newton’s contemporary physicists “used Newton’s laws of motion and his mathematical laws to show
that the things one could see in the sky could be understood . . . and predicted with accuracy . . . such that the whole
universe really did work like a well-made clock, and that it kept perfect time” (105-6).
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identities is a move toward a more particular notion of selfhood, in which markers of a unique
identity come into focus.
To adopt the scientific identity, Sprat argues, the scientist must “first know himself” (33).
Sprat pointedly illustrates this shift with the example of a politician, who cannot be successful
simply by grasping legal and political ideologies as an “expert in the Nature of Government, and
Laws, Obedience, and Rebellion, Peace, and War,” but rather through a more thorough, intimate
understanding of selfhood and “sagacity of judgement in particular things: a dexterity in
discerning the advantages of occasions: a study of the humor, and interest of the people he is to
govern” (17). If the politician, the most ready embodiment of the identity associated with the
Civil Wars and Restoration, can be improved by “sagacity” and a scientific “study” of the
particular, then scientific method might also be applied to the study of selfhood in ways that
could alleviate the violent ideological clash of identities of the middle and late seventeenth
century. If examining selfhood could make individuals aware of their own and of others’
differences, then they might begin to prove manageable.
This promise to accommodate difference without division was the goal of a private group
of scholars secluded from the public arena where ideological identities had struggled viciously
for control. Their practices emerged through the establishment of the Royal Society. When
Charles II, who heralded himself as the Society’s founder, chartered this group of scholars as the
Royal Society 1662 and renewed the charter a year later, the informal, empirical model of private
scientists became the basis for the formal methodology ultimately espoused by the Royal
Society. While the seeming decidedness of a royal charter might suggest a fixing of policy and
standardization of scientific inquiry, these earliest, emergent stages allowed the Society a more
nebulous, nominal authority to research and elaborate its epistemology. Michael Hunter argues
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that the establishment of the Royal Society institutionalized practices that came to define the
dictates of modern science, despite its initial variability (40-1).10 While the establishment of the
Society purportedly offered an answer to the discordant political and religious questions posed
heatedly in war and print and while it sought to correct the vicious rhetorical trends that
opponents wielded to characterize each other, it was still, however, marked by dissent within its
scientific community. Resolving these differences became one of the Society’s strengths, just as
the institutionalization of its epistemology and the identity of the scientist inaugurated a new way
of understanding selfhood and the rhetorical means for expressing it. The royal charter might
have authorized the new scientific epistemology, but it by no means regularized the variable
practices that would come to be the official methodology of the Royal Society. 11 Michael Hunter
points out, for instance, Society member Henry Oldenburg, for instance, distrusted the
experimental model that Sprat endorsed because of its diffusive tendency to develop new
experiments to explore experimental discrepancies—Oldenburg believed that, without some
10

Sprat’s history of the fledgling Royal Society functioned officially to situate the its inductive methodology among
vying scientific paradigms. It is a foundational text that presumed to delineate scientific tenets which were not yet
standardized among Society members. Sprat’s official history represents the members of the Society practicing a
uniform, inductive method of inquiry. In his history of the Society’s inception, Hunter stresses that to “presume
undue unanimity among” the members of the Royal Society is a mistake, noting that “this is the case with their
views on political and religious issues . . . underlined by the disparate affiliations of the Society’s founders and their
stress on how their enterprise might transcend such differences” (28). The “transcendent” promise the new scientific
paradigm offered, that a model of inquiry could allow disparate views to cohere, suggests a stability that is at odds
with its emergent methodology. Brian Vickers alludes to the competing methodologies from which the Society
grew: the “Royal Society, although mostly admirable, was the establishment organization for science; that did not
represent all the valuable work taking place in England . . . and that its own achievements were, and were seen by its
own members to be, variable, and in some areas disappointing. It represents one view, not necessarily the right one”
(3-4). When I reference the epistemology, methodology, or empiricism of the Royal Society, I refer to Sprat’s
representation of the Royal Society as a institution with institutional practices, even though the standardization of
these practices was itself emerging within the Society.
11
While the variability of opinion on scientific practice and discourse among the early members of the Society
might undermine the very principle of accommodation that Sprat praises in the Society’s new scientific model,
Hunter interprets it as an effort at self-propagation: “the Society’s organisers were anxious to spell out the broader
implications of what they were doing because of a genuine—if naïve—belief that the enterprise of the Royal Society
was innocuous and reconciling, and that, if this were expounded, the suspicions that people harboured towards it
could be swiftly overcome and many other enrolled in support of a worthwhile activity in which the Society’s
members often felt themselves embattled pioneers” (48). In this reading, the institutionalization of the Society was
an attempt to demonstrate the reliability of the Society’s practices; more importantly, it was an attempt to convert
others to the scientific understanding and means for making knowledge espoused by the natural philosophers in the
Royal Society. The argument for accommodation, then, is an argument for dissemination and incorporation.
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ordering principle, there could be no system of knowledge that experiment discovered; there
would be little Church influence (56-7, 68-9).
In this chapter, I will examine how this identity of the new scientist reshaped the
questions of identity raised by political and religious ideology in the Restoration and made the
emergence of the Royal Society possible. The identity of the scientist promised to mend the
dissent among differing ideologies and, thus, promised social progress, which depended on
personal, moral improvement. I argue that the identity of the Restoration scientist, which was
bound up in a shift from a deductive to an inductive epistemology, fundamentally altered the
ways selfhood would be determined and represented rhetorically, as well as the didactic effects
of these representations. The emergence of this new scientific context made possible the
emergence of a biographical form different from earlier modes of life writing. This emergent
form embodies a rhetoric of self that links the new scientific epistemology to its corresponding
rhetoric to represent selfhood biographically. I focus on two seminal works grounded in the new
science of the Royal Society, which mark the paradigm shift from a deductive to inductive
epistemology: Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society and John Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. Both Sprat and Locke were members of the Royal Society in the
seventeenth century. While their works were not in direct conversation, their application of the
new science to methods for general inquiry and inquiry into the self certainly were. Sprat’s and
Locke’s account of the Society’s practical foundation and the epistemological justification for its
methodology frame the emergence of new fields for inquiry into the natural world at large, in the
case of Sprat, and into self-conceptualization and selfhood in particular, in the case of Locke.
They are, consequently, vital to the emergence of biography in the eighteenth century, both as a
means of inquiry and as a literary form for representing what is found.
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I argue that Sprat’s History, which is more of an apologetic than an actual history of the
Society, challenges extant methodologies for understanding, as well as the means for
communicating that understanding. The refinement of the Society’s scientific procedures that
Sprat outlines had an influence on seventeenth-century life writing, but these procedures had
direct application for the emergence of eighteenth-century biography and its own approaches to
researching, obtaining, and interpreting the information that constituted biography. More
specifically, Locke advances an epistemology that narrows Sprat’s focus from an institutional
program to the understanding of a single person. I argue that the relationship between selfunderstanding and selfhood that Locke theorizes offers a conceptual framework that gives
continuity and coherence to biographical organization. Just as importantly, Sprat and Locke
propose particular rhetorical approaches for communicating scientific findings and facilitating
self-understanding that emphasize clarity, straightforwardness, and transparency—scientific and
rhetorical attributes crucial for organizing an accurate, biographical rhetoric of self. The
methodological and rhetorical considerations that Locke and Sprat address are complementary
parts of an epistemology emerging in the late seventeenth that, by the eighteenth century, would
shape modern biography.
To argue the relationship between scientific inquiry, its rhetoric, and eighteenth-century
biography, I will locate the effects of Sprat’s conceptual modeling in the biographical theory of
Roger North’s General Preface and Locke’s epistemological theorizing in the identity of Joseph
Addison’s and Richard Steele’s Mr. Spectator. While their Spectator is not biographical, the
identity of the scientist stands in through its periodical persona, “Mr. Spectator,” who evaluates
aesthetic considerations and arbitrates taste in order to guide readers toward their own moral
improvement. This transference from science to taste suggests that the Royal Society had great
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hopes for the implications of its theory, the potential, adaptable fluidity of the Restoration
scientist’s identity: as the scholars at Gresham College and the members of the Royal Society
hoped, the identity could shape social concerns beyond a strictly scientific purview. In the final
section of this chapter, I argue that the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive science not
only shaped North’s biographical theorizing and Addison and Steele’s periodical persona.12

Emergence and Shift: Scientific Epistemologies and Their Rhetorics
In his study of the emerging science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Peter
Dear draws a connection between the epistemology of the new science and its rhetorical
expression. He argues that “the Scientific Revolution was . . . a matter of a cognitive shift rather
than the simple acquisition of new information that demanded new theoretical frameworks to
accommodate it,” an epistemological shift that is evident in the need “to identify a technical
practice as new rather than as an unimportant variable variant upon an old practice” which
“requires particular conceptual and cognitive expectations on the part of the knower” (Discipline
12). To recognize a new set of practices for making knowledge is to acknowledge a new set of
“expectations” for what can be known and how it is constructed. His argument echoes Thomas
Kuhn’s classic conceptualization of shifts in scientific epistemology. In The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn postulates that a paradigm gives a theoretical structure to normal
practice in the sciences: a paradigm determines how knowledge is to be made, “the problems that
can be solved” and the “instrumental and conceptual techniques” for solving them (96), and it
also prescribes a rhetorical means for discussing what is found, a particular “esoteric vocabulary”
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These principles would lay a foundation for the didactic and biographical strategies of prominent eighteenthcentury biographers Samuel Johnson, Oliver Goldsmith, and James Boswell.

32

unique to the conceptual obligations of the paradigm (64). Kuhn’s argument essentially defines
the paradigmatic as what can be known and how it can be expressed.
Kuhn’s account largely limits the rhetorical change in paradigm shifts to an
“incommensurability of standards” about the “vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and
manipulative,” so that old and new paradigms cannot properly speak to one another (149). 13
Dear, likewise, argues that larger changes in narrative, “scientific literary practice,” are
necessary to report new knowledge in the larger context of a new epistemology (“Narratives”
135). These epistemological shifts and their corresponding rhetorics move from an emphasis on
the generalized principles that can be deduced, in the geometrical pattern of a syllogism, for
instance, to an inductive emphasis on particulars that only offer insight corporately, induced
from accumulation of details rather than deduced from a single example. In essence, deduction
moves from the generalize major premise to the specific minor premises as a means of affirming
the major premise; induction moves from the specific, experimental details to the general
principle. The standards that the Society’s natural scientists sought to institute mark a significant,
epistemological shift away from classical models of logic as a means for scientific inquiry. It is a
move from Aristotle’s syllogistic model of deduction and Cicero’s rhetorical theory, toward a
more inductive, empiricist paradigm that emerged through the models for scientific inquiry. As
philosophers on the cusp of the new science, René Descartes and Francis Bacon illustrate the
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Stanley Fish reads Kuhn’s theory as a conceptualization of discursive practice rather than scientific advancement.
He describes Kuhn’s argument not as purely scientific, but as “rhetorical through and through,” which points to
inextricable link between scientific practice and rhetorical representation (“Rhetoric” 486). In his reading, Kuhn’s
theories of normative practice have nothing to do with “the larger world of nature,” since “science does not proceed
by offering its descriptions to the independent judgment of nature; rather, it proceeds when the proponents of one
paradigm are able to present their case in a way that the adherents of other paradigms find compelling” (“Rhetoric”
487). By depending on the rhetorical ability of competing, synchronic claims to persuade those in opposition,
methodological practices are normalized by offering representations of facts that are “compelling” by design, that
persuade by offering credible claims. Fish regards the rhetorical of articulating scientific fact as important as the
techniques and apparatus used to construct the facts themselves. It is both the scientific knowledge and its
expression that make the paradigm creditable and its credibility that makes it normative.
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different epistemological poles between which the new science emerged, each accompanied by
rhetoric suitable to their epistemological ends. Descartes illustrates the older, deductive model,
while Francis Bacon advocates a new, inductive mode of inquiry.
Descartes’ methodology depended more on the classical, deductive methods in his
formulation of a scientific model based on his ideas of coordinate geometry, “which supposes the
problem is already solved, and examines the consequences of the supposition” (Russell 560). In
its structure, this epistemology is fundamentally Aristotelian, a deductive model based on the
enthymeme, in which the “problem already solved” guides inquiry: the task of science in this
deductive framework is simple demonstration14. Showing “the truth of fundamental statements,”
such demonstration reinforces overarching principles that are “simply accepted at the outset” of
an inquiry, like the established given of a geometric proof (Dear, “Narratives” 139). Enthymemic
argument applies a major premise, an accepted generalization or widely held belief, to a more
particular case. The conclusions this line argument draws, no matter how specific they are,
ultimately support the major premise. This method readily lent itself to medieval theological
arguments that sought to give proof to established ideas. Thomas Aquinas adopts Aristotelian
deduction in his Summa Theologica to prove and explore the fundamentally inexplicable nature
of the Christian God, the Trinity and angels. Rhetorically, this model arranges a scientific
inquiry syllogistically to verify what is already known and emphasizes the experiential expertise
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In discussing the distinction between rhetoric and logic in the eighteenth century, Howell cites an illustrative
example of the distinction eighteenth-century authors drew between deduction and induction from Thomas Reid’s
“A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic. With Remarks”: “The art of syllogism produced numberless disputes, and
numberless sects, who fought against each other with much animosity, without gaining or losing ground; but did
nothing considerable for the benefit of human life. The art of induction, first delineated by Lord Bacon, produced
numberless laboratories and observatories, in which Nature has been put to the question by thousands of
experiments, and forced to confess many of her secrets, which before were hid from mortals. And by these, arts have
been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully increased” (Eighteenth-Century 258). Drawing a comparison
between syllogistic logic and inductive science can prove challenging, as Reid’s comments indicate—deductive,
after all, is not understood today, after the advent of induction, to be any more scientific that Aristotelian science and
the importance it ascribes to an elemental theory.
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of the scientist that, as a given, is articulated by experimental records: what the expert scientist
knew from the outset is confirmed by the conclusion (Dear, “Narratives” 160). The rhetoric
follows the epistemological constraints of the deductive paradigm, a largely circular argument
for proving and demonstrating what is already known.
Within an epistemological and rhetorical context dominated by Aristotelian deduction,
life writing was organized around an overarching principle, a definitive attribute that the life
writer would locate in all the instances of a life. It was the given, the major premise, that the
experiences of the life would demonstrate and reinforce. In his Parallel Lives, for instance,
Plutarch represents men of ancient Greece and Rome comparatively in light of a particular virtue
or moral failing. Izaak Walton’s seventeenth-century account of John Donne, similarly,
represents Donne as a holy sermon writer rather than a secular poet. Walton’s introduction notes
that Donne’s “glorious spirit . . . is in Heaven” and promises to relate “those Vertues that were
but sparks upon Earth, [which have] become great and glorious flames in Heaven” (21-2).
Walton’s life writing borders on panegyric, but his approach is germane to his original purpose:
“when Doctor Donn’s Sermons were first printed, this [their printing] was then my excuse for
daring to write his life; and, I dare not now appear without it” (22). Walton’s account framed
Donne’s sermons as the holy works of a devout Christian man, works that reflected Donne’s life.
Walton’s life writing begins with the assumption of Donne’s devotion and piety and
demonstrates this overarching trait through the most of Donne’s experiences. Walton’s method
has the same reductive quality that equates religious ideology with identity that characterized the
crises of ideology during the Civil Wars, but also follows a pattern like the Aristotelian
enthymeme, both epistemologically and rhetorically.

35

The paradigmatic shift from Cartesian deduction to Baconian induction depended much
more heavily on organizing multiple, sometimes contrary, pieces of information and
experimentation other natural philosophers could replicate in order to derive specific principles.
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer describe, for instance, how important the collection of data
was in proving Robert Boyle’s law of pressure—while other experimenters could not reproduce
his results with the apparatus of his air-pump, they confirmed the findings through apparatuses of
their own design (281). As a precursor to the Royal Society’s practices, Bacon’s scientific model
privileged particularity over Aristotelian generality. Bacon’s inductive model formulated more
thorough conclusions that followed facts rather than major or minor premises: through his
method, Bacon sought “to arrive at general laws, having, in the first instance, the lowest degree
of generality. From a number of such laws he hoped to reach laws of the second degree of
generality and so on” (Russell 543). Bacon’s extreme aversion to older models suggests an early
attempt in the emergence of a new epistemology to distinguish it from other, competing
epistemologies, but still underscores the emergent quality of the shift. In the case of the
experimental new science advanced by the Royal Society, experience and experiment require a
new rhetorical arrangement: any “account of an action is an inseparable part of its meaning, just
as the meaning of the account itself relies on its implicit referent . . . there cannot be an account
of an experimental event without reference to the spatiotemporally defined region, while the
spatiotemporally defined region cannot be an experimental event without its constitution as such
in the account” (Dear, “Narratives” 136-7). This arrangement reflects the Society’s practices for
constructing knowledge because it aimed at relaying “spatiotemporally defined” limitations of an
experiment. To relate an experiment is to relay time, place, and happening. More simply put, it is
to relay experience.
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The shift in epistemology was a shift in the accompanying rhetoric of the overall
paradigm from deductive to inductive reason. The rhetorical method that emerged alongside the
epistemology depended on “singular contrived events . . . as foundational elements in making
natural knowledge,” representing them “by detailing a historical episode” or “experimental
report—an example of the characteristically seventeenth-century genre of the event experiment”
(Dear, Discipline 13, 14, 15). The “event experiment” recorded a spatiotemporal event, so that
“experience increasingly took the form of statements describing specific events . . . The new
scientific experience of the seventeenth century established its legitimacy by rendering credible
its historical reports of events, often citing witnesses. The singular experience could not be
evident, but it could provide evidence” (Dear, Discipline 25). The rhetorical arrangement of the
“event experiment” made the new epistemology possible by providing a necessary conceptual
frame in which the experiment could unfold. Without the rhetorical component, the epistemology
would have been unimaginable and untenable: “formulating natural knowledge . . . means
investigating the literary constitution and function of experience in scientific argument, because
it is in texts that the knowledge is made” (Dear, “Narratives” 163). As the site where the new
inductive epistemology and its corresponding rhetoric met to make knowledge, these
experimental accounts offered a means for making new understandings and representations of
selfhood that reflect commitments to the new methodology.
From the outset, Sprat seeks to justify the methodology and its inductive epistemology. In
the “Advertisement to the Reader,” Sprat signals that his work is, of necessity, more than simply
a historic account, conceding that“[t]hough this Book does Treat of many Subjects that are not
Historical, yet I have presum’d to name the whole a History, because that was the main end of
my Design.” Sprat claims that the “Objections and Cavils” leveled against the new Royal Society
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made “it necessary for me [Sprat] to write of it, not altogether in the way of a plain History, but
sometimes of an Apology.” Sprat’s apologetics in the History act as formal defense of and
justification for the Royal Society by regularizing it as an institution with a set of definitive
practices and beliefs. His History explained the Royal Society’s inductive paradigm, its
epistemology and rhetoric, which was in the process of emerging during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to supplant the traditional model of deductive inquiry. Sprat sought to
institutionalize the epistemology of the new science; Locke, later, sought to individuate it in
order to conceptualize selfhood scientifically.

Instituting the New Scientific Epistemology: Sprat’s Apologetics
In the History of the Royal Society, Thomas Sprat ascribed an inductive epistemology and
methodology to the Royal Society five years after its official inception. Sprat’s apologetics
aimed to make the new inductive paradigm the most persuasive model for scientific inquiry,
which his attack on other paradigms clarifies. While he exhibits the Royal Society’s platform on
inductive reasoning and empirical understanding, Sprat sets the Society’s epistemology in
historiographical conversation with other approaches, treating the new inductive science as the
culmination and correction of earlier methodologies for scientific inquiry. Instituting a scientific
epistemology as the dominant paradigm involves the representation of previous scientific
epistemologies as a linear historical progression, at the head of which would be the Royal
Society (Kuhn 137).15 In this way, the new paradigm is justified as a culmination of and an
improvement on earlier methodologies (Kuhn 153-6). Sprat’s criticisms reveal the practices he
15

For Kuhn, this representation of an epistemology is accomplished through textbooks, since they are “pedagogic
vehicles for the perpetuation” of a dominant paradigm, and they must be “rewritten in whole or in part whenever the
language, problem-structure, or standards” of the new epistemology change (137). The link between epistemology
and rhetoric make a shift possible, as the shift from deductive science and the rhetoric committed to articulating its
inquiry to an inductive model demonstrates.
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seeks to institutionalize for the Society’s epistemology and rhetoric. He claims to argue against
the “prejudice remaining on many mens minds, towards any new Discoveries in Natural
Things,” an argument warranted by the “Age itself, wherein I [Sprat] write; which (if I mistake
not) is farr more prepar’d to be perswaded to promote such Studies, then any other time that has
gone before us” (4-5). The inductive epistemology for scientific inquiry is the result of a lineage
that, for Sprat, runs from the ancient Greeks and Romans, through the early Christian church and
the medieval Catholic Church and early modern Scholastics into the competing scientific models
of his contemporaries that are now trumped by the inductive model of the Royal Society’s
natural philosophers.
How Sprat distinguishes the Royal Society’s scientific practices and agenda from other
historical and contemporary models emphasizes the epistemological and rhetorical commitments
that make it unique.16 To establish the superiority of the Society’s research methodologies
against other ancient and the modern epistemologies for inquiry, Sprat’s History sets the
Society’s inductive approach against the then-popular, deductive means of inquiry espoused by
classical philosophers, the Greeks in particular, and medieval Scholasticism, particularly in the
context of the Catholic Church. Sprat aligns the method of inquiry employed by the ancient
Greeks between two poles, the individual philosopher and factions of philosophers. He criticizes
the divisiveness that developed around competing philosophical inquiries, noting that “at the
same time, some few men did continue an earnest, and laborious pursuit, after Natural causes,
16

As a part of his apologetics, Sprat uses his historiography to direct interpretations of the Royal Society’s practices
by reducing the complexity of earlier practices. Sprat takes on a deliberate, significant role in instutionalizing the
Royal Society and in normalizing its scientific epistemology and rhetoric in his representation of scientific history:
“[o]n the one hand, it refers to a practice, hence to a reality; on the other, it is a closed discourse, a text that
organizes and concludes a mode of intelligibility” (Certeau 21). The historical approach of Sprat’s apologetics is not
the final word on the practices of the Royal Society. As a “closed discourse” and institutional document, it
“organizes” and renders “intelligible” the emergent trends in how scientists or natural philosophers were coming to
view themselves in relation to the natural world and how they were articulating those positions. By establishing the
Royal Society as a consequence and correction of earlier models, Sprat establishes a set discursive context in which
other modes of discourse, like biography, can emerge and evolve.
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and effects . . . But these Philosophers, digging deap, out of the sight of men; and studying more,
how to conceive things aright, and persuade their conceptions, to others; were quickly almost
quite overwhelm’d, by the more plausible and Talkative Sects” (9). Sprat’s critique underscores
two problems with the deductive scientific methodology in order to recommend the inductive
method of the Royal Society as a credible, accurate means of inquiry. According to Sprat,
historical scientific study was limited in its focus on factions rather than an actual inquiry. It is a
critique that recalls Sprat’s distrust of social and religious factiousness during the Civil Wars; the
new scientific paradigm would naturally oppose these problems. In such a context, scientific
inquiry would be reduced to individual labor, Sprat’s first critique of the older, deductive model.
Such individual endeavors would be free of the disadvantages that attend corporate inquiry, like
factiousness, but it would also forego the advantages of collaboration, like accountability, which
is the second problem Sprat locates in the older model.
The first problem with classical scientific inquiry, as Sprat represents it, is this lack of
accountability: it was at best the work of lone individuals “digging deap, out of the sight of
men.” The obscurity of their methods made the findings of lone individuals vulnerable to the
larger context: one person lacks the intellectual or personal clout to redirect or even challenge the
philosophical disputations of the “more plausible and Talkative Sects.” Since singularity is
suspect in a larger culture of contending opinions, the Royal Society answered with a motto by
member John Evelyn and other fellows for the royal charting of the Society—nullius in verba,
which is usually translated as “take nobody’s word for it” (Hunter 17). By nature of its
singularity, the word of one person operating “out of the sight of men” is suspect. As a
methodology, inquiry not held accountable by other scientists risks undermining the import of
natural philosophy, which Sprat explains is “to make faithful Records, of all the Works of
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Nature” and “to inlarge it, from being confin’d to the custody of a few; or from servitude to
private interests” (61, 62). In his critique of the lone scientist or natural philosopher of ancient
Greece, Sprat makes clear a fundamental principle of the new inductive methodology that will
resonate through the emergence of the biographical form: knowledge about the natural world or,
derivatively, about a biographical understanding of selfhood cannot rest on the authority of one
person’s inquiry. The emerging empirical methodology of the Royal Society required multiple
proofs to credit scientific claims or to credential scientific understanding.
Seventeenth-century life writers also increasingly stressed the importance of arranging a
biographical selfhood with evidence of the life from multiple sources. Roger North, a
contemporary of Sprat and Locke, postulates a theory of life writing that, though it was not
published during his lifetime, bears the unmistakable stamp of the new inductive science.17 Peter
Millard notes that North “was an enthusiastic supporter of the empirical science which
transformed thinking the seventeenth century [which] is obvious in his writings,” and that he
“accepted the Baconian doctrine that all nature, man included, was suitable for objective study”
(20, 21). His comprehensive, empirical approach to selfhood has the tenor of the “Baconian
doctrine” he endorsed. Roger North demonstrates this emerging biographical practice in his own
writing. Although his account of his brothers depends largely on his personal perspective—what
he witnessed and experienced first-hand and what he can recall—he also recognizes the
limitations of this approach: life writers, “knowing no better, must take what they find” for their
“accounts of lives” (77). Unlike a public “state history [which] hath the assistance of public
17

As Peter Millard, editor of Roger North’s General Preface & Life of Dr John North, explains, Roger North’s son,
Montagu North heavily edited and published his father’s Life of Dr John North in the mid-eighteenth century, after
his father’s death (14). Therefore, determining when Roger North drafted his manuscripts is nearly impossible. The
theory of life writing Roger North expounds in his General Preface to those lives went “unpublished and virtually
unnoticed until 1962” (Millard 14). Roger North’s statement of biographical principles offers a unique insight to the
emergence of the biographical form, its epistemology for and rhetorics of self within the larger cultural context of
the new science.
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registers, records, pamphlets, gazettes, and often the memoirs of private persons,” the history of
a private life offers few venues for a life writer “to be informed of the course of any one man’s
life” (North 77). He asks the readers of his posthumous life writing to “take his word for it,”
while acknowledging that the word of one person cannot sufficiently, credibly represent another
person’s selfhood. It is a paradox that leads North to “question whether there is now in the world
extant the history of any one man’s life so full as it ought to be, and since we have nothing to
judge by but what is left us, such as it is, who can say whether any one account is full and just or
no” (77). The “fullness” of an empirical account of selfhood depends on how much can be
known about the person and the materials that determine that understanding. Empirical life
writers, “knowing no better, must take what they can find.” What they can find to arrange as a
life must be credible, another value that Sprat ascribed to the Royal Society’s practices and its
inductive paradigm.
Because of the importance that Sprat places on accountability as credibility, the second
fundamental attribute Sprat ascribes to the Royal Society through his critiques is the Society’s
inductive means for credentialing knowledge and fact. He evaluates medieval learning and its
deductive method of inquiry: “[m]oncks, in their solitary, and idle course of life” were as limited
in their group inquiry as the solitary, classical philosopher (14). The Scholastics or “Scholemen,” for Sprat, illustrate “how farre more importantly a good Method of thinking, and a right
course of apprehending things, does contribute towards the attaining of perfection in true
knowledge, then the strongest, and most vigorous wit in the World, can do without them” (15).
By comparison, Sprat implies that the Society’s method is “a good Method of thinking and right
course of apprehending things”; it is transparent, publicly credible, and focused on natural
philosophy. He characterizes the method of the Scholastics, on the other hand, as disputation or
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word play devoted to syllogistic deduction. Its fundamental shortcoming is that it “rely’d on
general Terms, which had not much foundation in Nature; and also because they took no course,
but that of disputing . . . insisting altogether on establish’d Axioms” (16-7). The dependence on
axioms that Sprat critiques is itself a critique of the larger, deductive methodology for inquiry
opposed to the indicative epistemology of the Royal Society.18 A deductive epistemology begins
with what is already known, “some generall Definitions of things themselves according to their
universal Natures: Then divided them into parts, and drew them out into several propositions,
which they layd down as Problems: these they controverted on both sides: and by many nicities
of Arguments, and citations of Authorities, confuted their adversaries, and strengthened their
own dictates” (Sprat 16). A method based on disputation creates a paradigm that substitutes
rhetoric for the epistemology it should complement. “Nicities of Arguments and citations of
Authorities” become rhetorical maneuvers that take the place of inquiry and limit what can be
known. The Society’s inductive epistemology corrects flaws in the deductive method, which are
“confin’d, within their own Bounds, and not be suffer’d to hinder the enlargement of the
territories of other Sciences” (Sprat 21). In Sprat’s estimation, deduction confines itself to
proving the validity of assumptions, axioms, and givens, rather than focus on the details of the
natural world and experience. Scientific practice is reduced to rhetorical ornament.
Enlarging knowledge, the goal Sprat assigns the Royal Society, shifts the methodological
focus from strict, rhetorical disputation to an inquiry into “all the Works of Nature, or Art, which
can come within their reach” (61). Sprat does not renounce rhetoric completely. It is, after all,
bound up with the process of making knowledge inductively. Instead, Sprat outlines an
18

The main historian of eighteenth-century rhetoric Wilbur Samuel Howell notes that a methodology based on
axioms, “self-evident propositions and lucid definitions,” was characteristic of philosophers “who recognized
Descartes as their leader and who proceeded through reason and principle”—reasoning through disputation and
proofs—as opposed to the “method of experimental philosophers or Baconians who proceeded through induction”
(63). Sprat’s critique recommends the experimental method that “proceeded through induction.”
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epistemology that determines a complementary rhetoric that makes natural facts plain so that a
reader can induce truths about the “works of nature.” It is not the equivocal rhetoric of deductive
disputation. The emerging inductive epistemology that Sprat describes is a collective endeavor of
the Royal Society: “They have labor’d . . . They have striven . . . They have try’d . . . They have
studied . . . They have attempted” (62). His apologetic replaces isolated deductive disputation
with an active, collaborative induction, that “labors, strives, and studies” to expand
understanding. Sprat implies that the collaborative and active work among the Society’s
scientists builds on a broad range of perspectives and information in order to yield greater
scientific understanding. The members report “[t]heir Matter . . . before their weekly meetings, to
undergo a just and full examination . . . [so] that they might enjoy the benefits of a mix’d
Assembly, which are largeness of Observation, and diversity of Judgments, without the mischiefs
that usually accompany it, such as confusion, unsteddiness, and the little animosities of divided
Parties” (91). The collaboration of the Society’s members in knowledge-making not only held
scientists accountable by putting them in conversation with one another, but it also gave them a
venue for sharing the knowledge their active effort has generated. The limited inquiry of a single
researcher could achieve neither goal. As an apology for and defense of a new scientific
epistemology, the History must represent the Society’s practices as stable or potentially
stabilizing after the “little animosities of divided Parties” during the Civil Wars in order to make
a case for the Society’s viability. The diversity of opinions yields a broader range of information
that scientists might observe and consider to draw more reliable conclusions.
Paradoxically, the Royal Society’s methodological attention to accuracy and reliability
also accommodated a large degree of uncertainty. Steven Shapin explains that scientific
collaboration was modeled on the “practice known as civil conversation,” in order to establish
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and maintain a reliable network of scientists, which would consequently guarantee the
perpetuation of empirical inquiry (351). Civil conversation was the Society’s answer to the
factious politics that shaped the earlier part of the seventeenth century: “[t]he goal of
conversation was not understood as instrumental, save in the sense that the maintenance of
public discourse, and one’s continuing participation in it, offered members the possibility of
future instrumental actions in which they might require the assistance of others. Knowledge, of
course, figured in the practice of conversation as did judgments of the legitimate content and
character of knowledge” (Shapin 351). Essentially, conversation ensured future participation and
inquiry, which would further the inductive program. However, that “establishment of a space
which was so securely bounded that dispute could occur safely within it was a difficult
accomplishment in social cartography” (Shapin and Schaffer 303). The concession to this
challenge and to civility was a social arrangement of the new scientific community that, contrary
to modern expectations for scientific rigor, emphasized the discourse of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century conversation more than the actual scientific knowledge it generated: “[t]o
require too great a rigor, precision, and certainty might be to put too great a strain upon
conversation; it was to endanger its continuance. Certain conceptions of truth and precision were
not worth that price” (351). The scientific context of a collaborative, “civil conversation” could
absorb differing opinions as well as fostering new ones. The “price” of civility, the price for
maintaining this fecund, scientific trying ground, was the “rigor, precision, and certainty” that
post-Restoration scientific epistemologies would come to prefer.19 Although falling short of
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What could be known or revealed about a person biographically was a controversy in biography throughout the
eighteenth century. Whether letters should be published without an author’s permission or even posthumously, for
instance, was a question of what biography should protect to maintain the civil character of the biographical subject.
North noted that leaving out “what is scandalous and unfit for common practice” in representing the private person
has advantages for inculcating “good sense” (59). By the end of the eighteenth-century and the intimate nature of
Boswell’s Life of Johnson, questions of biographical propriety were largely answered or, at least, reframed.
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modern scientific methodology, this emergent scientific epistemology negotiated what could be
known in order to open a space for later findings.
The mutual acknowledgement of such open spaces also protected some knowledge from
inquiry: Sprat’s apologetics, for instance, insist that the methodology of the Royal Society does
not challenge doctrinal Christianity, the worship of God, or any religious practice (345-78).20
Restoration conceptions of Christian truth “were not worth the price” of exacting precision. As
Dear points out, natural philosophers or scientists in the Restoration such as Robert Boyle “spoke
of things that were ‘above reason,” he was demarcating a proper role for philosophy—
experimental philosophy, in his case—that by its very nature was not exhaustive or everything
that existed or could be known. What was left over was the transcendental part, whether ‘God’ or
‘Nature’” (“Intelligibility” 149). The distinction that Boyle draws acknowledges limits on
understanding, whether it is based on a deductive or inductive model. The social unrest that had
intertwined politics and religious practice necessitated such demarcations for maintaining social
order. Yet an inductive epistemology that operated on an accumulation of information would
also require an indeterminate space for drawing conclusions and inducing knowledge if it were to
allow what was not yet known. The inductive paradigm, then, could function at a respectful
remove from what “could be known” about the natural world or selfhood, yet incorporate such
mysteries as facts to be considered when inducing patterns that comprise knowledge.
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Michael Hunter argues that Sprat’s apologetics in the History had to adopt a Latitudinarian tone in which reason
necessarily complements spirituality if the Society’s scientific paradigm was to be reconciled to that of established
religion: the rationalist methodology of the Royal Society had to be represented as harmonious with a rationalist
tendencies embraced by much of the Anglican Church at the time (67). Yet it is also possible to interpret this
connection not as a purely Latitudinarian alignment, but instead “to see this union of the two bodies, one old, one
very new, rather as a self-legitimating move by the Royal Society to attach itself to the established center” (Vickers
51). From a practical perspective, Sprat’s anchoring of the Royal Society to the Anglican Church was as cautiously
politic as it was paradigmatically devout.
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Just as North asserted the importance of multiple sources for achieving accuracy and
reliability in life writing, so did he also acknowledge the necessity of uncertainty. North notes
that “all history of one sort or other is like painting, never exactly true; that which comes nearest
is best, and however discrepant, there may be some use or other that makes it reasonable not to
slight, but to preserve it” (North 77). Because the history of a life is “never exactly true,” the
uncertainty that discrepancies can introduce into life writing might “make reasonable not to
slight but to preserve it” regardless. North’s methodological approach to life writing and its
ability to accommodate uncertainty emerges within the context of the new inductive
methodology and its focus on multiple, diverse proofs as the source for establishing knowledge.
The deductive epistemology from which scientific induction was emerging allowed for no
uncertainty. This sort of rhetoric and methodology were well-suited to metaphysical questions
that philosophers like Thomas Aquinas would have raised in his Summa Theologica about the
existence of God, angels (and how many might fit on the head of a pin), Creation, and the
purpose of humankind. The unassailable given of Aquinas’s methodology was that God was the
immutable, fundamental fact of existence; for the inductive scientist God was out of bounds,
scientifically unobservable and, thus, accepted as neither proven nor disproven.21 Uncertainty
would undermine the deductive methodology and fundamentally disprove the knowledge it
presumed to reinforce. Such a model provides a basis for genres of life writing like hagiography,
which seek to frame every action in the context of sainthood and hold every aspect of the life
accountable to that definitive saintliness.

21

Since the Royal Society took up scientific inquiry of the natural, diurnal world rather than the transcendent,
spiritual realm, the rhetoric of deductive epistemology would, indeed, seem like “theory composed of
generalizations constantly revised by reference to practice, as a body of ritualistic conventions that have forgotten
their original contact with the real world” (Howell, England 65). The New Science sought to link rhetorical
convention to an inductive epistemology that prided itself on reflecting a natural operation of observation and
conclusion.
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In this emergent period, life writers contemporary to Sprat and North deferred to a
deductive model. By Izaak Walton’s account, every sin Donne might have committed and every
ribald word he might have written were filtered through the man’s faith, so that the life writing
expressed less about the life written than about a religious epistemology. In Gilbert Burnett’s
account of John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, a single moment, a deathbed conversion, overwrites
Rochester’s questionable ethics and religious practice; indeed, it overwrites the political and
social implications of libertinism in full, converting them into a cautionary tale that reaffirms the
importance of Christianity in a period reacting to the earlier strictures of Puritanical, Christian
governance. As the Royal Society institutionalized itself during the Restoration and eighteenth
century, it made analogous shifts based on its epistemology possible in other fields. Instances of
both epistemologies can be located in the life writing of the period, but North’s General Preface
in particular illustrates the transitional, emergent nature of this epistemological shift.
Unpublished during his lifetime and remaining unpublished for roughly two centuries after the
Royal Society’s beginnings, the Preface advocates an inductive approach for life writing that
would be honed in Samuel Johnson’s, Oliver Goldsmith’s, and James Boswell’s approaches to
develop increasingly intimate biographical form.
The degree of intimacy with selfhood that North’s life writing adopted and eighteenthcentury biographies assumed was possible through facts credentialed by multiple sources for
accuracy and reliability and an ability to absorb, accommodate, and use any uncertainty that went
beyond those facts. More importantly, however, Restoration life writing developed through an
epistemological dependence on the hallmark of the new inductive sciences: experiment is the
method for establishing and inducing facts that the inductive scientist could use to make
knowledge. Sprat’s History describes numerous experiments by the Society’s earliest natural
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philosophers. Their scientific methodology demonstrates the interconnectedness of experiment
and experience that provide a reference for the inductive epistemological context in which the
new biographical form emerged. For instance, in relaying “A PROPOSAL For making WINE by
Dr. Goddard” and “A RELATION OF THE PICO TENERIFFE Receiv’d from some
considerable Merchants and Men worthy of Credit, who went to the top of it,” Sprat’s
apologetics equate experiment with experience (193-99, 200-27). The observations of Dr.
Goddard comprise a narrative of the means of making wine from cane sugar grown in the
Barbados, with special attention to the connections between natural occurrences that threaten
crops of cane and the consequences of superstitious responses to these events. Likewise, the
narrative of “considerable,” credible merchants who climbed a volcano in Barbados gives an
account of what they saw of the land and its inhabitants.
As instances of the Royal Society’s scientific methodology, these scientific accounts
provide examples of what Peter Dear has labeled the Restoration “event experiment,” which is
more of a historical account than a scientific report (Dear, “Narratives” 15). The event
experiments provided narratives that, when credentialed collaboratively and considered
corporately, allow the Royal Society’s natural philosophers to induce truths about the natural
world that conflate experiment with experience. Sprat gives a succinct description of the Royal
Society’s epistemological considerations that made the event experiment necessary:
The True Philosophy must be first of all begun, on a scrupulous, and severe
examination of particulars: from them, there may be some general Rules, with
great caution drawn: But it must not rest there, nor is that the most difficult part of
its course: It must advance those Principles, to the finding out of new effects,
through all the varieties of Matter: and so both the courses must proceed orderly
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together; from experimenting, to Demonstrating, and from demonstrating, to
Experimenting again. (31)
The Society’s approach to inquiry and understanding is essentially experimental: its members are
“scrupulous,” rational, and regimented in their inquiry. They begin with “severe examination,”
proceed with “great caution,” and cycle through experimentation and demonstration of the
findings in an “orderly” fashion. To force too much order on the process of experimentation,
however, restricts its usual direction: “it is certain, that Experimenting is; like that which is call’d
Decence in humane life; which, though it be that, by which our Actions are to be fashion’d; and
though many things may be plausibly said upon it; yet is never wholly to be reduc’d to standing
Precepts; and may almost as easily be obtain’d, as defin’d” (Sprat 90). Sprat makes the
experimental epistemology of the Royal Society analogous to “decency,” linking it to an inborn,
personal quality that is more naturally practiced than formulated into “standing precepts.” In this
regard, the new scientific epistemology was framed by experience, and the practice of scientific
experimentation or human decency is determined situationally, not the other way around.
Experience and decency cannot be made to conform wholly to standing precepts or deductive
axioms, and any epistemology that represents them thus is not, Sprat implies, accurate and true to
nature.
Sprat’s description of “experimenting” as a fluid, responsive practice that depends on
disinterested experience and personal observation contrasts with the deductive epistemology and
its deference to established, determined, external standards. Not only is it a methodological
distinction, but inductive experiments are also an autodidactic moments, which Sprat cites as
additional justification for the new method. Later forms like novels, periodicals, and biographies
would justify their literary methods with the same autodidactic value. Since the emerging science
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represents the “honest pursuit of the conveniences, decences, and ornaments of a mortal
condition, by just and regular ways,” a necessary and productive consequence of this experiential
grounding is the experimental scientist’s commitment to “regard the least, and the plainest
things, and those that may appear at first the most inconsiderable; as well as the greatest
Curiosities” (367, 90). The “just and regular” scientific approach assigns value to “things” that
allow empirical observers the most ready means of fashioning modes of experimentation, “the
least and the plainest things” that are most common to experience. The move to an inductive
model that challenged older, classical models of inquiry reprioritized the process of inquiry and
knowledge making: an empirical scientist began in observation of the least and plainest things
which might “appear at first the most inconsiderable.” The larger model is a product derived
directly from these seemingly insignificant details. The Royal Society’s inductive epistemology
transferred experience from the commonplace to the consequential, forming the pattern of a
larger principle. The biographical form that emerged in this context thrived on the significance of
the seemingly inconsiderable details and used them as a basis for inducing a principle of
selfhood, representing the self more intimately and accurately through the least and plainest
things than earlier life writing practices.
The inculcation of “decency” possible in the natural scientist or, more broadly, the
scientific observer, is a function of personal observation and crucial to the practice of inductive
science. Sprat compares the function of inductive, experimental philosophy to the improvement
of Christian virtue: “spiritual Repentance is a careful survay of our former Errors, and a
resolution of amendment. The spiritual Humility is an observation of our Defects, and a lowly
sense of our weakness” (367). In Sprat’s estimation, the Christian practice of “repentance”
comes through an inductive process of examining available data through a “survey of our former
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errors,” in order to induce the more general “defects” in character that define a set of specific,
personal, human “weaknesses.” Sprat balances religious practices for improvement against the
practices of the “Experimenter . . . [who] must have some Qualities that answer to these: He must
judge aright of himself; he must misdoubt the best of his own thoughts; he must be sensible of
his own ignorance, if ever he will attempt to purge and renew his Reason” (367). By Sprat’s
account, the practices of the new inductive science hone the practices of Christian repentance. To
“renew one’s reason” is to strengthen the personal means for improving personal religious
practice. It becomes a means for teaching people to teach themselves, to inculcate the means for
personal religious improvement. The epistemology that Sprat describes puts the burden of
responsibility on the observer to recognize and verify facts in order to induce patterns that are
credible as scientific truth. This crucial feature of the new epistemology provides the means
through which the identity of the scientist can come to supplant the contending identities that
stoked the furor of the Civil Wars in England.
The distinction between the static deductive system and the autodidactic inductive
epistemology is evident in Roger North’s biographical theorizing, which models a life writing
that can instill “decene” in readers. In his General Preface, North invites readers to recognize his
inductive approach and acknowledges the distinction between a deductive pattern of life writing,
like his contemporary Izaak Walton, and the new inductive model:
One thing remains for me to clear, and that is the reason why, after so much as
hath been said of private biography, I produce here three lives of persons who had
all considerable posts of preferment, and two them concerned deep in affairs of
the public. I grant this to be so, and yet I stand to my point, that the lives I write
are private; for I shall not go out of my way to fall upon foreign affairs or national
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concerns, at least not so much as may be expected, and indeed no more than in the
lives of those persons is absolutely necessary to account for their passing their
time, and what they immediately transacted, and no further. (North 82)
Life writing before North and the advent of the Royal Society would have focused on the larger,
public personae of the three lives North writes for his brothers: Francis, the Lord-keeper, Sir
Dudley, and Dr. John North. Deductive life writing would have taken the public offices of each
man as a given premise, indicative of every aspect of each man’s life, so that their public policy
would become the guiding principle for understanding their private lives. North acknowledges
that some of this public persona is “necessary” to discuss their lives fully, but only to the degree
that it can help “account for their passing their time, and what they immediately transacted, and
no further.” The private details balanced against the public personas give readers the opportunity
to improve themselves by observing the lives of the Norths. In this arrangement, their lives
become the sum of the specific events marking the passage of time. Personal experience
becomes a narrative of event experiments that make observation, understanding, and selfhood
possible.
By linking the close observation of event experiments to “Decence in humane life,” Sprat
charges inductive experimentation and the particularity it examines with a moralizing force (90).
North, too, locates life writing’s promise to impart “decence” through the seemingly
inconsequential details that define simply how people passed their time. He asserts that the
“history of private lives adapted to the perusal of common men is more beneficial (generally)
than . . . the acts and monuments of famed [leaders]. The gross reason is because the latter
contain little if anything comparate or applicable to instruct a private economy, or tending to
make a man either wiser or more catelous in his own proper concerns” (51). The individual
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events of a person’s life are, according to Sprat, more applicable to the “common” readers who
“peruse” life writing. The larger, overriding principles that a deductive approach might use to
interpret a person’s life can “induce a positive inconvenience, as was feigned of Quixote,” since
“great actions and events superior to a [common] man’s own condition” have more potential to
confuse rather than illustrate (North 51). The small particularities of private life, evident through
an inductive approach to selfhood, relate to the everyday experiences of readers, and so “instruct
a private economy” to help the reader be “wiser” and “more cautious (catelous).” The process
moves the reader to apply inductive observations of another person’s experience to oneself,
through life writing that can be observed in the same manner that a Restoration scientist would
have observed a scientific event experiment. The shift toward an inductive epistemology evident
in Sprat would, forty years after Sprat’s history, come to make the intimate biography of the
eighteenth century and its didactic project possible on the foundations postulated by John Locke.

Articulating the New Scientific Epistemology: Sprat’s Call for Rhetorical Reform
A crucial part of the development of later literary genres and biography in particular
depends on the writing’s accessibility for later readers. Long the province of the educated,
deductive and syllogistic reasoning seemed even more at odds with the pragmatic approached of
the Royals Society. In the earlier part of the seventeenth century, rhetoric had served divisive
ends. Scientists like Sprat and Locke theorized how it could unify differences and disperse
scientific knowledge for the improvement of humankind. Kuhn has argued that a unique rhetoric
develops alongside any epistemological shifts in science as a means of expressing concepts
unique to the paradigm (64). A new paradigm must develop a language for expressing itself and
its findings to convey the knowledge it generates. Dear builds on Kuhn’s assertion, arguing that
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the rhetoric used to relay information that supports the epistemology is as important to the
paradigm as the epistemology itself:
An account of an action is an inseparable part of its meaning, just as the meaning
of the account itself relies on the implicit referent. Thus the meaning of an
account of an experimental event—that which makes it an account of an
experimental event rather than a series of marks on paper—is provided by its
implicit reference to a spatiotemporally defined region . . . manipulated by a
human agent. The meaning of that spatiotemporal region itself—what makes it
discernible as an experimental event—is conferred, reciprocally by the account of
an experimental event. (Dear, “Narratives” 136-7)
An account of the event experiment depends on “scientific literary practice,” and for Royal
Society writers like Sprat and John Locke, such accounts stress the importance of a new rhetoric
that departs from the older, disputative rhetoric of deduction (Dear, “Narratives” 135). The
rhetoric of the event experiment must frame the experiential action within time and place to give
“meaning” to the experience, representing it as “discernible,” observable, and thus factual.
Biography had the potential to give meaning to selfhood as an experiential event, its factuality
bounded spatiotemporally like the event experiment of the natural philosopher. The emergence
of a new rhetoric to accompany the inductive paradigm made its design compelling and
persuasive in the face of other paradigms, opening possibilities for new areas of inquiry. As an
emergent form, eighteenth-century biography tacitly refined a rhetoric of self that corresponded
to the model of scientific developments and to their prescribed, rhetorical, and literary practices
for representing experience.
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By involving readers as experiential witnesses, the narrative account of an event
experiment models its rhetoric on the epistemological practice of inductive science: readers
become observers who must draw conclusions from the facts that the event experiment presents.
They become, as Shapin and Schaffer argue, virtual witnesses: “[t]he technology of virtual
witnessing involves the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene
as obviates the necessity for either direct witness or replication . . . The validation of
experiments, and the crediting of their outcomes as matters of fact, necessarily entailed their
realization in the laboratory of the mind and the mind’s eye” (60). The onus of credentialing fact,
as a virtual witness, lies with the reader who must virtually construct an experiment and observe
its outcomes. The intangibility that frames this experience does not negate the “outcomes as
matters of fact.” Empirical readers must still induce the scientific truths it indicates as if the
experience were first-hand. The account of the experiment translated and transferred experience.
In order to make this reconstruction possible, a reader required rhetorical clarity that encouraged
conceptualization of the event experiment’s narrative.
Sprat’s distrust of older rhetorical models linked to a deductive epistemology is evident
first in his proposal for a new English academy that will promote a rhetoric amenable to the
“English Genius” that “generally love[s] to have Reason set out in plain, undeceiving
expressions” (40). It would facilitate an understanding within “the laboratory of the mind and the
mind’s eye” (Shapin and Schaffer 60). A rhetoric modeled after the “English genius” is aligned
with the simple pleasures “of the Fields,” rather than the “Humour, and Wit, and Variety, and
Elegance of Language, are chiefly to be fetch’d” of those who indulge the in the “Pleasures of
the Town” (41). An English academy would entail some “labor spent about in its [the English
language’s] polishing,” since it had been “fashioning, and beautifying it self” from the early
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modern period “down to the beginning of our late Civil Wars” (41, 42). He reasons that the “late
Civil Wars . . . themselves” are a culture moment “wherein all Languages use[d] . . . to increase
by extraordinary degrees; for in such busie, and active times, there arise more new thoughts of
men, which must be signfi’d, and varied by new expressions . . . which were introduc’d by our
Religious Sects; and many outlandish phrases” (42). The tumult that shifts language to address
the needs of “busy and active times” consequently introduces a superfluity that obscures
meaning and, worse still, threatens civil society. Sprat claims that “if some sober and judicious
Men, would take the whole Mass of our Language into their hands, as they find it, and would set
a mark on the ill Words; correct those, which are to be retain’d; admit, and establish the good”
(42). Such a language and a rhetoric would be more amenable to the English genius, but such
improvements would only be possible “when minds are somewhat settled, their Passions allai’d,
and the peace of . . . [the] Country gives . . . opportunity for such diversion” (42). The call for an
English academy mirrors the chartering of the Royal Society: each seeks to institutionalize
complementary parts of an emergent, inductive paradigm for improving English society that
depends on the “sober and judicious” application of empirical reason.22
Various approaches to inductive rhetoric emphasize alternately the content and structure
of the writing, even though they are epistemologically inseparable. In the final analysis,
however, these approaches underline the didactic consequence rhetoric has on the reasoning,
empirical reader. Howell summarizes the arguments for rhetorical reform that many inductive
scientists made as “recommend[ing] inductive procedures in rhetorical argumentation, strict
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Howell asserts that the “main conclusion to be drawn from” his tome “is that the changes which took place in
logical and rhetorical doctrine between 1700 and 1800 are perhaps best interpreted as responses to the emergence of
the new science” (Eighteenth-Century 5). His argument depends on an assumption since shown to be lacking in
social and cultural nuance, that scientific empiricism alone drove discursive changes in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, rhetorically and epistemologically, re-articulaing what could be known and how it could be
expressed rhetorically in the eighteenth-century
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standards in probable arguments . . . and the concept of plainness in . . . literary style”
(Eighteenth-Century 698). Stanley Fish, on the other hand, challenges Howell’s argument
outright, asserting that scholars “must . . . give up the notion that the decisive or explanatory
influence in the fashioning of late seventeenth-century style was the rise of science,” religious
belief, and political affiliation (Self-Consuming 375-6). He prefers examining seventeenthcentury rhetoric on the level of an author-reader relationship, in which readers are led to “a point
of certainty and clarity” or, conversely and more productively, to complication that raises “more
problems than it solves” (Self-Consuming 376). A reader, consequently, is forced to make
choices in order to make meaning, gaining experience, knowledge, and self-understanding in the
process. The dispute between Howard and Fish, however, shows how modern biography
produced a via media that brought the procedures of the Royal Society to the ethics of reading.
Fish’s theorization complements Sprat’s practice and the impetus for a rhetoric that matches
inductive practice. Despite his attack, his model also complements Howell’s outline for the uses
of the straightforward plainness that invites readers to experience an experiment: Fish argues that
rhetorical arrangement invites engagement; Howell, that the scientific content engages the
reader. Modern biography brought both practices into alignment.
Restoration life writing demonstrates an appreciation for the balance between rhetoric
and its effects on the reader. Roger North distinguishes between the “choice of words, charming
periods, invention of figures, interspersion of sentences, and facetious expressions” as the
primary “ingredients . . . brought to adorn fiction” and that they might even be applied
judiciously to improve histories and life writing in particular (59-60). For North, a judicious
application of complex “periods,” “figures,” and “facetious expressions” is contingent upon how
true to the original subject such application an might be, how truthful it is, and, most importantly,
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how edifying the complicated rhetoric renders the writing: “fiction, however deliciously dressed,
hath not those advantages to improve as history hath, for that it is not true is a cooling reflection.
And what force can any moral arguments or sentences have that are derived upon feigned
events? Nothing can invigorate eloquence like truth” (60). The value of life writing is in its
adherence to truth in North’s estimation, and the more true the writing in relating a life,
rhetorically and factually, the more valuable it is. This factuality is bound to the experience of
engaging the rhetoric, like observing the event experiment.
But the value of truthful life writing does not diminish the rhetorical adornment
characteristic of fiction. According to North, life writing and fiction are set apart by their end
function, their capacity to improve the lives and minds of common readers. North’s claim—that
“[t]here is great art, as well as felicity, in making a good description of plain facts, and it is . . .
justice and integrity of sense, and significancy of language, that sets it off”—recalls an inductive
paradigm that privileges “plain facts” over axiomatic principles and writing that translates
experience through accounts of an event experiment (60-1). Translations of experience, like
accounts of the complicated event experiment, were connected to the “justice and integrity of
sense, and significancy of language” that would provide a straightforward record, inviting
readers to induce truths about a person’s life. If life writers were to manage all of the information
about a person’s experience, they would need a style that would make the self accessible and
engaging in order to make moral improvement possible.
While a scientific understanding guided the choice of details and their arrangement as
rhetorics of self, these details themselves become distinctly characteristic of a particular person
by their connection to other epistemologies. What reads like an absolute denouncement of
rhetoric in Sprat’s History, Brian Vickers argues, is actually a call for stringent language reform
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to yield a more lucid, concise rhetoric amenable to civil conversation, both in the Royal Society
and British society at large (6-7). Sprat claims “when I consider the means of happy living, and
the causes of their corruption, I can hardly forbear recanting what I said before; and concluding
that eloquence ought to be banish’d out of all civil societies, as a thing fatal to Peace and good
Manners . . . it is a Weapon, which may be as easily procur’d by bad men, as good” (111). Sprat
levels his vehemence against not only against the rhetoric of the “religious sects” who wielded it
during the Civil Wars, but especially against their characteristic rhetoric, which he obliquely
associates with the classical traditions of Aristotle and Cicero, a rhetoric that obscures
understanding with ornamental language: “[w]ho can behold, without indignation, how many
mists and uncertainties, these specious Tropes and Figures have brought on our Knowledge?”
(112). Sprat argues that the use of language becomes the place where classical epistemologies,
logical and rhetorical, have cultural purchase and dangerous implications if left unchecked. For
Sprat, the connection between science and rhetoric has consequential social and cultural
implications.
The History articulates a new paradigm that sets specific assumptions for how knowledge
can be acquired and how it can be expressed, advocating a rhetorical approach with “some kind
of economical relation to its subject matter” (Vickers 7). Sprat calls for a transparent rhetoric that
facilitates participation in civil conversation, an approach to language that is succinct and simple:
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy,
that can be found for this extravagance . . . to return back to the primitive purity,
and shortness, when men deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal number of
words. They have extracted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of
speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness: bringing all things
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as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of
Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that of Wits, or Scholars. (113)
The length of Sprat’s definition contrasts sharply with the lengths he takes to describe and
disprove other models for language. Using words like “purity,” “shortness,” “close,” “naked,”
“natural,” “clear,” and “plainness,” he phrases this definition to stress the virtues of
straightforward brevity that the definition itself lays bare. Sprat credentials his definition of
language by associating it with nationality and mathematics. He proposes a language that
exhibits mathematical attributes: the economical ratio of “things” to “words” almost “in equal
number” and with a “mathematical plainness.” Mathematics can be reasoned through without
any training in superfluity that has corrupted language in Sprat’s estimation, since such plainness
makes scientific research accessible for those outside of the Society.
From the importance experimental philosophers placed on mathematical language, Mary
Poovey extrapolates a larger world view that influenced the development of the self in relation to
larger social structures in England: “experimental moral philosophers were able to claim” that
their observations of the natural world “were simultaneously derived from (a kind of)
observation, aligned with the (visible) harmony of God’s universe, and universally true. Thus the
figure of mathematical harmony—not the instrument of numerical representation—was used to
ground the kind of knowledge considered useful to self-government” (History 156). A
mathematical language was based on a mathematical worldview, in which an inductive
philosophy could tally and observe facts then draw conclusions. The rhetoric that facilitated the
practice of this epistemology within this scientific paradigm was “useful to self-government”—
the responsibility to draw judicious conclusions about oneself and one’s place in the world. Sprat
underscores the importance of a rhetoric that recognizes its epistemological commitments.
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Accessibility to scientific fact was enabled by an appeal to the “native easiness” of a
straightforward rhetoric that would encourage virtual witnesses among the “Artizans,
Countrymen, and Merchants.” A transparent style would enable the Royal Society to
communicate with merchants and laborers as well as “wits and scholars” and, more importantly,
would encourage a self-governance that made the didactic potential of the inductive paradigm
more efficacious. It had the potential to open selfhood to the view of all.
Both the excesses of language that Sprat derides and the reforms that he prescribes as a
remedy have strong implications for conceptualizing selfhood and representing it biographically
through rhetorics of self in the eighteenth century. A biographical selfhood would invite the
reader to witness the life of another person virtually in order to induce the self through a
narrative account of experience. As Roger North asserts, such witnessing encouraged selfgovernance and self-improvement, “to instruct a private economy, or tending to make a man
either wiser or more cautelous in his own proper concerns” (51). Epistemologically, John Locke
further elaborates on the relationship between selfhood and the rhetoric that translates it in his
theorization of understanding. Locke individuates the inductive paradigm, moving it from the
Royal Society’s larger scientific program with implications for self-improvement to
conceptualize a selfhood founded on the practice of self-government.

Individuating the New Scientific Epistemology: Locke’s Empirical Selfhood
The tenets of the new science in the History and the General Preface correlate tidily, yet
the intersection between Thomas Sprat’s attempt to institutionalize the new paradigm and Roger
North’s conceptualization of induction-based life writing point to a causal relationship between
science and life writing: this paradigmatic causality resonates through eighteenth-century
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thought, even fields as dissimilar from science as the humanities. Nowhere is this resonance
more clear than in John Locke’s influence on eighteenth-century epistemology and rhetoric, and
no form is more conscious of Locke than eighteenth-century biography. McKeon asserts that, for
the arts, “the effort to define the integrity and autonomy of aesthetic response and aesthetic
judgment . . . took place not in opposition to, but in explicit emulation of, a normative model of
empirical and scientific cognition. It was by imitating the emergent method and value system of
the natural sciences that the arts learned their own distinctive mode of being” (“Mediation” 385).
The scientific mode of writing that emerged alongside the inductive epistemology to translate an
experiment into narrative as experience provided the “normative model” for Restoration life
writing and eighteenth-century biography, and increasing thoroughness of this scientific
paradigm’s articulation created an increasingly normative model. Biography’s focus on
translating lived experience into print took its cue directly from the scientific epistemology and
corresponding rhetoric that sought to relay experimental experience into a repeatable experience
that observes could witness at a remove. Not only could it be a means for an institutional
method, but also a means for understanding selfhood biographically, within the context of a
community of readers and, ultimately, in relation to structures of authority, both governmental
and clerical. Locke’s essay narrowed the focus of the emerging, scientific paradigm from the
broader institutional model to a more specific, unique model of selfhood that biography would
emulate and put into practice.23
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The process of articulation that McKeon sites recalls the articulation of a scientific paradigm that Kuhn theorizes:
a paradigm’s “refinement,” as is evident in the articulation of earlier paradigms, has occurred when scientists “were
working both with fact and with theory, and their work produced not simply new information but a more precise
paradigm, obtained by the elimination of ambiguities that the original from which they worked had retained” (34).
Articulating the paradigm of the new, empirical science would have been first a matter of refining the system and
the practices, followed by a refinement of the participants in the system and, eventually, of people themselves. The
shift moves from the larger systematic context to the fields that emerge as the context is articulated, like biography.
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The institutionalization of the Royal Society set the terms in which John Locke’s An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding could conceptualize an empirical model of selfhood,
developed by scientific practices and systems of value. Locke’s model of self and language
articulated the Royal Society’s experimental, scientific paradigm by deepening its scientific
implications. He individuates the paradigm by applying the same standards for inductive
empiricism that Sprat iterates as Royal Society practice: careful, disinterested observation of
experimentation; a judicious consideration of all facts, no matter how mundane or seemingly
trivial; and an inductive pattern-finding that reinvents its conclusions as new facts emerge from
continued observation. Epistemologically and rhetorically, these standards depend on selfawareness and self-governance to foster self-recognition. In Locke’s model, selfhood is the
persistence of self-recognition over time. He approaches human understanding within the larger
context of the Royal Society’s increasing emphasis on empirical knowledge acquired through a
regular, experimental method: “[t]he Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and
perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a
distance, and make it its own Object” (1.1.1). His emphasis on observation, “the eye,” and
method, “art and pains,” point to an empiricist model of human understanding that emphasizes
the role of observation and methodology for recognizing selfhood. It is through Locke’s model
of selfhood and the language that defines selfhood that the inductive paradigm finds its
expression in fields of inquiry outside of the natural sciences studied by the Royal Society and its
members.
Just as Sprat’s articulation of the Royal Society’s guiding principles and practices is
evident in the theory of life writing that Roger North expounds, Locke epistemology of selfhood
develops those same guiding, scientific principles into a model of consciousness widely
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deployed in novels and periodical. Jill Marie Bradbury cites inductive scientists and Locke in
particular whose “theories of language and science had . . . [a] strong influence on the
conceptualization of prose kinds. The scientific revolutionaries . . . concern with semantics,
referentiality, and rhetoric was perhaps the most important philosophical influence on the
eighteenth-century understanding of literary kinds” (29). Because of their concern, the “new
science unsettled relations between the fields of knowledge and their textual forms” and, more
specifically, that the “epistemology of the new science influenced not only specific literary forms
and general forms of discourse, but also systems of prose genre” (30). Bradbury coins “systems
of prose genre” as a designation for deal with the indeterminate quality of many genres emerging
in the period: “genre itself was a critical problem during the late seventeenth and eighteenth
century, when there was no consistent principle for distinguishing among forms of prose
literature. The increased diversity of print matter after the suspension of the Licensing Act in
1695 made classification even more problematic” (29). Her assertion points to three general
effects the empiricist movement had on eighteenth-century literature: it influenced ways of
knowing available through extant, “specific literary forms”; it shaped rhetorical models; and it
enabled the emergence of new “systems of prose.”
Locke’s model of selfhood articulates practices that shape specific literary genres, giving
form and function based on a Lockean epistemology. Titles of the novel form, in particular, were
often character’s names, marking a narrative of selfhood. The titles of periodicals, likewise,
established a selfhood that determined the tenor of their articles and commentary. And
biography’s grounding drew heavily on the scientific epistemology espoused by the Royal
Society and Locke. The novel’s and the periodical’s commitment to credentialing a fictionalized
selfhood with a recognizable reproduction of experience is similar to biography’s
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representational effect, its depiction of a hypothetical selfhood. But biography depends on actual,
observed experiences, like those that shape the development of the self in Locke’s model. As a
conceptualization of selfhood, Locke’s individuated model is useful for interrogating the
emergence of new systems of prose like biography, and the form’s epistemological commitments
to a rhetoric of self based on principles germane to the new science.
Like Sprat, Locke advances an inductive epistemology over the earlier deductive
paradigm, and like many of the Restoration scientists articulating the inductive paradigm, Locke
argued that the deductive epistemology is flawed in its misapplication of reason: its primary
method of drawing conclusions, the syllogism, “shew[s] the connexion of the Proofs in any one
instance, and no more: but in this, it is of no great use, since the Mind can perceive such
Connexion where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps, better without it,” since the “Understanding
is not taught to reason by these [syllogistic] Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the
Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing
Repetitions” (4.17.4). Locke’s proto-psychological model of the mind gives it an inductive
“faculty” that is capable of inducing natural “connections” between multiple, related things or
differentiating unlike things. This faculty makes self-governance possible. The syllogistic model
of deductive understanding, on the other hand, tries to force this mental faculty into an “artificial
form” comprehensible “only to those who have thoroughly studied Mode and Figure” (4.12.4).
Locke stresses the importance of the disinterest that Sprat advocates for members of the Royal
Society and applies it to an individuated conceptualization of selfhood that emphasizes
disinterested self-examination and self-discovery. Locke argues that his inductive
conceptualization, more than Sprat’s generalized scientific method, is more amenable to the
ways people come to understand themselves and their world in a condition of civil liberty.
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Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood hinges on the assumption that understanding is the
result of two interrelated sets of observation, sensing and reflecting, and the self’s increasing
recognition of both: the former comprises empirical observation of objects outside of the self; the
latter, on what can be observed inside the self through memory (2.1.3-4). Each set converts
observation into experience, in the same way that the Restoration event experiment rendered
scientific models into experiential accounts. In Locke’s model, observing the world empirically
provides people with a collection of experiences, which they can use to synthesize a distinct,
internal, coherent selfhood in relation to the outward world. In this configuration, the most
decent person is able to improve by a disinterested examination of outer observations and inner
reflections. On their own, these outward and inward functions offer no certainty of selfhood, but
through the operation of consciousness, they come to cohere:
For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes
every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all
other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of
a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to
any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the identity of that Person; it is the
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now
reflects on it, that that Action was done. (2.27.9)
That “consciousness always accompanies” thought indicates a separation between awareness and
mental action; a person might be thinking, but also unaware. The “sameness of a rational being,”
for Locke, indicates sameness in the “rational” awareness that observes and reasons through the
function of its own thinking processes. “what Person stands for . . . is a thinking intelligent
Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in
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different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from
thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it” (2.27.9). The persistent self observes its
persistence over time and becomes a distinct person, distinct from outward circumstances and
other people, in the same way that the Royal Society’s experimental model called for deriving
principles from available facts put to experimental tests (Sprat 31). Single moments cannot
define selfhood in this epistemology; the sameness of a rational being is comprised of many
distinct details. The task of biographical representation is to locate a selfhood that can cohere
spatiotemporally, but at different times and in different places.
A consistency of self over time and place, experienced through discrete observation
unites disparate pieces of information about a person’s life in an accommodating rhetoric of self.
Selfhood is the pattern that develops from the pieces, not an imposition or a deductive
enthymeme. Such inductive continuity connects significant attributes with the least, plainest,
most inconsiderable things, as Sprat describes them, which fall within the purview of an
empirical scientist. Thus the character of a consistent selfhood runs throughout the situations in
which it occurs, at different times and different places. If applied disinterestedly, the self-aware
operation of the consciousness can objectify selfhood so that it can be it might be self-analyzed.
Charles Taylor traces Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood along a trajectory of historical
precedents for modern notions of self, characterizing Locke’s conceptualization of self as a
hyper-objectivity so disinterested that it can actually substitute selfhood with an observation of
the self. The practice of substituting the observation of selfhood for selfhood recalls the event
experiment that Sprat describes, in which the written, second-hand observation of an experiment
could stand in for witnessing it first-hand. A life written as experience, too, could stand in
rhetorically as a second-hand observation of a person self.
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Observing another’s selfhood is easier, however, than observing one’s own. Taylor
classifies the process of forming a Lockean selfhood as “radical reflexivity,” through which
consciousness brings about the “transposition of first-person experience into an objectified,
impersonal mode” (163). Taylor outlines the consequence of this disconnect and its reflexivity as
an empirical process: “[t]he point of the whole operation is to gain a kind of control. Instead of
being swept along to error by the ordinary bent of our experience, we stand back from it,
withdraw from it, reconstrue it objectively, and then learn to draw defensible conclusions from
it” (163). The innate capacity the self has for defining itself would offer a mechanism through
which a self-aware consciousness could empirically “reconstrue” and “draw defensible
conclusions from” the continuity of another person’s selfhood from an almost empirical and
experimental remove. This self-governance, which Taylor illuminates in Locke’s theory of
consciousness, allows for the construction and reconstruction of selfhood. It not only gives
constitutive integrity to the self, but it allows for change over time. The continuity that Locke’s
model presupposes offers an epistemological reason for biographical continuity among the
ostensibly disparate aspects of the self’s experiences or character.
The radical reflexivity that produces selfhood through a re-reading of multiple
experiences over time depends on a degree of self-objectification that, as McKeon points out, is
the primary challenge of Lockean reflexivity: “[i]n the empiricism of philosophical inquiry,
reflexivity is a problem because it threatens to compromise the degree of distance required by the
understanding to disembed the nature of the thing itself as an abstract and general idea”
(“Mediation” 407). Full empirical inquiry, particularly in comprehending the self, must
“disembed” what is observed to “abstract or generalize” it. But he distinguishes between the role
of objective reflexivity in the “empiricism of philosophical inquiry” that characterized the new
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science and the “empiricism of aesthetics” that emerged, reasoning that, “[i]n the empiricism of
aesthetics, however, reflexivity marks the crucially lesser distance that the imagination takes on
its object, signifying that what is being represented is not only the nature of the thing but also, as
figuration rather than full abstraction, the formal process of its representation” (“Mediation”
407). Methodologically, scientific facts of empirical, inductive inquiry had to “disembed the
nature of the thing itself as an abstract and general idea” that could be constructed objectively
through observation. As McKeon reasons, aesthetic empiricism still required a remove, but the
reader’s “imagination” more readily credentials the details the reader perceives as accurate
reflections
The practices and rhetoric of this new science, the empirical epistemology of the Royal
Society and John Locke, shared a less formalized practice—spectating. Addison and Steele
introduced a literary eidolon, the Spectator, who presumes to arbitrate questions of eighteenthcentury taste and opinion in the Spectator papers empirically, through observation, evaluation
and discussion, and finally a discerning conclusion. The literary uses for a Lockean concept of
selfhood are evident in the empiricism of aesthetics contextualizing the fiction and non-fiction
genres of the period, including the popular Spectator periodical. McKeon argues that Joseph
Addison and Richard Steele draw on the normative, scientific epistemology to formulate a
critical theory for art dependent on observation, imagination, and understanding, which can
disengage and construe an understanding of the artistic endeavor from a distance (McKeon,
“Meditation” 391-2). What is significant is that Addison and Steele anchor the inductive
empiricism on a particular self-awareness that defines itself by its empirical observations of the
world.
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Locke’s model for inductive selfhood rippled through the literary selfhoods like the
Spectator and, especially, through social practices, such as educating taste. The practices of the
Spectator demonstrate the benchmarks of a scientific epistemology. Addison and Steele chose an
appropriate venue for informal spectating common in the period, a coffee-house club,
Habermas’s trope for the public sphere where “Matters of Importance” are “laid and concerted”
and where advanced aesthetic theory was brought into the consideration of different classes and
professions (1.6). Empirically, an array of observations and viewpoints held the promise of a
more sound social commentary, one induced from multiple perspectives. Since a broader range
of participants would more likely appeal to the common experiences of many groups, the social
commentary was likely to be more reliable as well.24 Such epistemological practices indicate an
inductive influence, but the Lockean construction of self is particularly evident in the
conceptualization of the periodical’s speaker, Mr. Spectator.
The Spectator, his club, and its scrutiny of the world beyond the coffeehouse define them.
They recognize their selfhoods as distinct from others, taking the normative, empirical strategy
Locke postulated to define selfhood as a way of creating a persona that seeks to observe and
analyze the world morally and aesthetically. For Locke, the consciousness of self over time can
only come through sensation and reflection, which comprise experience (2.1.3-4). Sensation and
perception are the sources of retention and discernment, which in the Spectator accounts for the
development of taste (2.9-11). Locke defines these three attributes of understanding as the “true
24

Scholars often try to pin down the distribution and audience of the Spectator, but it was available through
subscription, sharing, republication and distribution. Such widespread popularity suggests that spectating, after the
empirical fashion of the new science, had become a pervasive model for understanding. It was a prose coffee-house
group whose scrutiny was framed by the larger public scrutiny of the coffee-house culture that took up the
Spectator’s topics to direct its own inquiry and discussion. The paper was subject to the scientific analysis it
modeled as social practice—a group of participants engaged in civil discourse around an event experience like Sprat
describes in the History. Essentially, the club spectated and its conclusions were, in turn, spectated by readers. The
conversation of these small reading communities came to define the larger public. Habermas asserts that the
“periodical articles were not only made the object of discussion but were viewed as integral parts” (42). While the
figure of the Spectator was not an inductive scientist, it practices align to the observation and induction of the
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History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge; whence the Mind has its first Objects, and
by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying in and storing up of those Ideas, out of which is
to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of . . . The best way to come to Truth . . . [is] to
examine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or
have been taught by others to imagine” (2.11.15). Experience makes self-reflexivity possible,
allowing a selfhood to draw distinctions based on empirical “examinations of things as they
really are,” which is to perceive and discern distinctions between oneself, others, and other
things. Addison and Steele devote the first two essays in their periodical series to distinguishing
the Spectator as namesake of the papers and his club, a speaker whose empirical modus
operandi, spectating and retaining information, yields aesthetic and moral conclusions.
Addison and Steele’s Spectator establishes a relationship with readers through identity,
claiming that “a Reader seldom peruses a Book with Pleasure ’till he knows whether the Writer
of it be a black or a fair man, of a mild or cholerick Disposition, Married or a Batchelor, with
other Particulars of the like nature, that conduce very much to the right Understanding of an
Author” (1.1). Acknowledging that he is in his readers’ view and subject to their observation,
Mr. Spectator invites them to join him as spectators of his social practice. Spectating implicates
them in the inductive process of a scientist. The Spectator acknowledges that, since “the chief
trouble of Compiling, Digesting and Correcting will fall to my Share, I must do my self the
Justice to open the Work with my own History” (1.1).25 In order to discern the world and draw
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Wahrman situates Locke’s conceptualization long eighteenth-century selfhood—a model in which “personhood,
or selfhood, can in certain cases roam away from the man, move to another man, or be superseded by another self
within the same man”—within a larger epistemology he labels the ancien régime (197). As he defines it, the ancien
régime blurs the boundaries between the coherence of the selfhood and its exact, external expression, and he
“insist[s] that equating interiority or deep emotion with self at the outset of the inquiry, as a universal experience
rather than as a historically specific understanding of this experience, presupposes what needs to be demonstrated”
(xvii). Wahrman argues Locke that establishes a “conceptual doubling, and especially the dissonances that it allowed
one to imagine possible, appear to have been a persistent thread that ran through the ancien régime of identity”
(Wahrman 197). While both uncertainty and certainty can be accommodated by a biographical rhetoric of self, the

72

moral and aesthetic distinctions about what he sees, the Spectator must relate the experiences of
his “own history” that define his awareness of himself as a spectator. Observation, selfawareness, and experience empirically define the continuity of selfhood, which an observer can
recognize and construct from patterns in experience.
Mr. Spectator and his papers illustrate how the use of empiricism to form “right
judgment” was spreading beyond scientific inquiry. For Locke, this methodology came to
represent an approach to the natural world and to the interior recesses of human understanding
and self-consciousness. The intersection of science, society, and selfhood embodied in the
persona of Mr. Spectator models the foundational practices the new scientific epistemology
deployed in establishing “the integrity and autonomy of aesthetic response and aesthetic
judgment—of the epistemology and psychology of the art experience” (McKeon, “Dramatic”
198). The “psychology of the art experience” is of particular importance to the formulation of a
rhetoric of self. An understanding of selfhood based on the epistemology of the new science
would shape its biographical representation and organization and, more importantly, the
psychological response to an experience with that rhetorically-mediated selfhood.
Locke’s argues that selfhood is a matter of self-consciousness perceiving itself over time
and discerning the natural world to recognize itself as distinct. Locke asserts self-consciousness
as the practice that allows the induction of selfhood from disparate experiences and
characteristics: “[n]othing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into the same Person”
(2.27.23). His conceptualization of “remote existences” that can define a person’s selfhood
accommodates variation so that the self is not static or bound by a single, definitive
characteristic. As in Sprat’s account of experimental practice, Locke postulates a selfhood that is
fluid character of identity in the ancien régime shifts the significance from a core trait that defines the selfhood
throughout its life, as would suit a deductive understanding of selfhood, to a set of empirical observations that reveal
the experiences or, inductively, the experiment of selfhood.
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fluid and responsive. While the experiences that define a self might seem contradictory, they
complement each other and give nuance to a particular selfhood in Locke’s model. This line of
thought is predicated on an epistemological argument that Sprat makes when he gives equal
importance to both glaringly significant and seemingly inconsequential facts (367). All facts are
necessary for inducing a larger pattern for understanding: “[e]very Man’s Reasoning and
Knowledge, is only about the Ideas existing in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them,
particular Existences: and our Knowledge and Reasoning about other Things, is only our
particular Ideas” (Locke 4.17.8). Collected, “particular existences,” no matter how remote,
provide a body of experiential detail from which the unique patterns that define selfhood can be
induced.
The Spectator, too, employs this normative, scientific practice to interrogate morality and
aesthetics by considering all facts as particular experiences. Discussions in the Spectator’s
fictitious club and the London coffee-houses depend on disinterested observation as a basis for
analysis and interpretation. Mr. Spectator establishes a protocol for spectating eighteenth-century
society through his own spectating selfhood:
[W]here-ever I see a Cluster of People I always mix with them, tho’ I never open
my Lips but in my own Club. Thus I live in the World, rather as a Spectator of
Mankind, than as one of the Species; by which means I have made my self a
Speculative Statesmen, Soldier, Merchant, and Artizan, without ever medling
with any Practical Part in Life. I am well versed in the Theory of an Husband, or a
Father, and can discern the Errors in the Oeconomy, Business, and Diversion of
others, better than those who are engaged in them; as Standers-by discover Blots,
which are apt to escape those who are in the Game. (1.4-5)

74

The observation that the Spectator models requires the observer to be at once both present and
absent: it depends on the experience it garners through a reflexivity that is simultaneously
present and distant, to “mix” with society, but to observe it as if he is not “one of the Species.”
Applied to the development of selfhood, the Spectator’s function matches radical reflexivity
Taylor finds in Locke. The Spectator must be “resolved to observe an exact Neutrality” in order
to preserve the clarity and accuracy of observation, which will allow him to collect a variety of
accurate insights into whatever social “cluster” he has chosen to observe (1.5). It is a pattern of
self-recognition that positions selfhood in relation to the rest of society. The practice of
spectating that Mr. Spectator embodies, both as namesake and interlocutor, is an epistemology
concerned with observation that is characterized by disinterested experience free of “medling,”
with the goal of accumulating a variety of information.
Jürgen Habermas has argued that, through periodicals like the Spectator, “the public held
up a mirror to itself; it did not yet come to a self-understanding through the detour of a reflection
on works of philosophy and literature, art and science, but through entering itself into ‘literature’
as an object . . . The public that read and debated this sort of thing read and debated about itself”
(43). The periodical selfhood translated experience scientifically into self by individuating the
inductive experimentation of the Royal Society. As a methodology, the informal spectating in the
Spectator offers insight into practices and theories that, as the Spectator asserts, allows for a
knowledge even “better than” the understanding of “those engaged in them.” The Spectator’s
“exact Neutrality” opens his inquiry to consider all aspects of the people he observes, and
through this impartiality he has become conversant with the full range of practices particular to
any field, the “Statesmen, Soldier, Merchant, and Artizan.” By scrutinizing the particulars of
practice closely, the Spectator has become “very well versed in the Theory” of husbandry or of
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“Oeconomy” and “Business.” The knowledge he has garnered autodidactically through his
empirical inquiry even trumps the self-understanding of the people he observes. The Spectator’s
inquiry allows him to “discern the Errors” that “are apt to escape those” whose practices actually
constitute “the Game.” In this instance, inductive practices affect selfhood by eliciting a selfgovernance on the part of the observer based on the actions of the observed. The function of the
Spectator as a self represents the empirical practices and didactic effects of an inductive
epistemology on selfhood.26

Individuating the New Scientific Epistemology: A Responsible Rhetoric for Relaying Selfhood
As daily periodical writers, Addison and Steele describe themselves as scientists of the
human condition with a responsibility to communicate with their audience. They eschewed the
“rests and Nodding-places” of the “voluminous Writer,” because, as writers who publish “by
Piece-meal,” they must “immediately fall into . . . [the] Subject, or . . . [their] Papers are thrown
by as dull and insipid” (1.506). Given the periodical essayist’s limits, an “Essay writer must
practise in the Chymical Method, and give the virtue of a full Draught in a few Drops” (1.506).
Their scientific approach exhibits a responsive and responsible rhetoric, aligned with Locke’s
prescriptions for rhetoric and language. Since rhetoric and epistemology are inseparable, Locke’s
call for rhetorical reform simultaneously helps create the inductive paradigm by opening a
26

While the Spectator endorses a method that invites readers to apply their own empirical reason and learn from
what they see, the aesthetic moralizing of the Spectator papers are not fully inductive and can be heavy-handed in
their prescriptions. J. Paul Hunter has commented that the “sheer amount of . . . advice provided in popular print—in
periodicals like The Athenian Mercury or The Spectator, in journalistic narratives of contemporary life, and in
dedicated treatises and tracts—argues a voracious public appetite for being told what to do. . . the attitude is all
‘ought’ and ‘must’” (246). It is a criticism that underscores the emergent quality of the inductive epistemology. It is
a motif that drives the periodical, but it is not the only methodology at play. McKeon reminds that “[t]he later
authority of ‘scientific method’ should not lead us to suppose a more or less instantaneous success. Indeed,
throughout the seventeenth century, ‘empirical’ continued to possess largely pejorative connotations as an
ungrounded practice . . . based on observation and experience, whose efficacy could not be explained” (“Dramatic”
200). Its emergence is a context for the emergence of other genres and advanced through the application of existing
ones, like the periodical.
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discursive space and by giving expression to its full articulation. Kuhn describes the particularity
of any scientific rhetoric as “an esoteric vocabulary,” suited to describing and articulating the
epistemology (Kuhn 64). Of the four books that comprise An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, Locke devotes an entire book to words, language, and rhetoric. A rhetoric that
matches an inductive epistemology must represent experience accurately, giving evidential
details that lay bare a discovery or invite readers to understand a new scientific principle, “giving
the virtue of a full draft in a few drops.” In order for the articulation of the scientific paradigm to
become normative, it must embody reproducible methods and practices for research, as well as a
vocabulary that accounts for these new means of knowledge making.
The insights garnered from this process were also a part of articulating the new scientific
paradigm. Another important step in this process that Sprat records was the documentation of the
Royal Society’s findings to advance scientific understanding by rendering older paradigms
obsolete (61). The goals for documentation make clear the larger, pedagogical program of the
new science that Sprat and the Society promoted. Locke’s epistemology of selfhood is connected
to a rhetorical model that emphasizes accessibility, like Sprat, for fundamentally pedagogical
ends. Locke argues that “those, who pretend seriously to search after, or maintain Truth, should
think themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity,
Doubtfulness, or Equivocation,” and he provides “Rules” in order “[t]o remedy the Defects of
Speech” (3.11.3, 8). The new science develops alongside a new rhetoric that asks readers to draw
conclusions and make judgments based on language that expresses facts without “obscurity,
doubtfulness, or equivocation.”
Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood, Jude David Law suggests, cannot be
oversimplified simply as a model for cognition. Law notes how closely both parts of the
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epistemology, the theoretical and rhetorical, are intertwined: “Locke’s account of knowledge and
experience relies alternately on two radically different accounts of cognition: one modeled on
visual perception and the other on the structure and effects of verbal language. The distinction is
not an openly acknowledged, let alone a systematic, one in the Essay” (51). A focus on how
Locke’s theories aided the formation of the biographical rhetoric of self must foreground the
“effects of verbal language” Locke outlines in his model, while paying due attention to the
epistemology that warrants claims about language and rhetoric. Language signifies a fluidity of
selfhood that can evacuate or entirely redefine itself, since words form understanding and selfrecognition. The significance of language in exemplifying an epistemology of selfhood resonates
in the rhetoric of self devised by eighteenth-century biographers, whose subjects that can be
observed empirically and represented rhetorically
For Locke, rhetoric and language are even more integral to the epistemology of the
inductive paradigm than they are in Sprat. He assigns two functions, civil and philosophical to
language and rhetoric. While the civic implications overlap the epistemological of philosophical
rhetoric, Locke distinguishes between the “Civil” and “Philosophical” uses in the
“communication by Words”:
First, By their civil Use, I mean such a communication of Thoughts and Ideas by
Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce,
about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life, in the Societies of
Men, one amongst another. Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean
such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to
express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind
may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge. (3.9.3)
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A “civil use” in Locke’s account of language reflects his own scientific practices, which
necessitated a productive interaction with people outside of the Society, so that the “Essay’s
revaluation of civil discourse grows from a recognition that whatever progress is possible in
natural philosophy depends on the efforts of mechanical hands” (Walmsley 145). The
foundational role that artisans play in Locke’s delineation of the civil use of language implies a
commonality of experience, “the ordinary and Conveniencies of civil Life,” maintained by a
“Conversation and Commerce” in society at large. The task of language is to “uphold” these
conversations and the connections they signify, much in the same way it made commerce
possible between the sciences and the trades and between Locke and the laborers. In this use,
language integrates society. A biographer seeking to portray selfhood in its context would have
to attend to the affairs and “conveniencies” in which it occurred. In the “philosophical use,” on
the other hand, language plays a much more specific role. Rather than upholding general, social
discourse, the philosophical use Locke locates in language functions to express with “precision”
and “certainty” of truths beyond doubt “which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with.”
This philosophical use of language fixes ideas that are stripped of superfluity with an insight
distilled from what might be the sort of dull and insipid excess of language that worried Addison
and Steele.
Both the civil and philosophical uses that Locke ascribes to language are social—words
“are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief end of Language.
The Use of Language is, by short sounds, to signifie with ease and dispatch general
Conceptions”—but this social aspect is more significant than simply facilitating the
“convenience of communication” (3.5.7). In the first instance, language serves a necessary
function, linking people and groups socially. This civil function is not as responsible to precision
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or the attention to certainty that the philosophical use requires. It does not pin down truth. It
does, however, respond to the “affairs and conveniencies” that delimit what will be considered
“ordinary.” In its civil use, language requires a specificity to uphold and maintain relationships
between groups like scholar and artisans. In examining the scientific rhetoric espoused by
Locke’s own writing and advocated in the Essay, Peter Walmsley observes that “Locke’s
scientific interests . . . tended toward practice and use rather than theory . . . Moreover Locke’s
study of nature inevitably brought him into conversation with mechanics, craftsmen, and laborers
as much as with scholars”(143). Locke’s practicality was in service of his own scientific inquiry
and how scientific inquiry or natural philosophy might serve the world beyond the Royal
Society.
The practicality of language’s civil uses facilitated interactions between the Society and
tradespeople, though each was guided by a different set of immediate interests: “[t]hose of his
fellows in the Royal Society who were committed to the history of trades had all insisted on the
importance of attending carefully to the artisan’s own account of his or her work” (143). For
Locke, interaction with the tradespeople served the needs of his research, but for the Society
members “committed to the history of trades,” the interaction and its careful recording was the
object of the research itself. Walmsley aligns Locke’s conversation with the specialists of the
Royal Society and of different trades. Sprat, too, stresses this conversation between science and
commerce. It is a conversation that requires the Society to attend both to tradespeople’s practical
expertise and their transmission of that expertise in order to make the work of both groups
accessible to the other. Members of the Royal Society sought civil outcomes beyond advancing
their own empiricism, rectifying “errors” in understanding, or opening news areas of inquiry. A
rhetoric that reflects experience as accurately as possible would allow the Society to open its
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findings and documentation, as Sprat argues, to scholars and tradespeople. Steven Shapin and
Simon Schaffer observe that “[w]hat sustained experimental space” in the seventeenth century
was “[t]he nascent laboratory of the Royal Society and other experimental places [that] were
producing things that were widely wanted in Restoration society . . . The experimentalist’s task
was to show others that their problems could be solved if they came to the experimental
philosopher and the space he occupied in Restoration culture” (Shapin and Schaffer 339-40).
Given an audience ideally larger than the Society’s own members, documentation of the
Society’s findings had to offer access to the full, potential range of readers. Like Sprat’s model
for rhetoric, Locke called for one in which language facilitated inductive reasoning.
The language that facilitated intersections between professionals and scientists was
paramount for bridging the distance between members of reading communities, the varied “Taste
of forty or fifty thousand Readers” of the Spectator, for instance (Addison and Steele 1.506). The
civil use of language, too, would make the remove between a reader’s experiences amenable to
those represented biographically. Addison and Steele comment on the writing of the new science
and class scientific writing with historical writing that “describes every thing in so lively a
manner, that . . . [the] whole History is an admirable Picture, and touches on such proper
Circumstances in every Story, that his Reader becomes a kind of Spectator” (3.574). The
aesthetic practice that Addison and Steele describe here echoes the scientific practice of the
Restoration scientist, which renders a reader into a virtual witness of an event experiment’s
narrative. They argue that “among this Sett of Writers, there are none who more gratifie and
enlarge the Imagination, than the Authors of the new Philosophy, whether we consider their
Theories of the Earth or Heavens, the Discoveries they have made by Glasses, or any other of
their Contemplations on Nature,” and the effect is that “we are lost in such a Labyrinth of Suns
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and Worlds, and confounded with the immensity and Magnificence of Nature” (3.574-5). The
effect of thorough, careful documentation is to excite the imagination so that it appeals to human
understanding, even though such documentation risks overwhelming it. Making the documents
accessible would make the scientist and the epistemology more available, showing seventeenthcentury readers “that their problems could be solved if they came to the experimental
philosopher” and, more importantly, teaching them how to draw their own conclusions from
those developed by the new science and philosophers like Locke.
The rhetoric championed by Sprat and Locke would invite readers to adopt an inductive
methodology so that they would come to generate knowledge for themselves autodidactically
from the facts that the new science presented. Not only do the Spectator’s empirical practices of
observation, discussion, and conclusion lend themselves to social discussions of taste and
opinion, but also to other fields of inquiry. The Spectator somewhat satirically acknowledges an
affinity with his
Brothers and Allies, . . . the Fraternity of Spectators who live in the World
without having any thing to do in it; and . . . have no other Business with the rest
of Mankind but to look upon them. Under this class of men are comprehended all
contemplative Tradesmen, titular Physitians, Fellows of the Royal Society,
Templers that are not given to be contentious, and Statesmen that are out of
Business. In short, every one that considers the World as a Theater and desires to
form a right Judgment of those who are Actors on it. (1.45-6)
In this instance, spectating provides a means for those who would “form a right Judgment.” No
conclusion can be drawn without it. Observation is a ready starting point for empiricism that the
“fraternity of spectators” can apply to fields as varied as the arts, sciences, and business, as well
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as printing and the market for periodicals like the Spectator. The rightness of a judgment, its
soundness and accuracy, depends on the empirical standards to which the Spectator initially
gestures: close observation from a careful remove in order to amass the information allows him
to induce more thoroughly the practices of a larger system or, as he labels it, a game played
artizans, craftsmen, soldiers, and other professions. But it also encourages the “decence” that
Sprat postulated as the outcome of a scientific practice (90). The Spectator conceives right
judgment in scientific terms as a verifiable conclusion drawn from inductive practice about any
topic that plays across the “theater” of the “world.”
The civic uses of language that Locke emphasizes recall Sprat’s own appeal for an
English academy that would match the Royal Society to improve communication. Establishing a
mode of common language that made event experiments and demonstration accessible to all
would also make widely available the didactic experiences through which readers would become
virtual witnesses and apply their own reason to draw conclusions about scientific principles.
Procedurally, people could also apply their reason to an understanding of others to improve
themselves. For Locke, such social considerations are important, but less substantive than the
philosophical implications of language and rhetoric for his conceptualization of human
understanding. Language plays a fundamental role in the definition of selfhood and is
foundational for translating sense and reflection into the details that a person might come to
recognize as a persistent selfhood over time. For Locke, a careful consideration of words “may . .
. lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how great
a dependence our Words have on common sensible Ideas . . . to conceive those Operations they
experimented in themselves . . . [and] to signify those internal Operations of their own minds”
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(3.1.5). Language gives personal, individuated significance to what is perceived, retained, and
discerned; it gives a vocabulary to neutral, empirical self-recognition.
In its philosophical use, language also serves a social end, since it requires an exactitude
that relates knowledge authoritatively, without doubt or need for any disputation to define its
meaning. The precision and certainty that Locke prescribes for the philosophical use of language
corrects what Locke regards as a fundamental failing in understandings of language:
It has not, that I know, hitherto been taken notice of by any Body, what Words
are, and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is (as I am apt to
think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling, and obscurity of Men’s
Discourses, whilst some demand definitions of Terms, that cannot be defined; and
others think, they ought to rest satisfied, in an Explication made by a more general
Word , and in Restriction, . . . when even after such Definition made according to
rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of
the Word, than they had before. (3.4.4)
“Wrangling” with “obscurity” to establish a certainty of meaning is, for Locke, fundamentally
divisive and, thus, dangerous. Its end is not to advance knowledge or gratify understanding, but,
rather, bald disputation. Such competition defies the collaborative science the Royal Society
advanced: “[t]he purpose of disputation is not the discovery and sharing of knowledge, but rather
the development and display of personal logical dexterity and, in most cases, the claiming of
personal legitimacy . . . No one attending a dispute would expect to hear solutions but were there
to witness and applaud the agility of disputants” (Walmsley 119). Locke promotes a collective,
agreed-upon understanding over the “personal logical dexterity” of individual disputants. Rather
than furthering contention, Locke advocates philosophical use of language upon “which the
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Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge” (3.9.3). A
perspicuous style inspires confidence that can resolve disputes in meaning, so that “minds may
rest upon” the language it has in common.
Because of the civic and philosophical implications of language, Locke famously attacks
rhetorical practices that were typical of the Civil Wars throughout his Essay. Such direct attacks
are a common trope in the empirical writings of the new scientists. They are as evident in Sprat’s
History as in Locke’s philosophy. These attacks, however, are not directed at rhetoric and its
epistemological import in general, but at the florid rhetoric associated with older models for
understanding. Howell states that the “tradition [Locke] demolished had said that man obtained
valid knowledge about himself and his world by examining propositions previously established
in connection with all of the subjects of human concern, and by treating those propositions as
alone capable of yielding complete certainty in all sciences” (Eighteenth-Century 267). Rather,
Locke sought to displace the older rhetorical models with the empirical models of the Royal
Society: Locke’s “denunciation of prearranged contrivances of style, and his advocacy of the
plain, perspicuous utterance, help to convince all sectors of the public that speeches and writings
did not have to keep to the vocabulary of the initiated, but could use the idiom of everyday life”
(Howell, Eighteenth-Century 501). Much like the split between the civil and philosophical uses
for language the Essay outlines, Locke also distinguishes between times when the rhetoric of
“everyday life” is appropriate. Such rhetoric would prove appropriate for representing experience
in an event experiment or a biography. Much like the accessibility Sprat requires of rhetorical
expression in order for readers to draw conclusions from narrative accounts of fact, Locke calls
for a rhetoric that is straightforward, transparent, and open, which can only be achieved through
an accessible rhetoric that evinces a “calm, dispassionate manner, with its stylistic self-
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effacement and studied refusal of ornament and rhythm” (Richetti 67). It is the neutrality with
which the Spectator claims to approach every human scene. Locke advocates an inviting style,
like the Spectator’s neutrality, to unite a variety of readers in larger considerations, which offers
the potential to uphold conversation and commerce.
Johnson would commend Addison’s normative, empirical, democratic standard for
rhetoric in The Lives of the Poets for being accessible both to specialists and non-specialists:
“[h]is prose is the model of the middle stile; on grave subjects not formal, on light occasions not
groveling; pure without scrupulosity, and exact without apparent elaboration; always equable,
and always easy, without glowing words or pointed sentences” (Lives XXII.678). What Johnson
locates in Addison’s rhetoric is the “model of the middle style” that can appeal to all readers and
invite them to draw conclusions from factual information rather than “glow words or pointed
sentences.” Addison’s rhetoric puts content before style, and “Addison never deviates from his
track to snatch a grace; he seeks no ambitious ornaments, and tries no hazardous innovations. His
page is always luminous, but never blazes in unexpected splendor” (Lives XXII.678). Johnson’s
analysis assumes that the “luminous” page, one that lights the way for a reader to draw
conclusions inductively, deserves commendation over the page that depends on “ambitious,”
rhetorical “ornament,” the sort of “blazing” ornament characteristic of earlier models of
deductive disputation.
In Addison, Johnson finds a rhetorical approach to his Londoner readers and the
widening British audience as the Spectator papers gained popularity because
if his language had been less idiomatical, it might have lost somewhat of its
genuine anglicism. What he attempted, he performed; he is never feeble, and he
did not wish to be energetick; he is never rapid, and he never stagnates. His
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sentences have neither studied amplitude, nor affected brevity: his periods, though
not diligently rounded, are voluble and easy. Whoever wishes to attain an English
stile, familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days
and nights to the volumes of Addison. (Lives XXII.678)
Addison’s style follows the pattern of an inductive rhetoric employed by the new scientists to
articulate an inductive epistemology. Locke argued that “Words, especially of Languages already
framed, being no Man’s private possession, but the common measure of Commerce and
Communication, ’tis not for any one, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in . . .
Men’s intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood” (3.11.11). In following
an easy, middle style, Johnson claims that Addison’s rhetoric achieves a “genuine Anglicism”
that typifies an “English style,” high praise which unites methodology and national ideals. Such a
style would not only enable commerce between members of reading communities, but it would
help them improve themselves as self-governing readers.27 Locke’s distinction between
entertainment and improvement matches the distinction Johnson makes in analyzing the
strengths of Addison’s rhetoric. Locke’s theory makes a place for entertainment in service of
instruction, “[s]ince Wit and Fancy find easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and
real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an
imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight,
than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass
for faults” (3.10.34). But Locke criticizes the ends of entertainment by pairing “wit and fancy”
with “pleasure and delight” and pitting them against “dry truth and real knowledge” and
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As increasingly self-governing readers, eighteenth-century reading audiences were developing the savvy reading
practices within the context of a variably print culture. Modern readers can assume certain fixities in print that allow
their degree of self-governance to focus less on print practice and more on interpretive practice.
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“information and improvement.” He also brands “figurative speech,” “allusion,” and
“ornaments” as undesirable outside of entertainment.
Locke’s critiques point back to older rhetorical models, the disputations that “were
central to the curriculum of English universities in Locke’s day . . . To Locke’s colleagues in the
Royal Society, the disputation epitomized all that was stagnant and word-bound in
scholasticism” (Walmsley 118). A style depending on ornamental language and figurative speech
evoked this model of understanding and associated it with exclusivity and “stagnation.” For
Locke, this sort of language is a “perfect cheat” (3.10.34). The nature of this cheat is stylistic,
characteristically bound to a competitive model of disputation, “laudable and allowable [for]
Oratory . . . in Harangues and popular Address” (3.10.34), but nonetheless a cheat because
all the Art of Rhetorick . . . all the artificial and figurative application of Words
Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move
the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment . . . ‘Tis evident how much Men
love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick, that powerful instrument of
Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has
always been had in great reputation. (3.10.34)
Locke implies that the outcomes of the “art of rhetoric” in “oratory,” “harangues,” and “popular
address” signified the cheat, associating it with the university rather than the Royal Society. In
creating a rhetoric of self, the eighteenth-century biographer who followed Locke’s critiques of
older rhetorical models had to represent a person precisely.
The correction Locke prescribes for the deceptive ends of the “art of rhetoric” is
directness and transparency. Locke argues that “Men’s Intentions in speaking are, or at least
should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other
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the like incommodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common Use. Propriety of
Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Men’s minds with the great ease
and advantage” (3.11.11). Directness of address can only accomplished by considering “common
usage,” addressing a clear topic with a clear purpose. A direct, rhetorical style, one that “gives
our thoughts entrance into other men’s minds,” is based largely on familiar expression that
evokes a familiarity with common experience, through the directness of expression, coupled with
transparency in purpose and explanation. It is a change preceded by the formative move from the
primacy of Latin to the vernacular Benedict Anderson describes in theorizing imagined
community (39-42). The crucial point, however, is that rhetoric gives a speaker, a scientist, an
essayist, a biographer access and entrance to another person’s mind.
The effective inductive rhetoric that Locke prescribes for general use depends on a plain,
transparent diction that strives to be as factual, accurate, and representative as the facts it relates.
An inductive rhetoric is not devoid of calculated rhetorical moves, but characterized by rhetorical
effects that invite a reader to draw conclusions, unlike a deductive rhetoric that begins with
conclusions and proceeds to proofs. Coaxing readers to induce conclusions for themselves from a
body of details is to defer to the new science’s epistemological obligations to an inductive
paradigm. But as Locke argues and the Spectator demonstrates, an inductive rhetoric has the
potential to enact what the substitution of the Restoration scientist’s identity for the factious
identities of the Civil Wars had promised all along: to foster a civic and social responsibility that
would train readers to induce civic and social patterns of truth from the facts they read and,
especially, the facts of their experience. More to the point, an inductive rhetoric makes the
didactic potential of the inductive paradigm plausible, giving rise to systems of prose genres
charged with a responsibility to help readers educate themselves.
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The emergence of the new science made a new notion of life writing possible in the late
seventeenth century. The inductive epistemology that Sprat ascribes to the Royal Society hinges
on an experimental model that renders experience into narratives that establish scientific fact:
experimentation follows a cyclical, inductive pattern of inquiry that collects facts from which
theories are developed, tested, observed, and adjusted based on the new facts generated by
experimentation. The empirical methodology allows for an increasingly in-depth examination of
the natural world. North applies this methodology to selfhood and life writing. While his theory
follows the contemporary patterns of Restoration scientific methodology, North’s model for life
writing was publish in full for three hundred years after he prescribed rules for an innovative
approach to biography. The genre emerged independently of North’s theory of life writing, but
nevertheless along the same empirical lines that the new science had established. In John
Locke’s conceptualization, the epistemology of the inductive paradigm moved from a model for
comprehending the natural world to an empirical model for comprehending human
understanding. Locke’s inductive model for selfhood held the potential for a pattern of selfimprovement as cyclical as the empirical model Sprat had described earlier: by observing and
reflecting on the facts of oneself and one’s experiences, a person could change and create new
facts and new experiences that would lead sounder logic, ethics, and morals. The impetus for
change lies in part in the late seventeenth-century vacuum of a fixed monarchical relationship
between the governing and governed and a rising middle class that stood as a public in relation to
traditional forms of state authority. A beheaded monarch and a deposed monarch of the same
house necessitated the creation of an empiricism that would yield a logic, ethics, and morality
removed from the passions of seventeenth-century civil discord and apropos of the social
situation developing in the long eighteenth century.
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The emergence of eighteenth-century biography within this empirical context emulates
the core practices and values that distinguish the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive
paradigm. The normative standards this scientific model provide made it possible for biographers
to gather as wide a range of facts as possible that could be credited as the experiences of the
person they sought to write. Such credit came from observation—facts from other people that put
the person in observable view of many people. The biography itself also put the person in view.
Eighteenth-century biography developed a rhetoric of self that would allow a reader to determine
selfhood from the facts the biographer presented. This rhetorical arrangement allowed the
biographer to create choices for the reader. In the next chapter, I will focus eighteenth-century
print culture shaped the generation of the observable facts from which readers located selfhood,
and, particularly, facts that allowed authors like Samuel Johnson and Oliver Goldsmith to
arrange for a reader to discern a self in their Life of Richard Savage and Life of Richard Nash.
The development of its methods that would come to define the new science made the emergence
of other fields of inquiry possible, even in literature. The emergence of the new scientific
epistemology redefined older models of life writing to develop a new biographical rhetoric of
self that could scientifically interrogate selfhood and scrupulously represent it. The eighteenthcentury biographer becomes something like a literary scientist, devoted to a record of accurate,
verifiable facts arranged into a clear, direct rhetoric of self.
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Chapter 2—Locating the Self:
Print Culture and a New Ethics of Reading

Seventeenth-century life writing exploded into a fast-flourishing genre during the
eighteenth century, “a time when the public appetite for biography was insatiable” (Butt 43). Not
only were quarto and folio length biographies popular, but any writing that opened personal life
to public scrutiny garnered attention and, too, the notoriety of scandal. Such a hunger for
evidence of life also led to the rise of the obituary. The brief biographical records of personal
lives began in 1731 with the first issue of Edward Cave’s ambitious, enduring project, the
Gentleman’s Magazine. The growing popularity of the obituary form provided a context that
allowed ephemera to swell into full biographical proportions and significance, not unlike
biography’s own emergence in the eighteenth century. Obituary grew from a simple record of
death to a more thoroughly-wrought memory of life. Readers had also been titillated by Lord
Chesterfield’s personal Letters to his Son, which scandalized its public audience with insight into
a famous man’s private thoughts. “It is now become so much the fashion to publish letters,”
James Boswell recalls Samuel Johnson commenting as they dined with a bookseller, “that in
order to avoid it, I put as little into mine as I can” (Life, iv.102). Johnson recognized his
contemporary readers’ desire for anything personal. Booksellers did, too. They fed the market
and were at the same time shaped by its appetites for personal life rendered as public selfhood by
print. Increasingly, an undocumented life was an unlived life, and the greater the documentation,
the more comprehensive the biography.
The popularization of the biographical form emerged with the rise of a burgeoning print
culture, increasingly hungry for the authentic details of private lives, which dovetailed with the
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New Science’s inductive epistemology. The form consequently depended on new sources that
privileged the sort of increased documentation that made biographical lives more verifiable and
observable, more like the factual account of Royal Society event experiment. Most significantly,
the inductive standards for credentialing print information developed a biographical form that
forced readers to evaluate rhetorics of self in eighteenth-century English biography in order to
educate themselves and improve their own lives. In this chapter, I examine how Samuel Johnson
in An Account of the Life of Richard Savage, Son of Earl Rivers28 and Oliver Goldsmith with his
Life of Richard Savage, Esq. locate the details of their biographies within the glut of documents
and manuscripts that characterize the period in order to arrange rhetorics of self that force
readers to make ethical, interpretive decisions about the lives they read.

Inductive Choice: The New Ethics of Reading
The empirical promise of inductive science was a fuller understanding of the natural
world. Its experimental methodology cycled repeatedly through observation, experimentation,
and theorization to accumulate information. The buildup of details ultimately allowed for
scientific accounts that would more clearly depict the natural world in order to lay bare its
fundamental operations. Such a lofty goal put a premium on experimental research and its
representation, charging both with an ethical significance. The responsibility of the Restoration
scientist was two-fold. First, the scientist owed a responsibility to accuracy in the
implementation of experiments. Scientific reports required good data to draw the sort of
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When referencing Johnson’s biographical account of Richard Savage’s life, I will refer to his later publication in
the Lives of the English Poets. Johnson revised it very little from his initial biographical account of Savage’s life, An
Account of the Life of Richard Savage, Son of Earl Rivers. When reference to the former edition is necessary, I will
distinguish it as the Lives; the latter, as the Account. A third complication will be important the discussion of
Johnson’s biography: I will refer to Johnson’s anonymously-authored source text, The Life of Mr. Richard Savage as
the Mr. Savage.
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conclusions that would prove foundational to successive cycles of inquiry, experimentation, and
hypothesis. Secondly, the scientist was also responsible to a community of readers made up of
both scientists as well as laypeople, who should be able to discern the truth accurately for
themselves given an apt representation of the findings, however voluminous those
representations came to be.
The cycle of research and reporting that characterizes the Scientific Revolution thrived on
an excess of detail.29 Rhetorically, the accumulation of detail presented by scientific reports in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inverted the rigid, classical canon of deductive
invention, in which the orator used to guide a passive audience to accept an argument
syllogistically, in favor of a new, sprawling arrangement that invited the reader to engage facts
and make specific, interpretive choices about what those facts mean. The more active, inductive
model offered greater didactic promise. It inundated readers with possibilities for understanding
and authorized them to use their reason in order to discern for themselves. This new, active
ethics of reading emerging in the Scientific Revolution required conscientious choice. Readerobservers were not only authorized, but even obligated to choose the strongest argument for
themselves. This process shifts the responsibility of interpreting information and drawing
conclusions from the speaker or writer to listeners and readers, which makes the process of
drawing conclusions from voluminous detail intensely personal. It is an effect that would be
amplified by the period’s almost voyeuristic obsession: the publication of private letters and the
intimate details of public lives.
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Thomas S. Kuhn has argued that “three normal foci for scientific investigation” articulate scientific paradigms and
are marked by experimental inquiry that seeks to show how the paradigm is applicable to a “larger variety of
situations,” to demonstrate continuity and “agreement” within that variety, and to find “alternative ways of applying
the paradigm to . . . new area[s] of interest” (25). Such goals can only be accomplished through a repeated and
extensive cycle of experimentation.
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Ethically, this method of writing invited the individual reader to make a personal decision
about the life represented in print, a decision characterized by its rightness. Other readers,
drawing a similar conclusions based on their personal estimation of what constitutes right, would
naturally group into a community of readers; their process of reading and drawing conclusions
would determine a print ethic of sociability. Roger Chartier locates these communities within
“the norms and conventions of reading that define, for each community of readers, legitimate
uses of the book, ways to read, and the instruments and methods of interpretations” (Chartier 4).
In order to theorize how communities conceptualize and imagine themselves, Benedict Anderson
argues that print, particularly the newspaper form, made a communal identity imaginable
because it conveyed a community mutually existing in time, though not necessarily in place, a
complication balanced by members’ shared reading practices, through which they are able to
imagine themselves and their differences from other communities (33-6). Joseph Addison
famously dubbed the community-building effect of print culture the “republic of letters” (2.2536). Addison’s republic of letters marries a self-sustaining, self-governing notion of community to
the print culture that opens a place for such a community.30
Nowhere is the sociability of this republic of letters more clear than in the advent of the
Gentleman’s Magazine in 1731, which introduced the magazine. This new print form sought to
reprint articles from the prominent newspapers and news sheets of London. Newspapers
appealed to political parties and responded both to the events of the time and to each other. They
were a sometimes-subtle blend of propaganda and fact, rife with mis- and disinformation. The
30

Jürgen Habermas has argued that the republic of letters Addison describes generated a public sphere, with
participants defined not by their capacity to draw distinctions, but by their education and their property (42, 56).
While they do participate in a critical-rational debate to define a bourgeois model of what public means, their
choices are not characterized by an ethical authority, but rather the structuring a public sphere as an corporate
authority that can stand against the sphere of public authority, against established government (29-30). While
Habermas claims his public sphere refers to a specific category of the middle class, the communities of readers that
Anderson describes are not bound by specific class restraints. Anderson’s communities, however, do not have to
imagine themselves in relation to socio-political authority, just in the shared context of like-minded readers.
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Gentleman’s Magazine assembled these viewpoints under its own heading, often printing
politically contrary news in side-by-side columns for easy comparison (Carlson 56). The
magazine depicted various viewpoints within larger political conversations so that readers could
exercise their reason on these viewpoints, defining themselves and the larger group their view
matched.
The importance of choice that moves a reader from the limitations of what is already
known to what can be concluded by considering all that is known highlights the productive
tension emerging from the empirical context of Restoration science as it was made manifest in
the practices of a new print culture. Resolving this tension was a question of choice for the
reader, the crux of the ethics of reading. Learning to make the most appropriate choices and to
draw the best conclusions from what was known had an autodidactic effect that authors like
Thomas Sprat and John Locke imagined. Induction is a process that depends on what can be
known, but that ultimately privileges choice as the hallmark of understanding. Restoration and
eighteenth-century authors channeled the autodidactic implications of these new protocols of
representation into rhetorical choices that would set up readers to develop their own
understandings.
Distinctly eighteenth-century forms like the novel and biography did not emerge in a
literary vacuum. Each informed the other, adapting generic markers for different ends, much like
the novel mimics the biographical selfhood’s dependence on actual lived experience with
imagined approximations of experience. Poetry was not exempt: the didactic operation of a
complex, fictional character like John Milton’s Satan demonstrates the autodidactic potential of
biographical selfhood, stronger for its application of lived experience. Stanley Fish describes the
experiential, empirical operation through which rhetorical choices have autodidactic effect on the
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reader of Paradise Lost. The process he locates might just as easily refer to an eighteenth-century
biography. Reading is an experience that he terms “affective stylistics” and treats the process of
making “meaning as an event” (Self-Consuming 383, 392). It is a pattern with inductive
foundations that frame a relationship between authors and readers in which reading is “no longer
an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of,
the reader,” and as an event, “[i]t is an experience; it occurs; it does something; it makes us do
something” (Self-Consuming 386, 393). What can be known and what can be concluded “does
something” to the reader that, in turn, makes “us do something” as readers—the autodidactic
upshot is a right action. If reading is an experience that moves readers to act, reading biographies
would invite readers to an experience an actual selfhood and react to the print person they meet
there, both to understand that person and themselves.
The experience of a print selfhood that triggered an autodidactic effect through an
affective stylistics was prevalent in most systems of prose emerging alongside an inductive
epistemology, such as the novel, biography, and the periodical, and in reimagining
representations of self in extant genres like poetry. The print self’s operation on the reader,
whether it is factual or fictitious, has didactic potential, since readers must induce the life and
character from fictitious or, in the example of biography, factual experiences. Meeting a self in
print, the Spectator, a biographical selfhood, or John Milton’s Satan, is itself an experience for
the reader, “an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader.” This
ethical imperative of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writing is the impetus that drives John
Milton’s Paradise Lost to make the reader “do something.” 31 Milton’s poem poses doctrinal
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Suggesting a defined difference between science writing and imaginative literature of the period neglects an
overlap in ethical function and content. Samuel Johnson, for instance, points Milton’s application of contemporary
astronomical research and discovery to Paradise Lost. In his “Life of Milton,” Johnson notes that Milton’s “great
excellence is amplitude, and he expands the adventitious image beyond the dimensions which the occasion required.
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questions centered on the character of Satan that had famously dogged readers: how could
Milton’s “justify the ways of God to men” (I.26) by valorizing the figure of Satan and his
demonic subversiveness?
Historically, Milton’s readers have drawn the wrong conclusions from Paradise Lost in
their experience with Satan’s character. Their misunderstandings of a fictional character
underscore the experiential significance of a witnessing factual self. Readers in Milton’s own
generation found the tension between Satan’s dominance and God’s order in Paradise Lost hard
to resolve. John Dryden, for instance, introduces his own translation of Virgil’s Aeneid by
compiling a list of heroic poets: Milton might have lain claim to the distinction “if the Devil had
not been his Heroe instead of Adam” (v.276). Dryden’s reading reduced the ethical and religious
import of the poem to character study, the Devil versus Adam. Joseph Addison, likewise,
focused on Milton’s poetic personae and also found the tension impossible to resolve within the
possibilities the poem itself presents: “Paradise Lost is an Epic, or a Narrative Poem, and he that
looks for an Hero in it, searches for that which Milton never intended, but if he will needs fix the
Name of Hero upon any Person in it, ‘tis certainly the Messiah who is the Hero, both in the
Principal Action, and in the chief Episodes” (3.59). Addison reasons that, since the Messiah is
the victor in the “Principal Action” of the Christian story of human redemption, then the Messiah
must also be the hero in Milton’s retelling. What could be known about Paradise Lost was a
matter of faith so fixed it hardly needed Addison’s reminder. Every seventeenth- or eighteenthcentury reader approaching the Christian story of humankind’s downfall would know that the
Messiah is the hero. What could be concluded from Milton’s poem, however, inverted readers’

Thus, comparing the shield of Satan to the orb of the moon, he crowds the imagination with the discovery of the
telescope, and all the wonders which the telescope discovers” (Lives 191). The fullness of Milton’s detail, even in
seemingly nonessential imagery, “crowds the imagination” and invites the reader to connect the religious and the
scientific to the poetic.
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expectations so sharply that it hardly needed Dryden to point it out—the character of Satan is the
hero or, at least, the sympathetic anti-hero.32 The poem’s tension forces readers to make a
discomforting, contrary choice with ethical implications. They can distrust their reason or their
faith.
Stanley Fish unravels the knot of these equally unappealing conclusions about Satan in
Paradise Lost to argue that Milton’s theodicy and heroic vision of Satan cohere doctrinally and
educate readers, since it makes an event of reading that forces an ethical choice on the reader. In
Fish’s explication, “the reader is presented with a series of interpretive puzzles whose solution
either contributes to or undermines his understanding of the poem’s great issues” (Surprised
236). These “puzzles” hinge on a rhetoric that tempts the reader to misinterpret the satanic causes
and consequences of the Fall. This rhetorical strategy forces the reader into an experience with
the poem that can only be resolved through “two stages: in the first, the reader is brought face to
face with the corruption within him, as he is made aware of the confusion reigning in his scale of
values and of the inadequacy of his perceptions” (Surprised 340). The educational upshot of this
tension comes in the second stage: the heightened awareness invites the reader “to cooperate
with the poem’s effort to effect his regeneration,” to reshape an understanding free from satanic
sympathies (Surprised 340). The experience of reading catches readers in the interpretive,
rhetorical puzzles Milton has written into Paradise Lost so that they will confront the
shortcomings fundamental to their own selfhoods in order to become better people. Milton’s
rhetoric depends on the same level of rhetorical challenge that drives a reader to make choices.
32

Northrop Frye has argued in The Return of Eden that “Paradise Lost is a profoundly anti-romantic and anti-heroic
poem,” which illustrates the dangers of letting the “ego,” in moments of self-doubt or failure, “support and console
us” (28). In Frye’s reading, “Satan is a rebel, and into Satan Milton has put all the horror and distress with which he
contemplated the egocentric revolutionaries of his time . . . There is an almost uncanny anticipation of some of the
moods of later Romanticism, also an age of egocentric revolutionaries” (28). Satan, in this argument, appears as an
argument appealing to the passive reader. He is a given force (that should not surprise savvy readers like Dryden or
Johnson) acting on a passive reader, who recognizes the disparity between an expected evil and the surprise of its
prominence without engaging the experience that connects the two.
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But his rendering of Satan humanizes abstractions of right, wrong, temptation, and sin
fundamental to Christian theology in a literary character, a print persona with a distinct selfhood,
however fictitious, that could challenge a reader’s ethics more directly than a collection of
scientific observations.
In order to present the reader with the sort of “interpretive puzzles” Fish identifies, which
can effect a practical or practicable self-education in Christian theology, Milton had to envision a
community of readers who were capable of self-improvement. Walter Ong has discussed the
rhetorical implications of the relationship between readers and authors, arguing that a “writer
must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role [that]
. . . correspondingly fictionalize[s] itself . . . to play the role in which the author has cast” it
(Interfaces 60-1). Writers’ fictionalization of their audience and the audience’s “corresponding
fictionalization” of itself point to a “game of literacy” that teaches readers “to conform
themselves to the projections of the writers they read and to operate in terms of these projections.
Within the specific context of biography, this fictionalization is a relationship between the reader
and the selfhood of the real person, even though the real person is only a rhetorical
representation created by the writer. 33 Writing, and biography in particular, “intensifies the sense
of self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness raising”
(Orality 179). The fictionalization of this relationship positions readers to know the print person
as intimately as a living person, giving them license to draw sympathetic conclusions. It is a
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Following this line of reasoning, the game biography asks fictional readers to play are distinct from the rules other
genres beg of their fictionalized readers. Biography fictionalizes intimate acquaintance. Ong argues that a “history
of the ways audiences have been called on to fictionalize themselves would be a correlative of the history of literary
genres and literary works, and indeed of culture itself” (Interfaces 60). These different fictionalizations are “the
underside of literary history, of which the topside is the history of genres and the handling of character and plot”
(Ong, Orality 102-3). More important than the chronological trajectory of a life is the set of details that define that
trajectory.
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game of literacy that allows them to comprehend how they can improve their own lives by
empirically spectating the lived experience a rhetoric of self translates into print.
The role eighteenth-century biographers fictionalized for their readers correlates to the
role that Adam Smith theorizes for social interaction in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. In
Smith’s social economy, shared ethical values develop through sympathy, which is only possible
between spectators and the people they spectate. A sympathetic exchange of sentiments depends
on a spectator viewing another person and understanding what that person should do in a
particular situation, what the most moral course of action of is, by imagining what he or she
would do in that same position: “[e]very faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of
the like faculty in another. I judge your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason
by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, your love by my love. I neither have, nor
can have, any other way of judging them” (19). Although spectators substitute their own
sentiments for those of the spectated, they sometimes “feel for another, a passion of which he
himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when . . . [they] put . . . [themselves] in his
case, that passion arises in . . . [their] breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from
the reality” (12). A sympathetic exchange depends as much what can be known about the
spectated as it does the self-understanding of the spectator.
The autodidactic process that Smith describes begins with recognizing the feelings of an
observed person, comparing them with one’s own feelings as a spectator, and drawing
conclusions that, consequently, affect self-understanding. This feeling for another, what Smith
deems “fellow-feeling” (10), is complemented by the sentiments of the observed who will
modulate the strength of his or her own passions in response to those of the spectator (22). The
exchange depends on each participant trying to understand the other by imagining the other
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through the own experience and understanding. The result of this mutual, social interaction is the
formation of shared sentiments that connect a single spectator to an observed person, either real
or fictional. This process unifies people who read such situations similarly, and who thereby
define or reassert shared values.
Eighteenth-century biographers capitalized on the role of imagination in the sympathetic
exchange between people and cast the reader in a fictional role, as an intimate acquaintance of
the figure they represented rhetorically. Biography turns lived experience—like an “event
experiment” of the new science—into print so that readers can share the experience, as if they
are having a personal relationship with the subject. It is a game of literacy after the fashion of the
experimental cycle of inductive science. Reading the print person allowed the reader to act as a
sort of print spectator, engaging the biographical rhetoric of self with the same sort of fellow
feeling appropriate to observing and interacting with a living person. This observational process
and the subsequent sympathetic exchange are matters of choice that depend upon and produce an
ethical readership.
What could be concluded sympathetically depends on what can be observed and
known—this rhetoric of self required the specificity and vivacity of the details that the
biographer provided to produce it. In a print culture characterized by a “glut of information” too
large “to be crammed into a single volume or to be absorbed by a single reader,” the excessive
volume of print swelled by the publication of private documents like letters and diaries
(Eisenstein 88). Evidence of lived experience was increasingly scattered across printed matter;
documentation was the marker of experience. Print became the invitation for all readers to
engage with private lives. Biographers drew on this documentation as a source for locating
selfhood, for gathering the details necessary to present selves so authentic they could be
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interlocutors in a sympathetic reading process, which required readers to make choices about the
information they presented.34 The rapid rise of a print culture, its procedures for documentation
of the self, and its scientific standards for credentialing information developed a biographical
rhetoric of self that required readers to evaluate print selves in order to educate themselves and
improve their own lives.

The Life of Richard Savage: Publicizing the Personal Self in Documentation
Johnsonian scholarship is often at pains to delineate Johnson’s philosophical system since
Johnson never set one down himself. Whatever philosophical model he had in mind as he wrote
poetry, fiction, essays, criticism, and biography is easier to describe than define, particularly
given Boswell’s representation of Johnson’s combative incredulity. This skepticism marks many
of the encounters a reader has with Boswell’s Johnson. He recalls, for instance, Johnson’s
pointed attack of Dr. George Berkley’s theory of immaterialism and the doubt it casts on sensing
the material world. In his Life of Johnson, Boswell shares the anecdote of Johnson’s answer:
“After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkley’s
ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is
merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to
refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with
might force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus’” (Life, i.471). As
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The tension between what a reader could know and what a reader could conclude was made richer by the
instability of eighteenth-century print culture “In an environment where unauthorized printing was seen as a real
possibility, the identity of the author, the authenticity of the text, and the credibility of the knowledge contained in
the text were all therefore destabilized” (Johns, Nature 620). The reader’s experience with the rhetorical, interpretive
puzzles of the text was further complicated by the reader’s experience with the materiality of the text and its
subsequent reliability.
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much as his attack of Berkley resolves the doubt the theory raises in conversation, his
straightforward, self-assured, authoritative style is anything but self-assuring for the reader.
In such an unstable context, a healthy incredulity is a necessity for drawing conclusions
about the immaterial and material, about philosophy and common experience. Howard D.
Weinbrot has observed that Johnson’s thought exhibits a Janus-like quality that simultaneously
looks back, giving deference to the past as a set, guide, but especially attending to the present,
with a distinctly modern “flexibility of approach” (56). Johnson’s flexibility is evident in his
“achievements . . . so varied, so complex, and often so situational that one should not confuse the
part with the whole, or impose our limited categories upon his broad-ranging mind. Johnson after
all was empirical and proceeded ‘according to experience.’ He nonetheless recognized the limits
of experience” (Weinbrot 69). According to Weinbrot, Johnson’s method, if one might be set,
depends on recognizing a situation and the right action it allows. That one approach will not
serve every situation challenges readers to weigh facts and choices judiciously and trains them to
make ethical choices conscientiously.
Perhaps the Janus-like tendency that Weinbrot ascribes to Johnson is part of the reason
Johnson proved to be such a gifted biographer. Michael Maner locates this philosophical ethics
of reading in Johnson’s biographical writing, particularly his Lives of the Poets, where Johnson
applies “constructively skeptical criteria” to evaluate the experiential facts of the poets’ lives he
writes (310). Maner claims that Johnson applied a rigorous skepticism for evaluating the veracity
of evidence or detail presented as a life, like Locke in general (306). His biographical writing
balances the experiential facts that could define a person’s life against what contemporary
readers needed in order to draw conclusions for themselves, both about the life of the person they
read and, autdodiactically, about their own lives. By choosing details that would frustrate easy
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answers or understandings of a person’s life, Johnson represents distinct, recognizable marks of a
selfhood in a biography that would force the reader’s judgment “[b]ecause he believes that the
ultimate moral purpose of biography is the philosophical one strengthening the reader’s
judgment, . . .draw[ing] us into the process of skeptically weighing probabilities . . . Johnson’s
skeptical manner is a form of philosophical dialectic, a way of juxtaposing probabilities and
forcing us to choose” (Maner 302). Johnson’s biographical output, like Milton’s Paradise Lost,
is charged with moral purpose that places ethical demands on readers in order to develop their
own sense of right action.
The booksellers who contracted Johnson “to write,” as he put it, “little Lives, and little
Prefaces, to a little edition of the English Poets” were not investing in his reputation as an
essayist, a literary critic, or even as a moralist, but as one of the preeminent biographers of the
eighteenth century (Life iii.109). The volume of biographical writing that Johnson published
from the outset of his career—ten biographies between 1738 and 1754 in The Gentleman’s
Magazine alone—as well as his particular regard for the form, evident in his conversation and his
essays, helped to popularize biography as it emerged. Johnson’s early reputation as a biographer
rests largely on a biography he published outside of the Gentleman’s Magazine: An Account of
the Life of Richard Savage, Son of the Earl Rivers, which Johnson reprinted later almost
verbatim in the Lives of the Poets. Paula Backscheider has argued that, in writing his Account of
the Life of Richard Savage, Johnson is “examining the life of what might be called an antimodel” (161). In order to write the selfhood of the “anti-model” that Savage’s life offered,
Johnson “expanded the subjects and purposes of biography” and “introduced new kinds of
evidence and new uses of evidence” (Backscheider 161). Through his Account, one of Johnson’s
most noteworthy contributions to biography is the widening scope of evidence he employs,
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drawing on a variety of facts to generate Savage’s textual selfhood, which forces readers to make
ethical choices for determining which proofs are most compellingly and persuasively indicative
of Savage himself. Readers who can come to understand Savage can understand themselves
better. Johnson locates established facts in print that operate at three degrees of removal from
Savage: first, documents penned by anonymous authors and subject to public approval; second,
documents penned by Savage himself; and third, Savage’s own recollections, turned into
documents by Johnson in his capacity as biographer.
Johnson’s reliance on documentation derives from his own investment in eighteenthcentury print culture, which marked a significant departure from the earlier forms and conditions
of writing. He helped to mediate a shifting understanding of authority and authorship in
eighteenth-century print culture. In a famous dispute between Lord Chesterfield and himself,
Johnson refused Chesterfield’s overtures of patronage for the forthcoming Dictionary,35 which
Alvin Kernan reads as “a great event in the history of letters and print, the scene in which not just
Samuel Johnson but the author, after centuries of subservience to the aristocracy, declares . . .
democratic independence of patronage” (20). Johnson’s career, according to Kernan, Chartier,
and others, was on a trajectory from the patron-based system to a model of professional
authorship. Johnson, originally bound to editors, printers, booksellers, and patrons for his living
as an anonymous Grub Street hack, had to embrace his commercial potential in order to subsist.
One of Johnson’s regular assertions, according to Boswell, gives evidence of his market
sensibility: “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money” (Life iii.19). The changing
print standard of this shift, however, also held Johnson accountable to his readership, a paying
35

In relating this episode, Boswell includes Lord Chesterfield’s protracted commendation of Johnson’s dictionary
project in The World and Johnson’s prompt, epistolary answer (Life i.255-66). As a lord and patron, Chesterfield
could afford to disseminate his comments in print, whereas Johnson, whose livelihood came from print, protected
his name and his dictionary project by writing a letter to Chesterfield that, however popular its legend and contents
grew, was a personal address.
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readership that came to trust and respect his ethos as a writer. The booksellers who sought
Johnson’s print expertise in delivering a canon of English poets would further contribute to his
ethos that allowed him to broker the biographical relationship between these poets and Johnson’s
readers.
Reliability developed within fluid, market-based parameters in eighteenth-century print
culture, particularly in more ephemeral publications like periodicals, newspapers, diurnals, and
pamphlets. Adrian Johns describes the nature of the relationship between these readers and print
as organic and responsive: “[t]hese were the sectors of print literature that most depended on
being credited by readers. But they were also the sectors whose credit was most suspect. These
were therefore the genres that first developed rhetorical procedures to project authenticity in the
domains of print to the highest degree” (Nature 174). Johnson draws a comparison between the
life of Savage he proposes and the lives of Savage other authors might pen, when he advertises
his intention to publish a life of Savage in the Gentleman’s Magazine: “It may be reasonably
imagined, that others may have the same design; but as it is not credible that they can obtain the
same materials, it must be expected they will supply from invention the want of intelligence; and
that under the title of ‘The Life of Savage,” they will publish only a novel, filled with romantick
adventures, and imaginary amours” (Life i.165).36 Johnson undermines the veracity of competing
lives of Savage by aligning them with the fictional sector of the print market. These forms,
novels and romances, were not accountable to the sort of credentialing that established print fact
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In the first edition of his Dictionary, Johnson provides five definitions for “invention.” The three Johnson has in
mind connote some sort of intentional deception: invention is both a “fiction” or a “forgery,” and it might also be
simply the “thing invented.” Traditionally, and prior to the Scientific Revolution, the primary association with
invention would have been rhetorical. Cicero’s first text, De Inventione focused on invention as the first canon for
composing an oration, drawing on commonplaces or topics, syllogism, and other modes of inquiry typical of
deductive epistemology. The connotations Johnson suggests by characterizing invention as spurious demonstrates a
preference for inductive means of knowing, in which facts are not generated by syllogism or traditional
understandings, but through empirical methods of research, observation, and demonstration. The details Johnson
uses to define selfhood for Savage draw on this preference for an empirical methodology.
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among readers. The scandals and obscurity so obvious in many sections of Savage’s life might
have a sort of generic appeal to the “adventures and imaginary amours” typical of novels and
romances, but an eighteenth-century print culture would require something more creditable than
lurid detail to convince them of Johnson’s authority and, by association, the authority of his life
of Savage.
Readers often criticize the reliability of Samuel Johnson’s Account of the Life of Richard
Savage for valorizing Savage by distorting and misrepresenting the facts of his life. Boswell
notes that “Johnson’s partiality for Savage made him entertain no doubt of his story, however
extraordinary and improbable” (Life i.169). Questions of Johnson’s partiality and his
interpretation of various biographical facts drive Richard Holmes’s biographical account of the
friendship between the biographer and his subject, Dr. Johnson & Mr. Savage. Nevertheless,
Johnson’s Account was highly esteemed by eighteenth-century readers. Boswell notes that it
“was no sooner published, than . . . liberal praise was given to it” (Life i.169). It went through six
editions between its initial publication in 1744 and its inclusion in the Lives of the Poets in 1781.
Modern biographers recognize it as an important point in the growth of the contemporary
biographical form. Despite Johnson’s glaring misinterpretations of the most controversial
moments in Savage’s life, his empirical mode of defining selfhood marks the beginning of a shift
from the more blatantly biased life writing of the seventeenth century toward an increasingly
accurate biographical form that raised readers’ ethical stakes in choosing an understanding of
Savage from a large body of biographical knowledge.
While Johnson does not directly lay claim to journalistic authority, he does cite print
culture proofs that qualify him over other authors to write the life of Savage, his friend. For
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eighteenth-century readers, a reliable author was tantamount to a reliable publication,37 and
Johnson describes himself as “a person who was favoured with his [Savage’s] confidence, and
received from himself an account of most of the transactions which he proposes to mention . . .
the account will be continued from materials still less liable to objection; his own letters, and
those of his friends, some of which will be inserted in the work, and abstracts of others subjoined
in the margin” (Life i.164-5).38 Instead of generating a fictional account from pure “invention”
rather than source materials, Johnson promises a biography distinguishable by its source
material. Johnson’s application means for discovering biographical fact was necessitated by the
print market of the eighteenth century and the ethics of reading developing within the
biographical form. These innovative means were dictated by the moments of intense publicity
that punctuated Savage’s life but, especially, by the public opinion that flared around them.
Whether it was the scandal of his birth to Countess Macclesfield, the audacity of his
claim to a birthright as the heir of Earl Rivers, or the murder of James Sinclair after a drunken
dispute, the most significant moments of Savage’s life had divided opinion so much that the
arguments for his birthright, his guilt, or his innocence were already familiar when Johnson
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The increasing emphasis toward the reliability of the author coincides with the in part, at least, with the so-called
Copyright Act of 1710. Although he misattributes its enactment to 1709, Roger Chartier argues that the Copyright
Act of 1710 marked the moment in the development of print culture “[w]hen the governing powers recognized the
authors’ right over their works, they did so in the ancient logic of privilege. This was true in the case with the Statute
of 1709, which attempted to break the monopoly of the London booksellers by giving authors the right to demand a
copyright themselves” (33). The reliability of the author gained importance in direct correlation to the responsibility
of the authors to the veracity of their own work.
38
Worth comparison is Johnson’s biographical treatment of Dr. Herman Boerhaave, which editor Edward Cave
published in four 1739 issues of the Gentleman’s Magazine. In the January issue, Johnson promises his biographical
account “will, we hope, be not unacceptable to our readers; we could have made it much larger, by adopting flying
reports, and inserting unattested facts: a close adherence to certainty has contracted our narrative, and hindered it
from swelling that bulk, at which modern histories generally arrive.” As in the his recounting of Savage’s life,
Johnson stresses here the importance of “certainty” or reliability to which the narrative subject, so subject that it
must shortened in the name of accuracy and truth. This would have been an important consideration for a Grub
Street hack like Johnson who was paid by the length or his writing: “Of his friend Cave, he always spoke with great
affection. ‘Yet (said he,) Cave, (who never looked out of his window, but with a view to the Gentleman’s
Magazine,) was a penurious paymaster; he would contract for lines by the hundreds, and expect the long hundred”
(Boswell, Life iv.409).
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wrote his biography (Lives XXII.852-4, 858, 873-4). In fact, they invited the duality of what
Weinbrot dubbed the Janus-faced Johnson, one who could manage divided public opinion
biographically. Savage cultivated this publicity both in spectacle and in print, fashioning a
selfhood that would garner sympathy and favor. Thus the facts of Savage’s life were clouded by
the publicity that Savage himself had excited in order to define it. Since the divisive and
pervasive familiarity of public opinion obscured the actual details of Savage’s life, Johnson’s
task as a biographer is to sort publicity and opinion in order to determine the most authoritative
facts of Savage’s elusive life from the most reliable print sources available.

Conceiving Savage’s Life: Publications, Letters, and Recollections
Of his three primary means for tracing the details of Savage’s life, Johnson depended on
an anonymous pamphlet The Life of Mr. Richard Savage that, its modern editor Timothy Ervin
explains, “had been composed some sixteen years earlier [than Johnson’s biography], in 1727”
(iii).39 It was a propaganda piece, an intentionally divisive account meant to garner support by
“stir[ring] public opinion in defense of Savage, who had committed a murder in a coffeehouse
altercation” (iii). This print account for much Savage’s life had passed the tests of print culture: it
effected the ends it sought—“pleading successfully for a royal pardon”—and its account
continued to be compelling for readers, “running quickly into three editions” (iii). Eighteenthcentury readers had credentialed this document as an authentic, factual record and strengthened
its authenticity through their positive reception of multiple editions, sanctioning the pedagogical
potential of the biography through their consumption. The public reception of multiple editions
39

James Gray, the editor of the Yale Edition of the Lives of the Poets, notes that Johnson drew most heavily on The
Life of Mr. Richard Savage, but that “[f]or the rest of the information, Johnson relied on his memory (not always
dependable), [and] the advice of friends of Savage . . . As well as letters written by Savage to friends in London,
Johnson had access to papers he left behind, including the manuscript of his last, heavily castigatory poem “ and
multiple, print editions of Savage’s poetic works (848-9).
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reinforced its account, however biased. Adrian Johns reminds that, through print, “[c]ultural
dispersion operated as a kind of chain reaction . . . it resembled not an orrery (representing the
model of central illumination) but the kind of firework that amazed eighteenth-century observers
by producing successive staggered bursts across the sky” (“Piratical” 303). These “successive
bursts” cemented an image of Savage’s life while he was still living for fifteen years between its
initial, 1727 publication until Savage’s death in 1742.
In accounting for Johnson’s use of the pamphlet version of Savage’s life, James Boswell
reveals how public documents and records could gain credit as fact in eighteenth-century print
culture. He argues that “Johnson was certainly well warranted in publishing his narrative,” since
“no attempt had been made to confute it, or to punish the authour or printer as a libeller” during
that time (Life i.170). By choosing the facts of Savage’s life from a source certified by a
sustained public response, however flawed in content, Johnson defers to the standards of
credibility dictated by eighteenth-century print culture, which gave preference to public assent as
a marker of factual accuracy. This document provided Johnson with a publicly authorized
baseline for developing Savage’s selfhood by comparison to other documents that Johnson
would incorporate into Savage’s life.
Savage also did nothing to dissuade the reputation this pamphlet furthered, but instead he
sought to cultivate the figure he cut through the literary or, more simply, the print world of Grub
Street. Savage lived his life through print. Hal Gladfelder argues that Savage simultaneously
eschewed the print culture of Grub Street authors and used it as a means to define himself in
print: “Savage endeavored . . . to legitimate himself as an aristocratic heir for whom authorship
was an expression of idleness. In the process he exposed how completely author’s lives can
consume them” (447). This consumption is most obvious in the accusations that Savage lived
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with the “appearance of friendship with some whom he satirised, and of making use of the
confidence which he gained by a seeming kindness to discover failings and expose them” (Lives
XXII.887). But Johnson’s task as a biographer was to determine details about Savage that he
could put in conversation with the details that had come to be accepted as fact through print and
Savage’s affectation of aristocracy. Boswell reprints Johnson’s advertisement for his biography,
in which Johnson promises an accurate rhetoric of self as a biographer “who was favoured with
his [Savage’s] confidence,” but also, an accurate depiction based on “materials still less liable to
object,” Savage’s personal and public documents, his letters and poetry (Life i.164-5). Johnson
sought to create a tension between what readers assumed they knew about Savage and facts he
would present to confront them, challenging the biography’s reader to draw ethical conclusions
like the reader of Paradise Lost to make interpretive choices that allow for ethical conclusions.
Johnson draws on facts authenticated by the eighteenth-century print market place to put
Savage’s emotional and psychological self to the same scrutiny as the public self Savage
cultivated. Johnson’s biography invites readers to observe Savage more intimately, between the
public reputation and the intimate self.
Johnson’s Life answers the question of Savage’s extraction with facts that address one of
the most contested aspects of Savage’s life: whether he was the aristocratic son of a countess,
Anne, Lady Macclesfield, and heir to Earl Rivers or the son of a common laborer, a nurse hired
to “care” for and “to superintend the education of the child” (Johnson, Lives XXII.854). Johnson
follows the account in the anonymous pamphlet, which presents Savage as the victim of the Lady
Macclesfield’s divorce, through which “her Son, being thus bastardized, could not be born, as
otherwise he would have been, a Lord by Courtesy, and Heir to the Title of an English Earl, with
one of the finest Estates in the Kingdom, which was afterwards, for want of Male-Issue, the
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Occasion of engaging two eminent Peers in a Duel, in which they had the Misfortune to kill each
other” (4). In this version of the narrative, Lady Macclesfield’s actions betray her son and
resonate throughout aristocratic circles to ill effect. The anonymous author characterizes her as a
“resentful” woman who “forget[s] her sucking Child!” (4, 8). Johnson endorses the facts as the
pamphlet and Savage himself present them: Lady Macclesfield does abandon her son; Savage is
a dispossessed aristocrat; he has been cut off from what is his by natural and legal right.40
Johnson’s appraisal of Lady Macclesfield’s character, however, is much more venomous than the
pamphlet’s. He locates the scandal in her “barbarity,” which threatens, disease-like, to “infect
others with the same cruelty” and so makes Savage the victim of her dissolute life (Lives
XXII.854).
More important than the unknowable fact of Savage’s birth is Johnson’s choice in
presenting the facts of Savage’s birth so definitively. Backsheider blames it on a panegyric
impulse in which Johnson’s “groundbreaking biography of Richard Savage is a fabric of wishes,
speculations, and fantasies that put his friend and his most dubious actions in a favourable light”
(76-7).41 Johnson is aware of the danger that any biographer faced when writing the life a
personal acquaintance like his own to Savage and, without citing his Account, notes that
[i]f the biographer writes from personal knowledge, and makes haste to gratify the
publick curiosity, there is danger lest his interest, his fear, his gratitude, or his tenderness
overpower his fidelity, and tempt him to conceal, if not to invent. There are many who
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Johnson’s endorsement seems unequivocal, unquestioning, and perhaps naïve. Backscheider notes that “[i]n spite
of the fact that Johnson accepted his friend’s anecdotes and interpretations too uncritically, his Life of Savage is as
important as Boswell’s Life of Johnson for the modern history of biography” (241 n.30). The rhetorical effects he
creates with these details allows him to give readers a Richard Savage they can know.
41
Johnson states that Savage displayed his affection for their relationship when “he left London in July 1739, having
taken leave with great tenderness of his friends, and parted from the author of this narrative with tears in his eyes”
(Lives XXII.945). Johnson’s own account seems to admit a tenderness that might overpower the veracity of a
biographer.
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think it an act of piety to hide the faults or failings of their friends, even when they can no
longer suffer by their detection. (Rambler III.323)
Balancing the risk he takes by representing Savage’s story as true against his regard for the
“fidelity” of the biographer, Johnson risks his reputation as a biographer well before he has
established it. In taking up the burden of biographical proof for a subject as hazy as Savage’s
life, he must credential the facts through the contemporary channels of print culture, which
introduce innovations for authorizing biographical fact.42 As a publicly documented scandal, the
events of Savage’s birth had long been subject to public scrutiny. The anonymous pamphlet of
Savage’s life presents the scandal to raise readers’ sympathies, beginning with the claim that
“[p]erhaps no History in the World, either ancient or modern, can produce an Instance of any one
Man’s Life fill’d with so many calamitous Circumstances, as That of the unhappy young
Gentleman, who is the melancholy subject of the following Sheets” (3). This account begins with
a direct appeal to the reader’s sympathies. It does not invite the reader to draw educational
conclusions. Johnson’s anonymous source pamphlet depends on a one-sided account that appeals
to readers’ emotions, rather than engaging their critical capacity.
While Johnson’s sympathies undoubtedly lie with Savage, he recasts these print details
and their persuasive bent in a didactic arrangement that can be easily misunderstood as
sympathetic in the same way that Milton’s Satan can easily tempt readers into misreading him as
heroic. The pamphlet casts Savage in a superlative light, harder pressed than anyone in the
“history of the world.” On the other hand, Johnson recasts the print Savage as another of the
42

Johnson almost seems to take up the biographical task of telling Savage’s life for the mere challenge of making it
reliable as fact: given the slim record of their acquaintance—Johnson’s alone—such literary play might be the
reason for his life of Savage, the challenge of making a bad man good. Such an approach would have cast Johnson
as a novelist than a biographer, a role he never otherwise chose to play except, in sense, with the History of
Rasselas, a highly fictionalized fable. But Johnson is not playing a literary game; his stake is in the allowing the
reader to make ethical, educational choices. At the other extreme, however, is Holmes’ interpretation, which
brushes aside Johnson’s biographical rigor or fictional play to reconcile Johnson’s favorable treatment of Savage by
suggesting that Johnson believed Savage’s fraud as truth because Savage believed it as truth (235).
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“heroes of literary as well as civil history [who] have been very often no less remarkable for
what they have suffered, than for what they have atchieved; and volumes have been written only
to enumerate the miseries of the learned, and relate their unhappy lives, and untimely deaths. To
these mournful narratives, I am about to add the life of Richard Savage” (Lives XXII.851).
Johnson rearranges the established print details of Savage’s life for comparison to others whose
“unhappy lives” make for “mournful narratives,” but he provides no specific comparisons to the
lives of other “heroes of literary history.” Instead, Johnson opens Savage’s life with the
observation that the “general lot of mankind is misery, and the misfortunes of those whose
eminence drew upon them an universal attention, [that] have been more carefully recorded,
because they were more generally observed, and have in reality been only more conspicuous
than those of others, not more frequent or more severe” (Lives XXII.850-1). Johnson
simultaneously affirms the accepted print facts of Savage’s life that have been and remain in
public view, but he downplays their importance by making the publicity itself part of Savage’s
mournful lot. This key element of what will become the celebrity biography uses the reader’s
own interest in the celebrity’s life to show how prying eyes and print culture have shaped that
life.
Johnson invites the reader to observe the known circumstances of Savage’s life and his
birth, without immediately crediting them as reliable facts. Johnson’s source text, the pamphlet,
presented Savage’s highly publicized murder of James Sinclair and his trial as a fact not yet
proven. It was, after all, written to garner support for Savage, and it casts the event in the
passive: “Let it suffice in this place to say, that the direful Consequence of their going in there,
was from an insult offer’d by Mr. Merchant to the company who were drinking there, a mortal
Wound given to Mr. Sinclair, of which he languish’d till the next day, and then died, and the
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Condemnation of Mr. Savage and Mr. Gregory for the said Fact” (21). The passive tone suits the
pamphlet’s persuasive purpose, to garner public support Savage and to sway the sentencing
decision. It sets what can be known against what must be concluded legally, acknowledging that
a quarrel was the cause of the fight, that Sinclair was wounded, and that Savage was blamed. By
leaving out Savage’s guilty action, his innocence is strongly implied. It also encourages the
reader to see the partiality of any one source and asks the reader to judge for him or herself out of
a larger body of evidence, to run a more extensive experiment on this life.
Johnson again defers to public assent, but rather than recall the spectacular news story,
Johnson uses the spectacle of the infamous fight and murder to orchestrate a sympathetic
exchange between spectators or readers and Savage. In Johnson’s account, Mr. Merchant is again
responsible for “a quarrel, [for which] swords were drawn on both sides, and one Mr. James
Sinclair was killed. Savage, having wounded likewise a maid that held him, forced his way with
Merchant out of the house; but being intimidated and confused, without resolution either to fly or
stay, they were taken in a backcourt by one of the company and some soldiers” (Lives
XXII.874). Johnson also deploys the passive in his version—“one Mr. James Sinclair was
killed”—but he leaves no doubt about Savage’s guilt, noting that he “wounded likewise a maid
that held him.” The word “likewise” sets Savage’s definite wounding of the maid in opposition
to his murder of Sinclair. Rather than a straightforward recounting, Johnson again reaffirms the
accepted account at the same time that he challenges it and challenges readers to locate the truth
of this crucial incident in Richard Savage’s life. The rhetoric of self Johnson arranges addresses
readers who are already confident in their understanding of Savage. He brings them to reevaluate
Savage, not by confronting them with new facts, but by leading them to recognize the possibility
of multiple points of view about Savage in Johnson’s account.
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Johnson also enlarged the archive of the facts of Savage’s life with documents that
reached beyond the popular pamphlet account of Savage’s life: Johnson revealed facts of
Savage’s life and his character from Savage’s own publications. Johnson used the credibility of
print culture to augment the popular pamphlet with Savage’s own publications, the poems and
plays that proved to be a well of information from which Johnson could draw biographical facts.
Savage’s publications could not bear the same type scrutiny applied to the pamphlet, but Johnson
used this different rhetorical situation to his advantage. Johnson submits that Savage’s choice of
topics and words offer an insight into his life; Johnson offers these documents to his readers as
part of a life that is more a matter of interpretation than mere journalistic account.
At points, Savage’s own poetry and prose crowds the narrative off the physical, printed
page of Johnson’s 1744 Life, a reminder that Richard Savage was a man who seemed to be
composed of documents, a man who could only be redeemed by public evidence, documentation.
In the material space for representing selfhood on the page, Johnson equates Savage’s publicized
print selfhood with this personal experience of a life lived in print and, by association and
juxtaposition to Savage’s writing, with the rhetoric of self the biography has created for him.
Johnson’s description of the common criticism of Savage’s poem, The Wanderer, might be well
be a description of Savage’s lived experience. Johnson acknowledges the public criticism is
“universal, and therefore it is reasonable to believe it at least in a Degree just,” (Account 55):
It has been generally objected to the Wanderer, that the Disposition of the Parts is
irregular, that the Design is obscure, and the Plan perplexed, that the Images,
however beautiful, succeed each other without Order; and that the whole
performance is not so much a regular fabric as a Heap of shining Materials
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through together by Accident, which strikes rather with the solemn Magnificence
of a stupendous Ruin, than the elegant Grandeur of a finished Pile. (Account 55)
Johnson’s account of reviews of the Wanderer mirrors his own task as a biographer; to present
disparate materials in a way that retains a sense of their authentic messiness while also allowing
the reader to form his or her own experience of the whole of a life. As a biographer, Johnson’s
task in arranging a compelling rhetoric of self for the paradoxically public and elusive Richard
Savage regular is to thread the “heap of shining” experiences into consistent “disposition,” with a
narrative “plan” for a “finished,” observable selfhood teased from the mysterious spaces in
Savage’s life.
Johnson locates much of Savage’s character in the Wanderer, defining him two ways:
textually, in a narrative of his experience, and paratextually, in glossed text that stands as a
marker of Savage’s narrative. Paired on the page, publicly verified ancillary text like the
Wanderer corroborates Johnson’s recounting of Savage’s experience in the main narrative.
Johnson defers to Savage’s account of the long-lasting effects of his life-long estrangement from
his so-called mother, Lady Macclesfield: “[e]ven in this poem he has not been able to forbear
one touch upon the cruelty of his mother, which, though remarkable delicate and tender, is a
proof how deep an impression is had upon his mind” (Lives XXII.893). He provides thirteen
lines of the Wanderer to support his commentary on the narrative. Similarly, he cites instances of
Savage’s power of description as a poet, quoting thirty-two lines of Savage’s poetry. In this case,
he juxtaposes Savage’s personal life with his own public printings—they even share a footnote
space in the 1744 Account (69).43 Johnson’s credentialing apparatus suggests several important
facts about Savage’s print selfhood. First, Johnson’s citation and footnoting fills gaps in the
43

For instance, Johnson cites the dedication to the Wanderer on page 78; it continues through page 79, met on page
79 by another reference to a poem, which provides an documentary example of Savage’s ability to appeal to the
sentiments of his benefactors. This citation runs from page 79 through page 81.
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narrative. The nature of the gaps is, quite often, psychological or emotional—even a first person
witness to Savage’s experience could not discern the truth without recourse to some other aid.
Significantly, this print evident of Savage’s emotional and psychological makeup become facts
with the same gravity as the legal evidence subjected to public scrutiny in the Sinclair case. It
marks a move from the externally observable toward observations of the intimate. Johnson cites
Savage’s poem the Bastard, for instance, as “a Poem remarkable for the vivacious Sallies of
Thought in the Beginning, where he makes a pompous Enumeration of the imaginary
Advantages of base Birth, and the pathetic Sentiments at the End, where he recounts the real
Calamities which he suffered by the Crime of his Parents” (Account 91). Johnson glosses
excerpts of the Bastard with the effect of illustrating how Savage’s early circumstances shaped
his later life. The poem and its placement in the biography give continuity to both the
experiential and psychological components of Savage’s rhetoric of self.
Likewise, Johnson locates a parallel between “the author of The Wanderer, the man of
exalted sentiments, extensive views, and curious observations; the man whose remarks on life
might have assisted the statesman, whose ideas of virtue might have enlightened the moralist,
whose eloquence might have influenced senates, and whose delicacy might have polished
courts” and a man who might be found “[o]n a bulk, in a cellar, or in a glass-house among
thieves and beggars” (Lives XXII.929). In Johnson’s construction, the balance between Savage’s
life as an author and as a destitute man is most evident in Savage’s most public selfdocumentation and Johnson’s most ready source for Savage’s psychological and emotional
experience. Johnson cites lines from The Wanderer as a “probable” example of Savage’s
“reflections on his own conduct,” which, as the poem explains, “ev’n then he scorn’d, and
blush’d to name” (Lives XXII.929). Johnson uses this poetry as a means of determining Savage’s
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character: these excerpts from The Wanderer head a section that provides instances of Savage’s
characteristic imposition on friends and benefactors, particularly his penchant for soliciting
“small sums” of money from his acquaintance (Lives XXII.929). That Savage’s poetry
documents and suggests a “probable” character for Savage indicates another print culture
precedent for ascertaining factuality. Savage’s choice of topics and words becomes a
fundamentally biographical, public documentation of the man’s life. What Savage offered to the
public for critical examination opened him to public judgment, and for his biographer, this
judgment delineated Savage’s character and put it in view of discriminating, ethical readers who
would improve themselves through the print acquaintance. Johnson forces them to judge the
evidence for themselves and, in so doing, to become implicated in the rhetorical construction of
his life.
Johnson’s innovative application of print documents to credential the murky life of
Richard Savage included semi-public, epistolary records, which became print documents in
Johnson’s biography. Their credibility for readers in eighteenth-century print culture was
immense: they signified an older tradition of documentation, but they also made facts of social
interaction. Later in the century, Boswell came to use epistolary evidence of Johnson’s life to
lend continuity to these social interactions and to the character of Johnson overall. Even though
Johnson would disparage the practice of publishing private letters, his own biographical practice
indicates a different tack and then only out of necessity (Life v.102). Johnson’s biography
depends on Savage’s correspondence from the end of Savage’s life when little other documented
evidence of Savage’s experience existed.
Unlike anonymous pamphlets, poetry, or speeches, epistolary documents record a social
network as much as their authors’ reports and reflections. In addition to readers who could bear
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witness to the proof of Savage’s life evident in his poetic output, an epistolary record adds the
correspondent as a print witness. Unlike print documents that have been open to public scrutiny
and are, as a result, subject to divisive interpretations, private documents like letters were, as
Clare Brant points out, “[a]ssociated with instruction” which “strengthened the relationship
between print culture and the lower classes . . . letters had liminal meanings for those in power
and powerful meanings for liminal people” (15). As a person on the periphery of both the literary
and aristocratic worlds to which he had at various times aspired, Savage is a letter writer whose
personal words offer significant insight into how he could be read, as authentic, credible
documentation. It is a documentary record that opens Savage’s experience to scrutiny, providing
readers with evidence of Savage’s life that is much less nebulous Savage’s public reputation.
From this record, readers can extrapolate how Savage wanted to be read more easily from the
cues his self-conscious representation provides. They invited readers to draw ethical conclusions
that would instruct them, like many letters, in how they should behave.
Johnson develops much of Savage’s social life by situating it in correspondence, either
letters written by Savage himself or letters written to be signed by Savage. From the act of letterwriting alone, Johnson demonstrates the characteristic pride that Savage imposed on his friends
and those he reckoned as enemies. In one instance, Johnson notes that Alexander Pope wrote a
letter to be dictated to Savage, that he might write and beg the assistance of a patron he had once
offended, but Savage refused, preferring his pride to his former social connection (Lives
XXII.944-5). Savage’s letters document his life more readily and offer the instructive, ethical
choices that Johnson arranges throughout the narrative. When he is imprisoned in Bristol for
debt, Savage’s correspondence forms the bulk of the narrative. Johnson describes that “having
been at supper with two of his friends, he [Savage] was at his return to his lodgings arrested for a
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debt of about eight pounds, which he owed at a coffee-house” (Lives XXII.952). In a letter to
Reverend William Saunders a minor cleric at Bristol Cathedral, Savage relates and interprets
these experiential facts:
I was arrested at the suit of Mrs. Read [the coffee-shop owner], just as I was going
up stairs to bed, at Mr. Bowyer’s; but taken in so private a manner, that I believe
nobody at the White Lion is apprised of it. Though I let the officers know the
strength (or rather weakness) of my pocket, yet they treated me with the utmost
civility; and even when they conducted me to confinement, it was in such a
manner, that I verily believe I could have escaped, which I would rather be ruined
than have done, notwithstanding the whole amount of my finances was but three
pence half-penny. (Lives XXII.952-3)
Johnson’s choice to draw details of Savage’s life from his correspondence with a cleric
associates Savage’s account with a religious veracity. Presented with the choice to take Savage at
his word in his letter or to consider him in light of other evidence, a reader might choose to see
Savage’s character here possessed of a stoic dignity that defied his circumstances. Johnson uses
Savage’s relationship to money to authenticate his class position in this account. The guards
“treat him with the utmost civility,” suggesting they apprehend something about Savage’s natural
authority and class position. Savage would rather be ruined than escape, affirming his
relationship to older honor codes in a market-driven age of opportunity. The reader is shown, not
told, that Savage has a native dignity, revealed to Johnson’s readers for their own evaluation
through Savage’s exchange with Reverend Saunders.
An ethical reader would experience this moment along the trajectory of selfhood that
Johnson demonstrates. An ethical reader, through this experience, understands Savage in the
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same light his acquaintance viewed him and as Johnson has presented prior to this moment: the
perpetual borrower of The Wanderer. This epistolary narrative might equally be little more than
the affectation of dignity as a precursor to begging, like his protest later in the letter, in which,
Savage commands Saunders “not to offer me any pecuniary assistance, nor attempt getting me
any from any one of your friends” (Lives XXII.953). Savage’s private address to Saunders
becomes a public address through Saunders’ response, observing what Savage claims to be his
wish or ignoring it and seeking assistance. In both instances, Saunders response is an epistolary
address to the public. Through Johnson’s biographical representation, the epistolary privacy
becomes a public document. The shift from private to public is a sympathetic move that allows
readers a greater degree of sympathetic understanding for Savage. His personal dignity in the
face of debtor’s prison becomes a nobleman’s warranted pride. In fact, Savage begs, “let me
entreat you to let have your boy to attend to me for this day, not only for the sake of saving me
the expense of porters,” justifying a request so close on his statement of his dignity “that my
truly valuable friend [Reverend Saunders] may not think I am too proud to ask a favour” (Lives
XXII.953-4). Nothing else may be documented in Savage’s confinement except his reflections
and his relationships to friends. The end of Savage’s letter-writing roughly marks the end of his
life in Johnson’s account. Without documentation, after all, there can be no life to recount. In
using Savage’s private letters as a means of discovering hidden, experiential details, Johnson
moves past the publicized and self-publicizing man to a more intimate portrayal of Savage’s
selfhood that was available only to a coterie of correspondents and friends, albeit no less
mediated by the rhetoric of self that Savage was already constructing.
Johnson’s biographical approach to Savage depends on a third set of details that are more
personal still than explicating Savage’s poetry or reading his letters: personal experience. In his
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Rambler essay on biography, Johnson noted that “[t]here are many invisible circumstances
which, whether we read as enquirers after natural or moral knowledge, whether we intend to
enlarge our science, or increase our virtue, are more important than publick occurrences” (321).
For Johnson, biographical narrative must utilize the available means for discovering the details
of a person’s experience. This is one of the hallmarks of modern biography that has strengthened
since print culture emerged, but the rhetoric of self that Johnson’s narrative of Savage creates
depends on more than the documentation that drove print’s ascendancy in eighteenth-century
London. In his biography of Addison, Johnson argued that experience with the person was a
crucial for arranging a biography:
History may be formed from permanent monuments and records; but lives can
only be written through personal knowledge, which is growing every day less, and
in a short time is lost for ever. What is known can seldom be told; and when it
might be told, it is no longer known. The delicate features of the mind, the nice
discriminations of character, and the minute peculiarities of conduct, are soon
obliterated. (Lives XXII.637)
First-hand experience allows the biographer to nuance the demonstration of selfhood, blending
documentation and the accounts of other people into a depiction of selfhood more easily
identifiable as a person whom the reader might spectate and know. Personal experience can
connect the documentation of the person to the person. Johnson cites his own experience as his
foremost credential in the advertisement he posted in The Gentleman’s Magazine for his
biography of Savage (Boswell, Life i.164-5).
Richard Holmes interrogates the relationship between Savage and Johnson that has,
through Johnson’s account, come to be taken as a given—that Johnson and Savage were friends
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brought together by their political beliefs, their Grub Street associations, and their poverty.
Holmes notes “an extraordinary fact”: “no one, at any time, or in any place, ever left a first-hand
account of seeing Johnson and Savage together. It was, from the start, an invisible friendship”
(35). In publishing a biography so close after the death of his friend, Johnson is documenting the
experiential “incidents which give excellence to biography,” details that “are of a volatile and
evanescent kind, such as soon escape the memory, and are rarely transmitted by tradition”
(Rambler 323). He is translating the shining heap of materials into a coherent, nuanced rhetoric
of self. Part of Johnson’s function in this period of emergent eighteenth-century biography is to
straddle the modern standards for factual accuracy to which Holmes defers and to be the fact,
making a record where no record had previously been made in an unstable world of eighteenthcentury print. Johnson recalls the common, personal circumstances of the public, documented
“author of The Wanderer”:
He lodged as much by accident as he dined, and passed the night sometimes in
mean houses, which are set open at night to any casual wanderers, sometimes in
cellars among the riot and filth of the meanest and most profligate of the rabble;
and sometimes, when he had not money to support even the expences of these
receptacles, walked about the streets till he was weary, and lay down in the
summer upon a bulk, or in the winter, with his associates in poverty, among the
ashes of a glass-house. (Lives XXII.928)
In describing the consequence of Savage’s impecunious lifestyle, Johnson associates the “author
of The Wanderer” with “any casual wanderers” whose poverty forces them to take shelter where
they can find it, and none of these “associates in poverty” were likely to recount these
experiences, except one.
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Not only as a witness, but a participant in Savage’s life, Johnson is able to raise the
distinction of a man suffering from his poverty and “the man of exalted sentiments, extensive
views, and curious observations; the man whose remarks on life might have assisted the
statesman, who ideas of virtue might have enlightened the moralist, who eloquence might have
influenced senates, and who delicacy might have polished courts” (Lives XXII.929). Johnson
juxtaposes the extremes that framed Savage’s life, portraying him as a man who slept in ashes or
on eaves, and whose views might easily range no farther than the next meal or place to sleep; in
Johnson’s rhetoric, Savage’s views are the insights of a “statesmen,” “moralist,” or courtier.
Readers of this life had to reconcile the tension between the facets of Savage’s character and his
actions ethically. Johnson makes this selfhood something to be observed rhetorically, locating
facts and presenting them to force readers to a conclusion.
Johnson’s own biographer, James Boswell, prints a reflection on this moment in
Johnson’s life almost fifty years after Johnson first reported it, suggesting that “[i]t is melancholy
to reflect, that Johnson and Savage were sometimes in such extreme indigence, that they could
not pay for a lodging; so that they have wandered together whole nights in the streets” (Life
i.163). Boswell is not following Johnson in deferring to a private, first-hand account that is, as
Holmes points out, undocumented elsewhere; rather, and much more significantly, Boswell is
following Johnson’s example as a biographer in using an account that has become public fact by
virtue of having been printed and attaining the public assent of readers. The reliability of the
account is public acceptance. Boswell’s recounting of the time when Johnson’s life overlapped
with Savage’s reinforces the usefulness of personal facts in the development of biography, and
also emphasizes the fluid parameters in which facts came to be accredited through print in the
eighteenth century. Johnson’s application of his own experiences as a spectator or witness of
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Richard Savage’s life proves no less reliable and no less subject to public assent than the print
details and personal letters in which he locates Savage’s self.
Johnson not only bears witness to Savage’s circumstances, but also to his conversation.
He relates the prosecution’s attack of Savage’s character in court during his trial for murder.
Johnson’s selections give as evidence an “eloquent harangue” in Savage’s 1727 trial that was
circulated by “Mr. Savage [who] used to relate it” (Lives XXII.876). Such “incidents . . . of a
volatile and evanescent kind” show Savage imagining himself as a public figure (Rambler 323).
Johnson recalls Savage’s narration of Mr. Page, Savage’s prosecutor, when he drew a
comparison between specific aspects of Savage’s appearance that might characterize a man of
means, suggesting that they hide a man capable of murder. Page accused Savage of affecting a
well-dressed gentleman, when in fact, Page implies, Savage was thoroughly indigent. But
Johnson, by presenting this gap between an old model of class that is heritable (in which Savage
is authorized to wear good clothes by his birth, however illegitimate) and a new, more portable
model of class that reads for a collection of economic, social, and behavioral markers. Page
implies that Savage’s capacity for deceit is the mark of a murderer who could hide a crime while
Johnson, by presenting the evidence as he does, leaves open the reading that Savage is a
dispossessed noble whose very existence points to the voraciousness and injustice of new models
of economic class. The prosecutor models what the reader must do with the facts of Savage’s life
by presenting them directly to the reader:
Gentlemen of the jury, you are to consider that Mr. Savage is a very great man, a
much greater man than you or I, gentlemen of the jury; that he wears very fine
clothes, much finer clothes than you or I, gentlemen of the jury; that he has
abundance of money in his pocket, much more money than you or I, gentlemen of
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the jury: but, gentlemen of the jury, is it not a very hard case, gentlemen of the
jury, that Mr. Savage should therefore kill you or me, gentlemen of the jury?
(Lives XXII.876)
By a similar mechanism that could make fact from an unchallenged pamphlet, Savage’s
recitation of his prosecutor’s damning criticism acquired some degree of factuality simply by its
publicity and repetition. While Johnson employs it to establish the facts of Savage’s life,
however, he must also represent its credibility as fact. Though it is “eloquent harangue,” Johnson
cites it as the most accurate transcription of the trial. And it is, because it is the only record.
Savage’s self-fashioning takes on the gravity and accuracy of documented fact, of a recorded
transcript rather than a rehearsed memory. As a print fact that readers can examine objectively,
the speech turns a reading public into the “gentlemen of a jury” who must judge the factuality of
Richard Savage’s public claims about his own life and discern the person from rumor for
themselves.
The empirical impulse driving eighteenth-century biography would have guided Johnson
to depict as many observable, credible, documented pieces of information about Savage’s life as
possible, in order to locate the nuanced patterns in these details that would establish Savage’s
life. Having drawn the facts of Savage’s life from publications, Savage’s own writing, and letters
up to the moment of his death, Johnson uses his biographical collection of facts to depict
Savage’s person and character, free of chronological narrative. After relating Savage’s death in
debtor’s prison, Johnson goes on to describe Savage’s physical appearance, “a thin habit of body,
a long visage, coarse features, and melancholy aspect”; Savage’s judgment, which was
“eminently exact both with regard to writings and to men”; and Savage’s knowledge, attained by
a thorough, intimate acquaintance with “coffee-houses” and company (Lives XXII.963-4).
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Ultimately, Johnson’s documented facts of Savage’s life and his recollections of Savage’s
private self pose a test for readers; he asks them to make up their own minds. Johnson catalogs
the shortcomings of Savage’s character and the virtues of his authorship (Lives XXII.963-6). He
balances in Savage a man whose “knowledge of life was indeed his chief attainment” but of
whom “[i]t cannot be said, that he made use of his abilities for the direction of his own conduct”
(Lives XXII.964, 965). Likewise Johnson represents Savage as a man “compassionate both by
nature and principle,” but whose “friendship was . . . of little value” because “it was dangerous to
trust him” (Lives XXII.965). He ultimately becomes a set of contrarieties that might be
oversimplified as binaries—Savage is landed gentry or homeless vagrant, slighted heir or
pretender, victim of circumstance or murderer, poet-philosopher or petty scribbler, and so on.
These are the givens that Johnson establishes rhetorically, through details and their presentation,
so that a reader may engage Savage’s selfhood, observe a nuanced selfhood somewhere within
the binaries, and draw conclusions about who the man was.
While Johnson’s rhetoric of self forces the reader to know Savage and to judge him,
Johnson notes no “wise man . . . will presume to say, ‘Had I been in Savage’s condition, I should
have lived or written better than Savage” (Lives XXII.968). Having engaged readers to draw
conclusions, Johnson’s comment has a paradoxical edge, but it serves to remind the
discriminating, ethical reader that no life bears easy judgment, especially not a life viewed
intimately, and that readers must consider their own condition intimately as much as they would
consider Savage’s, since “[t]hose are no proper judges of his conduct, who have slumbered away
their time on the down of plenty” (Lives XXII.968). Readers of this new kind of biography are a
sort of print spectator, engaging the biographical rhetoric of self with the same sort of fellow
feeling appropriate to a living person. The process of spectating the subject of a biography as a
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rhetoric of self is meant to produce ethical readers who engage Johnson’s Account and the
Savage of the Lives. More importantly, Johnson’s biography makes the facts of Savage’s life
more credible by inviting readers to apply the biography to their own “condition,” lives, and
practices, since “[w]e are all prompted by the same motives, all deceived by the same fallacies,
all animated by hope, obstructed by danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure”
(Rambler III.320). In spectating the print self of Savage that Johnson constructs, readers come to
understand him by understanding themselves.

The Life of Richard Nash: Spectating a Person and a Character Type as Documentation
While Johnson’s biographical work might not be as accurate as modern biographical
standards require, his application of the print criteria to his biographical writing achieved the
ethical ends that earned him the respect of his contemporaries. It also established patterns for
writing biography that echoed through later works like Oliver Goldsmith’s Life of Richard Nash
and James Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson. Their critical principles are predicated on
Johnson’s methods of documentation, his empiricism, and the didactic, rhetorical effects of his
approach. Eighteen years after the first printing of Johnson’s Account of the Life of Richard
Savage, Oliver Goldsmith published his Life of Richard Nash, Esq., a rhetoric of self that reads
like the biographical heir to Johnson’s Savage. The lives that Johnson and Goldsmith arrange
engage readers to locate the person between the publicity they sought for themselves and the
slim record of their private lives. They are both men whose private lives were marked by
publicity and self-publicizing that invited public speculation; they are each, in different ways,
celebrity biographies, but each is calculated for the improvement of the reader. According to
Johnson, people read biography to improve their own characters (Rambler III.321). The fictional
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reader that Johnson devises for biography reads purposefully; therefore, “the business of the
biographer is often to pass lightly over those performances and incidents which produce vulgar
greatness, to lead the thoughts into domestick privacies, and display the minute details of daily
life, where exterior appendages are cast aside, and men excel each other only by prudence and by
virtue” (Rambler III.321). The balance Johnson strikes between public records and his own
experience with Savage’s “domestic privacies” and “minute details of daily life” invites readers
to decide where Savage’s “prudence” and “virtue” fail or, less often, “excel.”
From the outset of his Life of Nash, Goldsmith echoes many of Johnson’s sentiments
regarding biography,44 either because he obliquely cites them or because Johnson’s biographical
approach, demonstrated in his Savage and articulated in later essay projects like the Rambler and
Idler, was emerging into a normative approach for writing biography. Much like the emphasis
Johnson places on the biography of common lives over those of public renown (Idler II.262-3),
Goldsmith stresses that “whether the heroe or the clown be the subject of the memoir, it is only
man that appears with all his native minuteness about him, for nothing ever great was ever yet
formed from the little materials of humanity” (III.290). The “native minuteness” that defines the
“little materials of humanity” provides a counterpoint to the minuteness of a reader’s own
circumstances that, again, make the contrarieties of character the biographer displays more
amenable to the reader’s own self-conception and improvement. Goldsmith explicitly explains
the value of discovering minute, incidental, and intimate markers of a person’s humanity, which
are, paradoxically, more interesting in the case of the celebrity life. He asserts that “the
generality of mankind find the most real improvements from relations which are levelled to the
general surface of life; which tell, not how men learned to conquer, but how they endeavoured to
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Arthur Friedman, editor to the Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, lists six such allusions to Johnson’s Idler,
No. 84 (24 November 1759) at the beginning of Goldsmith’s Nash.

131

live; not how they gained the shout of the admiring croud, but how they acquired the esteem of
their friends and acquaintance” (Rambler III.290). The experiences that illustrate the “general
surface of human life” have more in common with the general experiences of most readers. The
surface of human life, what can be observed empirically, holds sway over what a reader can
internalize sympathetically. These experiences are more readily observed and, in their
minuteness, more easily understood and more immediately applicable.
In theorizing biography, Johnson notes that “[t]he mischievous consequences of vice and
folly, or irregular desires and predominant passions, are best discovered by those relations which
are levelled with the general surface of life, which tell not how any man became great, but how
he was made happy; not how he lost the favour of his prince, but how he became discontented
with himself” (Idler II.262). The sentiments overlap, deemphasizing the publicized, famous, or
well-known person; the “prince” rather than the person most subject to front the “general surface
of life.” In Johnson, the private aspect of the well-known or common person is most important.
Goldsmith’s focus on the “heroe or the clown” who can be observed and situated in social
networks follows a similar biographical approach to Johnson and sets the tone for the rhetoric of
self he devises for Nash. Both Johnson’s and Goldsmith’s biographical approaches underscore
the significance of biography’s autodidactic promise, the importance of choice that moves a
reader from the limitations of what is already known about Savage or Nash to what can be
concluded about the intimate selfhood by considering all that is known.
Johnson’s focus on a person’s own happiness or discontentedness privileges the sort of
detail he promised in his advertisement to the Account of the Life of Richard Savage as a balance
to the documented aspects of Savage’s life. Documentation established readers’ expectations
against which Johnson could present private aspects of Savage’s life so that readers would be
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forced to challenge these expectations and draw their own conclusions. Boswell reported
Johnson’s criticism of Goldsmith’s biographical approach to the life of Dr. Thomas Parnell:
“Goldsmith’s Life of Parnell is poor; not that it is poorly written, but that he had poor materials;
for nobody can write the life of a man, but those who have eat and drunk and lived in social
intercourse with him” (Life ii.166). His critique recalls his own approach to Savage’s life and
emphasizes a personal relationship between the biographer and the life to be written. But
Goldsmith was not anymore personally familiar with Nash than he had been with Parnell.
Moreover, Goldsmith lacked the body of public printings that Johnson balanced against his
personal observations of Savage’s life. Nash was no poet, nor was he mired in scandals
surrounding his extraction or an acquittal for murder. Consequently, the details Goldsmith must
find might seem to compensate for the deficiencies in source materials Johnson utilizes in his
biography of Savage.
In the same way that Johnson extrapolates the facts of Savage’s life from public
documents, Goldsmith also uses documentary evidence like letters, but invites readers to view
Nash sympathetically. Their sympathies singly and collaboratively develop the facts about Nash
that they can know for themselves, facts that Goldsmith often withholds, lacking materials to
completely situate Nash in documents as a print self. Goldsmith’s most significant biographical
approach sets the details for an inductive appraisal of the facts by renegotiating an older,
deductive rhetorical tradition—character writing, instituted as the province of rhetoricians by
Theophrastus, Aristotle’s acolyte and successor at the Lyceum, as a means of comprehending
ethical values through a human lens. Goldsmith’s treatment of Nash’s character is more overtly
Theophrastan than Johnson’s representation of Savage’s character. Whereas Johnson reveals
Nash’s private character through the authority and purported nobility of an eighteenth-century
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celebrity, Goldsmith resituates Nash in established public frame in order to locate his private
character.
Goldsmith’s first method for determining the details of Nash’s life, like Johnson’s,
depends on documentation that situates the private person’s character within the networks of his
correspondence. And, like Johnson, Goldsmith uses documents that have the imprimatur of
credibility, and in his advertisement assures the reader that
We have the Permission of George Scott, Esq; (who kindly undertook to settle the
Affairs of Mr. Nash, for the benefit of his Family and Creditors) to assure the
Publick, that all the Papers found in the Custody of Mr. Nash, which any ways
respected his Life, and were thought interesting to the Publick, were
communicated to the Editor of this Volume; so that the Reader will, at least, have
the Satisfaction of perusing an Account that is genuine, and not the Work of
Imagination, as Biographical Writings too frequently are. (III.287)
Goldsmith compensates for what he lacks in personal knowledge of Nash (and what strengthened
Johnson’s rhetoric of self in his Life of Savage) with letters that are so authentic they require the
“Permission” of Nash’s executor to publish. More importantly, the epistolary evidence has
“Publick” appeal, the potential to engage readers with “interesting” information that commands
authority in eighteenth-century print culture.
In order to gain print credit for his Nash, Goldsmith uses correspondence with people
who have public renown. A pair letters from the Duchess of Marlborough (III.332-3) and two
from Alexander Pope (III.342-3) add to the level of what public intimacy Goldsmith cultivates.45
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In his treatment of celebrity, Joseph Roach describes public intimacy: he compares celebrities to monarchs who
“have two bodies—the body natural, which decays and dies, and the body politic, which does neither . . . celebrities
foreground a peculiar combination of strength and vulnerability, expressed through outward signs of the union of
their imperishable and mortal bodies. Let those marks of strength be called charismata; the signs of vulnerability
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Unlike Johnson, Goldsmith only includes epistolary responses from Nash’s correspondents,
never including Nash’s original letters. While this might underscore the lack of materials
available to Goldsmith, it also opens a rhetorical possibility. Without a set of correspondence
from the letter writer and the recipient, a reader must infer Nash’s correspondence. Goldsmith
invites the reader to imagine the author of the originals by reading the responses. In short, he
asks the reader to discover the facts of Savage’s own character themselves. They must
reconstruct the documentation of Nash’s life in order to understand him. What is known about
Nash is subject to the imagination of the reader, who must fill in the gap the one-sided sets of
correspondence create.
These sets of letters answer Nash’s, giving provocative cues that invite a reader to draw
conclusions about Nash, much like Savage’s letter to his Reverend William Saunders in
Johnson’s biography. Goldsmith points out that “[t]he duchess of Marlborough seems not to be a
much better writer than Mr. Nash; but she was worth many thousand pounds, and that might
console her. It may give splenetic philosophy, however, some scope for mediation, when it
considers, what a parcel of stupid trifles the world is ready to admire” (III.333). She writes, after
all, about trivial matters, like Nash’s recommendations on cloth for dresses or on likely
landscapers for her grounds. Goldsmith frames these letters by characterizing their
correspondence about “concerns of a private nature. Her letting leases, building bridges, or
forming canals, were often carried on under his guidance; but she advised with him particularly
in purchasing liveries for the footmen; a business to which she thought his genius best adapted”
(III.332). Nash and Marlborough give Goldsmith’s audience the chance to decide whether Nash
lacks depth or “not only took care . . . to protect ladies from the insults of our sex, but to guard
stigmata . . . [T]heir beguiling interplay . . . has a long history as well as a popular currency as the source of public
intimacy” (24). Roach’s notion of public intimacy is particularly appropriate to Nash, whose celebrity, unlike
Savage’s or Johnson’s later, is based on little more than the assertion of his selfhood in a popular resort area.
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them from the slanders of each other” with prudent advice on style (III.331). These facets of
Nash’s character, defender of women, foppish dilettante, confidant, and household manager are
in contention for the reader who would know Nash. The process of judging depends on the
ability to play the role that Goldsmith has established for his reader. Goldsmith fictionalizes his
reader as the Duchess of Marlborough’s correspondent, as Nash himself. In this position, the
reader constructs the facts of Nash’s interiority imaginatively.
Pope’s letters to Nash offer a better insight into the sympathetic function toward which
Goldsmith turns the letters. Goldsmith introduces the letters from Pope with his own unmet
responsibility as a biographer to include enough epistolary detail for the reader to witness the
exchange: “I should have been glad to have given Mr. Nash’s letter upon this occasion; the
reader, however, must be satisfied with Pope’s reply” (III.342). The satisfaction the reader takes
from Pope’s reply derives less from reading Pope than imaginatively reconstructing Nash’s
initial letter and, biographically, the man who had written it. Pope cannot resist a mock-polite
tone in his first letter that invites speculation about the man to which he addressed his derision.
Nash, apparently, had written Pope requesting an inscription engraved on an obelisk honoring a
visit to Bath, Nash’s home, by the Prince of Wales. Pope first thanks Nash for considering him
worthy of praising a prince, but points out that “[y]ou say words cannot express the gratitude you
feel for the favour of his R. H. [Royal Highness] and yet you would have me express what you
feel, and in a few words. I own myself unequal to the task; for even, granting it possible to
express an inexpressible idea, I am the worst person . . . who have received so few favours from
the great myself” (III.342). Pope’s sarcastic reply could only have answered the letter of a man
who Goldsmith has left the reader to imagine Nash from a social response. As in the instance of
Marlborough’s letters to Nash, Pope’s letters raise the question of who Nash might be: was
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Pope’s correspondence intended as vitriol directed at a man Pope deemed a fool? Or was it an
upbraiding of a well-intentioned man who overstepped the etiquette of begging a favor from a
stranger? However readers choose to define Nash depends on how they imagine him as a letter
writer. As in the letter to Marlborough, the reader assumes the role of Nash. More importantly,
how they imagine him through his celebrity determines the facts that define him.
Pope’s subsequent letter answers neither question; again, it opens Nash to a sympathetic
reconstruction by Goldsmith’s readers. Goldsmith frames the letter by inviting the reader to
consider, again, “[w]hat Mr. Nash’s answer” to Pope’s letter was, and Goldsmith confesses that
he “cannot take upon me [himself] to ascertain, but it was probably a perseverance in his former
request” (III.342). He cannot take it upon himself; rather, he leaves ascertaining Nash’s answer
to the reader. Pope’s letter makes the claim that Pope had unsuccessfully investigated who might
be able to better write an inscription honoring the prince. In lieu of another writer, Pope drafts
and sends a plain inscription that “is nearly the common sense of the thing” (III.343). Pope
attaches Nash’s name to the inscription, and directly reminds Nash “I think I need not tell you
my name should not be mentioned” (III.343). The final product was indeed plain, and Goldsmith
almost seems to cite it to stress the almost triviality of Nash’s persistence: “The inscription
referred to in this letter, was the same which was afterwards engraved on the obelisk; and is as
follows.
In memory of honours bestow’d,
And in gratitude for benefits conferred in this city,
By his Royal Highness
Frederick, Prince of Wales,
And his Royal Consort,
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In the Year 1738,
This obelisk is erected by
Richard Nash, Esq” (III.343).
In this gesture, Pope opens an imaginary space for Nash by assigning his name to the inscription
he did not write. Nash becomes a presence who is signed to an inscription he did not write and as
a silent correspondent in active communication. Yet he remains absent. In order to flesh out the
presence Goldsmith outlines, readers must observe Nash’s rhetoric of self sympathetically,
putting themselves in Nash’s position to imagine his selfhood.
Challenging readers to draw conclusions about a print person allows the reader to become
a spectator of lived experience through a print selfhood. By picturing the moments that frame a
rhetoric of self, the biographer determines details that have the potential to excite the sympathies
of their biographical spectators, readers who recognize their responsibility to judge other
selfhoods in order to improve their own. By depending on the resources at his disposal and
printing the letters available to him, Goldsmith forces readers to project their sympathies onto
Nash. They must imagine the man whose correspondence drew answers from the Duchess of
Marlborough and Alexander Pope. As Smith theorizes, “[e]very faculty in one man is the
measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another . . . I neither have, nor can have, any
other way of judging them” (19). To “measure” Nash by imagining themselves as the writers of
his letters ties the experience of print to a rhetoric of self in order to utilize both as a means of
inculcating virtue in readers. The details that Goldsmith establishes require readers to imagine a
Nash from whom they can draw conclusions about the selfhood they can only envision
experientially by putting themselves in his place. By imaginatively constructing themselves as
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Nash, the effect of reading a print self is autodidactic and ethical, teaching them how to act by
embodying Nash’s action.
Like Johnson, who employs the role of documentation in a print culture increasingly
dependent on tangible, documented evidence, Goldsmith also establishes biographical detail
using a form with recognizable associations to periodical culture and an older, rhetorical
tradition.46 Goldsmith draws on the conventions of character writing for details of Nash’s life
that readers can evaluate inductively as factors for determining the character of the person. By
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, character writing was most recognizably the
province of periodical publications, led by The Spectator, in which authors framed essays
through the voice of a familiar character given to set traits. They were a mainstay of one of print
culture’s most popular eighteenth-century forms. Character types and character writing
functioned, J. W. Smeed suggests, as “the relish in the sandwich, the entertainment between two
slices of instruction” (67). Richard Steele’s Tatler and the Mr. Spectator personae he shared with
Joseph Addison where characters whose attitudes guided the aesthetic discussions in their
periodicals. Johnson contributed a Mr. Rambler, an Idler, and an Adventurer as essayspokespeople to broach moral and social topics, and James Boswell offered up a
Hypochondriack whose character depended on eighteenth-century stereotypes of depression and,
particularly, Boswell’s own identification with those stereotypes.
As a standard for understanding character during the eighteenth century, character writing
offers a useful means of accessing contemporary assumptions about personality and selfhood.
Smeed notes that the rhetoricians following Theophrastus, “firmly regarded” character writing
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The tradition of character writing, thought grounded in the deductive rhetoric of ancient Greece, exerted a strong
influence on eighteenth-century understandings of self and morality and on biography as an emergent form. Its
influence is not paradoxical, despite the eighteenth century’s inductive bent, since character writing, like other
biographical facts an author could invent, was evidential and could be used to induce conclusions about the self.
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“as part of education, and . . . the depiction of types . . . has a moral function” (7). Elaine M.
McGirr outlines how eighteenth-century character writing achieved this didactic aim: “[t]he
‘character’ taught readers how to interpret the world and what values to attach to different
classes or types of people. And because they were so pervasive in eighteenth-century England,
‘characters’ operated as icons that needed no explication . . . The character sketch fixed
identities, transforming individuals into ‘types’ that were both definable and consistent” (4).47
Such iconic status operates as a cultural shorthand for signifying the values necessary for an
ethics of reading. The drive to correlate a specific social value to a specific, fictitious identity
provides another means for representing a character that can be accredited in print, through its
periodical popularity with readers.
But this approach was a vestige of deductive rhetoric: the namesake character of a
particular character sketch was a sort of syllogistic major premise; the behaviors of their lives
highlighted different aspects of the major premise, reaffirming it in the context of these different
behaviors. Eighteenth-century periodicals where populated by such characters. Their unique
attributes set the periodicals topics and tone—the Tatler was light and dealt with manners, while
the Spectator took up larger social issues and aesthetic judgment. Taken on its own, a single
character study seems out of place in the inductive context eighteenth-century biographers were
developing for arranging selfhood. Goldsmith, however, puts character types in conversation,
like inductive data points that require the reader’s evaluation in order to induce Goldsmith’s
selfhood. Goldsmith demonstrated a knowledge of this tradition in his critique of Samuel
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McGirr divides her treatment of eighteenth-century characters in three categories, men, women, and the other.
Under these heads, she outlines general character types at a remove from Theophrastus’s ancient Greece and
particular to the eighteenth century. For men, she outlines four characters, the Rake, the Fop, the Country
Gentleman, and the Cit. The characters of women, she divides four sets of character types, the Heroine and Wife, the
Coquette and the Prude, the Country Maid and the Town Lady, and Learned Ladies and Female Wits. The other
characters of the eighteenth century are Catholic, Protestants, and Scots.
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Butler’s character writing, noting that Butler’s characters “want that entertaining variety, and
seem drawn rather from the designs of Theophrastus; and we must do our countryman the justice
to own, that his sketches are not inferior to those of the refined Grecian” (I.209). Goldsmith
associates the details of Nash’s character from the attributes that readers would recognize as the
values typical of their reading community, recognized by their own republic of letters. Goldsmith
develops two disparate character types that match Nash’s celebrity, reflecting eighteenth-century
values and roles: the gamester and the king. Goldsmith establishes a productive tension between
the types and the self that allows readers to prioritize different facts about the self in order to
assess moral flaws in order to obtain self-knowledge through identifying with the native
minuteness of Nash.
For Peter Briggs, the incongruent character types that Goldsmith assigns to Nash’s
celebrity, the difference between the character types Goldsmith assigns Nash and Nash’s own
character amounts to “careful equivocation of large and small, importance and unimportance,
social power and; mere vanity . . . unqualified praise and light blame . . . is momentarily
stabilized in the notion that even triflers can have a significant social impact” (Briggs 214). He
misreads the smallness that Goldsmith accords Nash as definitive. The function of the biography
in this reading is to depict Nash “not [as] a unique individual but instead as a social symptom
with great resonances or implications extending well beyond his personal story. In other words,
Nash’s career was made to seem naturally figurative, a reflection of the aspirations and
puzzlements of the larger society (and to which he lent) his essential energies and meanings”
(215). For Briggs, Goldsmith’s Nash presents little more an artifact of “great resonances and
implications,” the “aspirations and puzzlements” of Nash’s own time, rather than a rhetoric of
self endowed with autodidactic application for readers.
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As a young man in London, Nash’s life typified that of the disreputable gamester, an
admission that Goldsmith makes in the service of biographical integrity: “[n]ot to disguise any
part of his character, he was now, by profession, a gamester, and went on from day to day,
feeling the vicissitudes of rapture and anguish, in proportion to the fluctuations of fortune”
(III.298). Treating this fact of Nash’s life as an admission rather than a simple fact invited
readers to draw ethical conclusions about Nash. Goldsmith makes him the man of a historical
moment, associated with a “spirit of gaming, [that] had been introduced in the licentious age of
Charles II. and had . . . thriven surprizingly. Yet all its devastations were confined to London
alone” (III.298). Within this larger context, Goldsmith’s audience would have anticipated certain
stereotypical traits that marked a professional Restoration gambler: the inconstancy, unreliability,
and rapacity that come from having “hitherto only led a life of expedients” and which had caused
the middle-aged Nash to “thank chance alone for his support, and have been long precariously
supported, he became, at length, totally a stranger to prudence or precaution” (III.298).
Goldsmith portrays Nash’s character through reference to normative character types. Readers
have to weigh the generality of the character type against the specifics of Nash’s character.
While Goldsmith follows Johnson’s method of presenting all details of a self, regardless
of how unflattering they seem, he makes an important rhetorical move here that underscores the
differences between his mode of locating details for a rhetoric of self and Johnson’s. Johnson
generates a rhetoric of self for Savage that situates the man between the matrix of his
circumstances and the ethical nature of his choices within that matrix. Savage’s life was not
simply a self-determined by the question of his parentage, his trial for murder, or his stint in
debtor’s prison; rather, he was an actor accountable to his decisions. In Goldsmith, the possibility
exists that the self can be determined by the context, a Restoration “spirit of gaming” in London
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or even the excessive frivolity of Bath, either of which yields a gambler or a Master of
Ceremonies. Such determinism is possible in Goldsmith’s Nash because Nash provides a human
lens for spectating and observing ethical character traits more specifically and more closely.
Goldsmith uses the possibility of this determinism to foreground character, but he
ultimately defers to the autodidactic promise of the form: “I attempt the character of one, who
was just such a man as probably you or I may be, but with this difference, that he never
performed an action which the world did not know, or ever formed a wish which he did not take
pains to divulge” (III.291). While few materials exist to document Nash, his transparency in
performing actions and forming wishes makes his selfhood an easier lens for viewing the effects
of ethical values on a person and for the reader identifying with them. As much Johnson and
Goldsmith had used print documents mark the lives of Savage and Nash, the rhetorical mode of
character writing provided an additional biographical source for inducing selfhood
In character writing, the traits of a character type are written into the character; they
became “‘natural’ qualities,” which “taught readers how to assume or avoid identification with
that character—how to ‘put on’ or eschew those natural attributes” (McGirr 4). But Goldsmith
writes them onto the life of a real person, which requires the reader to choose between
understanding the character of Nash as that of a gambler or discerning the “natural” character of
the man. From the details Goldsmith arranges, the conflict between the character types that
Goldsmith exemplified in Nash and the character that Nash embodied was a conflict between a
“constitutionally passionate and generous” man who “never formed by nature of a successful
gamester,” despite being a professional, and the “perfection” of the external type, a character
“naturally phlegmatic, reserved and cool; [whose] every passion must learn to obey control”
(III.313). Nash’s innate, “constitutional” character signifies a personal imperfection determined
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by his social circumstances and subject to them. The natural qualities of the “perfect gamester”
frame Nash’s Goldsmith for readers who must not only spectate and understand Nash through his
correspondence, but also within contemporary understandings of character.
Most significantly, Goldsmith evokes the character of a king to gesture toward the
responsibilities and character of Beau Nash, the recognized Master of Ceremonies at Bath for
fifty-seven years. Peter Briggs notes that Goldsmith makes a representational decision to pit
contrary aspects of Nash’s character against each (214). Despite reading selfhood and
circumstance as contrary elements of Nash, the contrariety that Briggs locates in Goldsmith’s
representation highlights the importance of ethical choices written into the biography. Lending
the gravity of kingship to the triviality of a recognized but unofficial post as master of
ceremonies allows Goldsmith’s biography to pose interpretative dilemmas. Goldsmith frames
Nash as “a man placed in the middle ranks of life . . . whose vices and virtues were open to the
eye of the most undiscerning spectator, who was placed in public view without power to repress
censure, or command adulation, who had too much merit not to become remarkable, yet too
much folly to arrive at greatness” (III.291). His position makes him easier for readers to view
sympathetically, a familiar character. Goldsmith assures readers that Nash is worth their
attention, that he has “one undeniable claim to their attention. Mr. Nash was himself a King. In
this particular, perhaps no Biographer has been so happy as I [Goldsmith]” (III.291-2).
Goldsmith’s “happiness” as a biographer derives from the character-typed choices he can give a
reader for determining Nash’s personal character: “[t]hey who are for a delineation of men and
manners may find some satisfaction that way, and those who delight in adventures of Kings and
Queens, may perhaps find their hopes satisfied in another” (III.292). In addition to the character
type of the gamester, Nash also embodies the public character type of a monarch, determined in
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part by his circumstances in Bath, made real by his stature as a person in the “middle ranks of
life.”
Goldsmith pictures the character his monarch ruling in the period of Bath’s initial growth,
at the beginning of the eighteenth century during a reinvigorated period in public works, most
notably the Bath Pump-House, where Nash, “in order to proceed in every thing like a king, . . .
was resolved to give his subjects a law, and the following rules were accordingly put up in the
Pump-room” (III.303). Just as notable as Nash’s public proclamation of social order is the
response Goldsmith records: “[i]t is certain, they were in general religiously observed by his
subjects, and executed by him with impartiality” (III.304). In these instances, Nash is seen as a
typical monarch, administering to the needs of the people to promote social order and unity and
to maintain it “with impartiality.” By aligning Nash’s character with the character type of a
monarch, Goldsmith is better able to put the facts of Nash’s life in contrast with the type. Nash’s
monarchical decrees, listed under the posted heading “RULES to be observ’d at BATH,”
stipulate, for instance, “[t]hat all whisperers of lies and scandal, be taken for their authors,” and
also “[t]hat all repeaters of such lies, and scandal be shun’d by all company;—except such as
have been guilty of the same crime” (III.303). They were, Goldsmith notes, “undoubtedly
designed . . . for wit” and, “tho’ stupid, . . . were probably received with sympathetic
approbation” (III.303). Typed as a king, Nash’s character could be aligned with classical
precedent: “a weak man, governing weaker subjects, and may be considered as resembling a
monarch of Cappadocia, whom Cicero somewhere calls, the little king of a little people”
(Goldsmith III.289). The details that Goldsmith develops elevate Nash to a classical,
monarchical rank while stressing his pettiness and weakness, the qualities of a person with whom
a reader might sympathize.
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However, Goldsmith closes the biography with a didactic reminder to readers of the
choices he has provided them for discerning the life of Nash and applying it to their own: Nash’s
“singularities are forgotten when we behold his virtues, and he who laughed at the whimsical
character and behaviour of this Monarch of Bath, now laments that he is no more” (III.392). But
Goldsmith’s passive construction—“singularities are forgotten”—leaves the possibility that the
collective “we” who will focus on virtue does not have to be the same as the unnamed collective
who will forget Nash’s “singularities.” Readers, then, might either remember Nash’s faults or
behold his virtue to improve their own lives; they can “laugh” and “lament” in order to
understand the selfhood Goldsmith creates. Collectively or singly, readers must resolve the
tension between what can be known about Nash and what can be discovered by making a choice,
between the Nash’s celebrity and the public, external characters that frame it, and the experience
of the man.
The context of an inductive science that put the onus on the researcher to observe and
draw conclusions engendered a literature that forced readers to read like scientists, observing and
drawing conclusions from the details they saw. Authors like Milton, Johnson, and Goldsmith
locate details to arrange into selfhoods that readers could observe, locating contrasts and
contrarieties that create tensions within the character, which could only be resolved by the
reader’s sympathies. Their sympathetic choices mark an ethics of reading that identified and
defined virtue for the reader and the community of readers. Since the emergent biographical
form presented rhetorics of self that could stand in for the lives they represented, so that readers
could spectate those rhetorics as living selves and learn by reconciling what they saw with what
they could conclude. Their role as readers was to play the acquaintance of the biographical selves
they read. Eighteenth-century biographers discovered the details for the lives they wrote from
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sources that were credited by public assent. The private character of the man comes through
public evidence of his life—what the audience sees of these public selves invites it to draw
conclusion about the private person and, in turn, about itself.
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Chapter 3—The Intimate Rhetoric of Self:
The Ethos of the Intimate Biographer

Scholars who plot the history of the biographical form often pass from seventeenthcentury life writing like Izaak Walton’s lives of George Herbert and John Donne to Samuel
Johnson’s biography of Richard Savage and then on to James Boswell’s life of Johnson. The
move from Walton to Johnson is a broad shift in form from life writing to biography. But the
formal development from Johnson’s Savage to Boswell’s Johnson is a formal refinement,
moving biographical selfhood toward a deeper, representational interiority. They maintained a
remove between the subject and biographer with their scientific approach, but Boswell balances
a wealth of observations and recollections against his own first-hand account and records. He
embraces his subject and uses his own ethos to probe the private, intimate self and, in doing so
advances biography into its modern form. Even though Boswell’s biographical “task” was
formally identical to Johnson’s and Goldsmith’s— to organize documented, lived experience
into a print selfhood that empirical readers can observe sympathetically, like a living person, in
order to teach themselves right social practice—his arrangement of Johnson’s experience
required more than the selfhood of a vagrant poet or an affected dandy, whose actual lives had
been eclipsed by their biographies. Scandal did not define the life of Johnson in the public eye.
On the contrary, whatever scandal arose, Johnson bested, whether it was James Macpherson’s
public threats to harm him after Johnson challenged Macpherson’s Ossian or Lord Chesterfield’s
snub at Johnson’s appeal for patronage (Life ii.289-98, i.261-2).48

48

Johnson’s letter to Macpherson offered an unyielding response to the possibility of violence: “Any violence
offered me I shall do my best to repel; and what I cannot do for myself, the law shall do for me . . . What would you
have me retract? I thought your book an imposture; I think it an imposture still . . . Your rage I defy . . . You may
print this if you will” (Life ii.298). Johnson’s answer to Chesterfield’s snub and weak attempts to ingratiate himself
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The biographical form presented particular difficulties and limitations to eighteenthcentury biographers—what documents were available that recorded the life, what every day
practices characterized it, and what character defined it—but the life of Johnson presented
Boswell with specific biographical challenges to render a well-documented public life intimate,
its character personal, and the man himself familiar. Johnson had faced similar challenges in
developing a didactic rhetoric of self for Richard Savage. He bolstered scanty documentary
evidence with his own accounts of Savage’s life, using his own experience as documentary
evidence that he could arrange as a biographer. Johnson’s challenge was Savage’s obscurity;
Though Boswell himself was a minor public figure, his challenge was Johnson’s publicity and
finding the intimate self within it:
To write the Life of him who excelled all mankind writing the lives of others, and
who, whether we consider his extraordinary endowments, or his various works,
has been equaled by few in any age, is an arduous, and may be reckoned in me a
presumptuous task . . . As I had the honour and happiness of enjoying his
friendship for upwards of twenty years; as I had the scheme of writing his life
constantly in view . . . and as I have spared no pains in obtaining materials
concerning him . . . I flatter myself that few biographers have entered upon such a
work as this, with more advantages; independent of literary abilities, in which I
am not vain enough to compare myself with some great names who have gone
before me in this kind of writing. (Life i.25-6)
That Boswell must addresses his legitimacy as Johnson’s biographer before he can even begin to
arrange Johnson’s biography underscores the pressure on his biographical ethos. The

are most economically expressed in his revision to the definition of “patron” in his Dictionary: “[o]ne who
countenances, supports, or protects. Commonly a wretch who supports with insolence, and is paid with flattery.”
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construction of his opening sentence leaves off explicit mention of those who would “reckon” his
biography “presumptuous,” the readers themselves. By implying the role of the readers, Boswell
emphasizes the “task.” His task, at the outset, is to situate himself within the tradition of the
general ethos developing within the contexts of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century print
culture, the New Science and its community of scientific participants, and within the emergent
contexts of eighteenth-century biographers. The task for Boswell is to innovate the inductive
experiment rather than avoiding presumption.
In this opening, Boswell indicates his ability to represent Johnson’s life for a readership
demands an ethos proportional to Johnson’s achievements. Johnson’s “extraordinary
endowments” as a public, authorial figure earned much of his reputation through the sales of his
biographical works. He is, as Boswell notes, a man who “excelled all mankind writing the lives
of others,” which shapes Boswell’s own responsibilities as biographer. Boswell sets this ethos
against the representational challenges that Johnson’s endowments present, even though his fame
as an author seems almost entirely eclipsed by Johnson’s. More significantly, Boswell puts his
ethos at a remove from direct comparison to Johnson’s, choosing to set it in conversation “with
some great names who have gone before him in this kind of writing.” He sets himself in contrast
to the generic context of great biographical predecessors, like Johnson, but not in direct
comparison to them.
Boswell credentials his experimental method with the claim that it “enlarges upon the
excellent plan of Mr. Mason, in his Memoirs of Gray” (Life i.29). William Mason’s biographical
account of the poet Thomas Gray, The Poems of Mr. Gray: to which Are Prefixed Memoirs of his
Life (1774) presents a rigid structure divided into two parts and subdivided into letters and
poems. Mason’s memoirs comprise the first part, and although dubs it a memoir, it is strictly
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biographical, built on extensive epistolary documentation that eschews the biographer’s
intervention beyond short, connective narratives. Its dependence on correspondence to and from
Gray borders on autobiography, but achieves an even more objective tone than Johnson’s
account of Savage, and drier, too. The second part catalogs Gray’s poetry and Mason’s critical
glosses, which are almost a fourth as long as the initial memoirs. Boswell expressed an
appreciation for Mason’s biography in his common place book, noting his favorite sayings from
Gray and, often, his personal response to them as a reader.49 Boswell’s comments on Gray’s
comment to Horace Walpole: “I know not if this be his own or a quotation. But it supports my
opinion against that of General Paoli, that one does not fall in love with a woman of dignity.
Perhaps indeed a Hero may. Glory is his metaphorical mistress” (ms. 225.2). Boswell applies the
sayings of an important poet to his own deeply personal response in his private commonplace
book. What he appreciates about Mason’s biography is a “plan” arranged around documentation
that recreates intimate aspects of a life, which can elicit a reader’s personal response.
To enlarge Mason’s form, Boswell expands its representational capacity for portraying an
intimate rhetoric of self for Johnson. Boswell combines Johnson’s epistolary and literary output,
so that neither one structures Johnson’s print alone. Instead, increase the conventions of the
eighteenth-century biographical form: “instead of melting my materials into one mass, and
constantly speaking in my own person, by which I might have appeared to have more merit in
the execution of the work . . . I produce, wherever it is in my power, his [Johnson’s] own
minutes, letters, or conversations” (Life i.29). He claims that his method de-emphasizes the ethos
of the biographer like Goldsmith and Johnson established, shifting the interpretive burden onto
his readers, since it depends on an “accumulation of intelligence from various points.” The
49

In a letter to his friend Temple, Boswell notes that “Mason’s Life of Gray is excellent, because it is interspersed
with Letters which shew us the Man. His Life of Whitehead is not a Life at all; for there is neither a letter nor a
saying from first to last” (Correspondence 208).
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network of sources yields a depiction of the public, authorial self, presented to the reader out of
the facts, not made by the author. Boswell thus brilliantly excuses himself of the burden of an
ethos equal to that of Johnson’s in his opening methodological bid.
However, Boswell’s inductive approach requires an authoritative ethos as well. Since a
wider range of information can yield a greater definition of a particular selfhood, Boswell’s
biographical ethos requires him to first assemble and divide the true Johnsoniana from the
spurious, gauging the authenticity of other perspectives through the only available means—his
personal understanding of Samuel Johnson.50 Boswell is also responsible for exerting control
over his materials, ordering the disparate portions of his selections into a print life that coheres
and matches, again, his personal understanding of Johnson. Each responsibility puts a premium
on the intimacy Boswell strives to depict. Boswell’s biographical ethos, though he seems to
downplay it, authorizes him to select the details of Johnson’s life. More importantly, his ethos
holds these details together.
Because Boswell deferred to his intimate understanding of and experience with Johnson
to establish his legitimacy as biographer, critics often attacked his Life of Johnson by attacking
Boswell’s biographical ethos. He perceives attacks in Hester Piozzi’s Anecdotes of the Late
Samuel Johnson and again vents his frustrations and concerns to Malone: “[s]he is a little artful
impudent malignant Devil . . . It is clear that she means to bite me as much as she can,” and he
takes particular issue when her perceives that Piozzi misremembers a conversation about
drunken truth, misrepresents an anecdote Boswell shared with her as her own, and her book
“describes what the Jade has often seen me do—but with Dr. Johnson’s approbation; for he at all
50

Boswell’s announcement at the end of his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides likewise stresses the significance of
his ethos: “Mr. Boswell has been collecting materials for this work for more than twenty years, during which he was
honoured with the intimate friendship of Dr. Johnson,” and he invites a reading public to engage the intimate
friendship, noting that “[h]e has already obtained a large collection of Dr. Johnson’s letters to his friends, and shall
be much obliged for others as yet remain in private hands” (Life v.421).
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times was flattered by my preserving what fell from his mind when shaken by conversation, so
there was nothing like treachery” (Correspondence 114). Boswell’s account to Malone
underscores his fear that Piozzi’s account strikes at his own ethos which is inextricably bound up
with his method. An attack on Boswell’s ethos discredits his means of collecting “what fell
from” Johnson’s “mind when shaken by conversation,” as well as his means of representing him
within a compelling rhetoric of self.51
Contemporary scholars have also questioned Boswell’s ethos as a biographer and its role
in mediating a rhetoric of self for Johnson. Frederick A. Pottle, editor of the Boswell Papers and
the release of trade and scholarly editions of Boswell’s journals from 1950 to 1989, aligns his
treatment of Boswell with stereotypes of the man’s personal character, so that he can casually
reduce Boswell to the character of Macheath from John Gay’s Beggar’s Opera. Pottle interprets
Boswell’s description of Paul Lewis, a popular rakish convict, as a signifier for Boswell’s own
ethos, noting that “[i]n one way or another the figure of Macheath dominates this entire journal”
(Pottle 252 n.7). The current general editor of the Boswell Papers, Gordon Turnbull, has sought
to recuperate Boswell’s print ethos, overwriting Pottle’s assessment of Boswell’s personal ethos
in the journals with a statement that Paul Lewis’s Macheath-type character is “[n]ot just
Boswell’s perception, but part of Lewis’s self display,” citing an account of Lewis from the
Gentleman’s Magazine that shaped perceptions of Lewis (463 n.8). The character of Macheath
could be put on or taken off—self-representation as a choice might be more useful for
understanding Boswell’s selfhood than self-representation as a brand.
51

After the Life’s publication, critics were particularly focused on the importance of Boswell’s ethos in playing
biographer to Johnson. In the 20 May 1791 Morning Post, and Daily Advertiser, for instance, a pundit suggested
that “Sir JOHN HAWKINS, it is affirmed by BOZZY, never lived near enough to JOHNSON’s Privacy to know
his character.—The latter took in the true Haut Gout.—Sir JOHN contented himself with smelling him at a distance”
(qtd. in Larsen 162). Referring to the biographer as “Bozzy,” the critic attacks this crucial, intimate ethos; Bozzy
was Johnson’s pet name for Boswell. The critic also suggests Boswell’s Life is in bad taste. Hawkins’s distance
weakens his ethos, but Boswell’s intimacy puts him close enough to smell the slight odor of decay as Johnson flavor
seasons, like wild game aging toward a haut gout.
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While these readings of Boswell’s character grapple with the differences between the
person and the cultural standards of his time shaping his character, they indicate a disjunction
between the received perceptions of Boswell and the ways he chooses to represent himself. As
Samuel Johnson’s biographer, Boswell uses his ethos as a means of developing and arranging an
intimate rhetoric of self for Johnson, more intimate than earlier precedents, like Johnson’s
objective treatment of Savage or Mason’s almost entirely documentary construction of Gray’s
print person.
The biographical ethos that Boswell brings to bear on the Life of Johnson did not develop
in a literary vacuum; he did not arrive on the eighteenth-century biographical scene as a literary
unknown. This chapter will put Boswell’s ethos as the biographer of the Life in the context of his
earlier writing to examine how the works he authored gave him authority to play Johnson’s
biographer, a biographer capable of relaying an intimate representation of this towering public
figure. To generate this biographical shift from a known, recognizable selfhood to a personal
self, Boswell addresses three challenges with the print ethos he created for himself in his earlier
manuscripts and published writings. In these contexts, Boswell’s authorial ethos matures into a
biographer whose print self has the authority to act as an interlocutor for Johnson. Boswell’s
well-known relationship with Johnson acts as a print fact that establishes a reader’s expectations
and gives a revelatory context to Johnson’s selfhood. Second, Boswell establishes an ethos as a
biographer who is competent to represent Johnson’s public prominence, the reputation of his
print self by counterbalancing his ethos against Johnson’s established print self. Third,
Boswell’s ethos destabilizes Johnson’s public, print persona so that he can himself overwrite it.
Boswell uses his ethos to show that he can innovate how readers might come to understand
Johnson’s selfhood personally, publicly, and nationally.
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I will give particular attention to his ethos as the Scottish persona of a periodical writer
from Edinburgh in one of his early manuscripts, as the travel writer in his Account of Corsica,
the essayist of the Hypochondriack, the anonymous author of occasional pieces in the London
Magazine, or even a proto-biographer travelogue writer in the Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides.
I argue that the ethos he develops in these writings are a necessary precedent to the Life since
they provide him with the means for balancing Johnson’s public, authorial persona against the
private persona that Boswell was later at such pains to arrange rhetorically. Ultimately,
Boswell’s ethos allows him to establish a relationship with his audience that would allow him to
translate the national and literary significance of Samuel Johnson at a distance from Boswell’s
readers into a rhetoric of self that closed this distance, making Johnson a familiar self to whom
they can relate.

Ethos as a Mediator for Selfhood
In order to arrange a compelling biography, Boswell must first establish himself as an
author capable of playing mediator between his audience and his subject. Paula Backsheider
suggests that the decision to take on the challenges of writing a biography is ultimately a
decision to explore and interpret a person so closely as to enter into an intimate relationship with
the life of that person. The relationship between the biographer and “a subject . . . need not be
those most commonly assigned—identification or affinity or sympathy. It can be a deep
understanding of the pressures the time brought to bear on the subject. It can be deep
engagement with the ‘puzzles’ that remain unsolved about the life. It can be a particular
engagement with the challenges of the act of writing a particular life or kind of life”
(Backsheider 59). On a larger scale, and “[i]n the most successful biographies, the writer also has
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a clear conception of what that life represents and in what ways it was significant and has
significance for us” (Backscheider 59). Boswell’s ethos as a biographer of the public and
intimate self depends on the “commonly assigned,” personal reasons, but it especially abstracts
the significance of Johnson’s life to stress what it “represents” for a public audience beyond
Boswell’s own “identification or affinity or sympathy.” By positioning himself in a personal
relationship to a public figure, Boswell creates a print ethos to stand in for his audience’s
personal knowledge of Johnson that promises the reader an experience of meaning through the
modern biographical strategies of intimacy and identity.
Boswell’s attempt to introduce a new biographical rhetoric was a means to realizing an
earlier, authorial ambition to gain literary repute. Boswell claims to have had Johnson’s
biography in mind for upwards of twenty years, during which time he began collecting
information for the later Life. At the same time, though without any indication he was
consciously establishing himself to write the Life, Boswell was developing credentials that would
give his later biographical ethos enough literary efficacy to recommend it. His early Account of
Corsica displays some literary merit that would look toward his later biographical approach.52 In
the Life, for instance, Boswell recalls his anxiety that Johnson might take offense at the
publication of his private letter to Boswell (Life ii.46-7). This early failure on Boswell’s part
marks an immature misstep that he would later avoid by negotiating the private and the public
aspects of literary selfhood.

52

In the 1768 Preface of his first publication, the Account of Corsica, Boswell gives particular attention to the
function and the effects of a compelling ethos. While the Account is a travel narrative, it acts in some ways as a
timely political manifesto, roughly coinciding with the arrival of the exiled General Pasquale Paoli in Britain after
the invasion of Corsica by France and Genoa in 1768. Thomas M. Curley describes Boswell’s political edge as
“artful propaganda transforming personal experience and historical research into a coherent case for British support
of Corsican independence. It is a fact-based artifact having a romantic libertarian perspective shaped in part by
Rosseau and the classics but nevertheless containing a reliable British description of the country” (93).
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In a letter critiquing the Account, Johnson distinguishes between a crucial handling of the
public and private: “[y]our History is like other histories, but your Journal is in a very high
degree curious and delightful. There is between the history and the journal that difference which
there will always be found from notions borrowed from without, and notions generated within . .
. You express images which operated strongly upon yourself, and . . . have impressed them with
great force upon your readers” (ii.70). The inward turn for which Johnson praises Boswell defers
to a display of the private person, the ethos generated through personal of a vaguely empirical
nature, from which Boswell can draw conclusions that might be “impressed with great force” on
his audience. Most notably, it achieves this interior turn, as Johnson suggests, through Boswell’s
journaling. The context for Boswell’s journaling is Corsica’s battle for sovereignty, the sort of
history from which Hugh Blair and Adam Smith distinguish the biographical form in their
rhetorical lectures.53 Boswell’s autobiographical journaling, though not applied to a biographical
account, humanizes the history of Corsica’s struggle, much like Johnson’s explanation of how
biography acts on the reader: “[a]ll or joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is
produced by an act of the imagination that realises the event however fictitious, or approximates
it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose fortune we
contemplate” (Rambler III.318-9). With his account of Corsica, Boswell begin to develop an
autobiographical ethos that can humanize history and, later, a public selfhood and celebrity in the
Life that his journaling “places the reader in the condition” of his own ethos as a first-hand
witness of Samuel Johnson.
53

As noted in the introduction, Blair classes biography as a historical construction, subject to the common attributes
of historical rhetoric. He notes that “History is a species of Writing designed for the instruction of mankind, [so]
sound morality should always reign in it,” and he also argues that the biographical form “or the Writing of Lives, is
a very useful kind of Composition; less formal and stately than History; but to the bulk of readers, perhaps, no less
instructive; as it affords them the opportunity of seeing the characters and tempers, the virtues and failings of
eminent men fully displayed; and admits them into a more thorough and intimate acquaintance than History
generally allows” (411). Blair’s notion of biography emphasizes the form’s appeal to readers, its familiar human
closeness set against the historical remove.
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The rhetoric of self Boswell would later craft in the Life depends on the “images” of
Johnson that Boswell chose to record in his journals, those images “which operated strongly
upon” the biographer, who sought to impress “them with great force.” It is an almost Lockean
endeavor to give significance to images that every reader could view and interpret collectively.
His journal accounts of Johnson’s life would become the backbone of the Life. Boswell does not
explicitly theorize the ethos of the biographer in the public, political context of a Corsican tour,
yet his discussion of authorship and the authority outlines the interplay between an author’s ethos
and the audience that shape Boswell as a biographer. His treatment of authorship also points
toward an attention to the intimate, “curious and delightful” details in Boswell’s journals that
establish a crucial distinction “between the history and the journal,” which for Boswell develops
into “that difference which will always be found from notions borrowed from without, and
notions generated within.” It is an early literary move to situate the intimate and private in the
view of public readers.
Through his private journaling, Boswell begins to craft a public, authorial ethos, that he
explores in the Preface to the Account of Corsica: “[t]he author of an approved book may allow
his natural disposition an easy play, and yet indulge the pride of a superiour genius when he
considers that by those who know him only as an authour, he never ceases to be respected”
(Corsica 14). Thus readers “who know Boswell only as an author” will see his “superior genius”
in that “natural disposition of easy play” that his journaling reveals and that Johnson
commended. In the Life, Boswell is able to play dual roles as an author and biographer: he is
Johnson’s friend, giving his own “natural disposition” free reign and an “easy play” with the
celebrity of Johnson’s selfhood, which he later arranges with “superior genius” as a public
biographer. The ethos that “appears in print” and is distributed for a wider audience does not
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harden “a man’s character” personally, but establishes a print remove between the “character” of
the author as a public figure and as a private person, a “natural disposition of an easy play”
privately and in person, that goes unknown to a public, “superior genius” in print. In this
construction, Boswell grants an author’s ethos the duality that would make his trademark
intimacy possible in later biographical writing.54
Boswell is the first of the modern eighteenth-century biographers to capitalize on his role
as eyewitness to the biographical subject.55 There is no record that Oliver Goldsmith played
eyewitness to the experiences of Richard Nash, so he arranged a rhetoric of self for Nash based
largely on Nash’s reputation at Bath. Goldsmith necessarily adopted an ethos that could translate
Nash into character types, matching the public facts of the Nash’s reputation as a publicly
recognizable selfhood of a man who shaped the public (III.288). Johnson stressed the importance
of distance between the biographical ethos and the subject, in order to make the biography more
accurate and reliable (Rambler III.323). Johnson’s personal relationship to Richard Savage, their
nighttime roving, appears nowhere in the biography Johnson wrote for him.56 Johnson adopted
an objective ethos, structuring these night walks in the biography as Savage’s alone (Lives
XXII.928). Boswell’s early model for cultivating an authorial ethos sets an approach that allows
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The duality of an author’s private life and public output is no revelation to eighteenth-century authors. Johnson,
too, acknowledges the distinction in an early Rambler essay, No 14. Saturday, 5 May 1750, arguing that readers
develop expectations for authors based on their writing which are often frustrated by their actual company (III.92-7).
As a biographer, however, Boswell capitalizes on this distinction in a way that Johnson did not.
55
In his life of Addison, however, Johnson does stress that “lives can only be written from personal knowledge,
which is growing less every day,” but he does not stipulate the knowledge be eye-witness (Lives XXII.637). To the
contrary, he notes that “more knowledge may be gained of a man’s real character, by a short conversation with one
of his servants” (Rambler III.322).
56
Chapter 2 gives more thorough attention to Johnson and Savage’s roving; Richard Holmes discussed it most
thoroughly in Dr. Johnson & Mr. Savage. Sir John Hawkins reports in his Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. that
Johnson recalled “whole nights . . . spent by him and Savage in conversations . . . in a perambulation round the
squares of Westminster, . . . . when all the money they could both raise was less than sufficient to purchase for them
the shelter and sordid comforts of a night cellar” (33-4). Boswell, likewise, reinforced the fact of the relationship
(Life i.163 and 163 n2.)
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him to mediate Johnson through his own personal account, to be both the objective author in
control of the biography and an intimate source that is intertwined with the life.
Boswell began overtly developing his ethos as a biographer with his Journal of a Tour to
the Hebrides. He organizes the Tour around the journal he kept while traveling through the
Hebrides with Johnson in the latter half of 1773, and while it has an ostensible focus on the
Hebrides and Scotland, it is primarily devoted to Johnson. As Ian McGowan observes, the “Tour
retains its place for the student of biography and literary representation as Boswell’s
breakthrough in technique” (127). That the Tour was Boswell’s stylistic trying ground for the
later Life of Johnson has become a commonplace, which reduces the journaling in the Tour to
little more than a stylistic practice run for the application of journals in the later Life. But the
published account of Johnson in the Journal Tour was for Boswell a necessary precedent to the
Life. More than a study in stylistics, Boswell uses the Tour to begin developing an ethos that
mediates an intimate rhetoric of self in the Life. In the Tour, Boswell’s ethos is a means for
balancing Johnson’s public, authorial persona against the private persona that he himself had
taken such pain to record. John Radner notes that “Boswell used the journal to establish his
authority to narrate this portion of Johnson’s life and his credentials to narrate the rest . . . and to
demonstrate his ability to appreciate and assess Johnson” (“Narrative Control” 67). More than
simply refining and innovating Boswell’s biographical style, the Tour allowed Boswell to
establish his credentials as Johnson’s preeminent biographer in two ways: it exhibits Johnson’s
approval of Boswell’s biographical project, and it also downplays Boswell’s presumption,
qualifying him to play the biographer rather than a mere fan.
Boswell used the Tour to credential his authority and his mastery of Johnson’s life, so he
had to show that his ability to represent Johnson biographically had been endorsed by Johnson
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himself. Boswell portrays Johnson as a collaborator who avidly follows and affirms the journal
account of the trip, thus endorsing Boswell’s journalistic and, later, biographical ethos. Their trip
ran just over three months, from 15 August 1773 to 21 November 1773, and Boswell maintained
his journal 11 November. The last time Johnson perused it was 26 October, where Boswell
gestures toward Johnson’s collaboration: “[h]aving mentioned, more than once, that my Journal
was perused by Dr. Johnson, I think it proper to inform my readers that this is the last paragraph
which he read” of Boswell’s journal, in Scotland or back in London (Life v.360, n. 4). Radner
characterizes these perusals not only as collaboration between the two, but especially as research
for Boswell’s later project, noting that, “[t]hough they collaborate on input, Boswell is primarily
in charge of the process. He determines what to preserve for Johnson (and others) to read, and
for Boswell himself perhaps to use later” (“Johnson’s Role” 306). 57 In his constant references,
“more than once,” to Johnson’s review of the journal, Boswell bolsters his ethos as a researcher
so thorough he is qualified to mediate Johnson’s selfhood.
Johnson’s permission, implied through his collaboration, freed Boswell to present a fuller
picture of his subject, one that included potentially off-putting, but nevertheless Johnsonian
foibles, peccadillos, and personality ticks. Johnson’s permission distanced Boswell from his own
personal feelings about Johnson. Thus unchecked, Boswell could cultivate the sort of ethos he
57

Boswell also had to develop a mature biographical persona with an authoritative ethos that could be a strong voice
within the wider conversation surrounding Johnson. The public interest in Johnson’s selfhood had been gratified if
not filled by multiple biographies published shortly after his death: “[t]he lives all had their staple ingredients,
usually borrowed from one another . . . Despite these similarities, each biography was in its own way different from
the others . . . Each projected his own image of Johnson, but collectively they conveyed the two main images of
Johnson as writer and moralist,” aspects of his selfhood that were both public and private, but the early biographers
presented was of a public “moralist rather than Johnson the writer” (Kelley and Brack 117-8). With so many
biographies and repetitious facts in circulation about the life of Johnson, Hester Thrale Piozzi could note a month
before the publication of Boswell’s Life, that “Mr Boswell’s Book is coming out, & the Wits expect me to tremble,”
since the authority of his ethos promised to challenge the one she established in her Anecdotes of the Late Samuel
Johnson, but Piozzi wondered, “what will the Fellow say?—that has not been said already?” (Thraliana 807). This
context gave Boswell the imperative to make Johnson new with an ethos that could mediate Johnson by enriching
the public narrative of Johnson’s life with new details of his private life, evaluated judiciously and arranged
logically.
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projected in his account of Corsica—a necessary component of an ethos that could balance the
public authority of the biographer against the intimate, first-hand accounting that Boswell sought
to incorporate into his Life of Johnson. In the Tour entry for 19 September 1773, Boswell records
that Johnson “came into my room this morning before breakfast, to read my Journal, which he
has done all along. He often before said, ‘I take great delight in reading it.’ To-day he said, ‘You
improve: it grows better and better’” (Life v.225). Similarly, Boswell recounts that Johnson “read
to-night, to himself, as he sat in company, a great deal of my Journal, and said to me, ‘The more
I read of this, I think the more highly of you’” (Life v.262). Johnson’s praise equates Boswell the
journalist with Boswell the person, so that Boswell is as much of a literary creation as the
Johnson that Boswell records in the journal. Boswell appears to delight in this praise and even
tests Johnson and the reader by describing his own excesses.
On 25 October 1773, Boswell imagines himself “knight-errant” for the “ladies maids
tripping about in neat morning dresses” at the Duke of Argyle’s house, women who were more
polished than the Hebridean “rusticity” he had so often seen to that point (Life v.355). He notes
that, “[o]n reflection, at the distance of several years, I wonder that my venerable fellow-traveller
should have read this passage without censuring my levity” (Life v.355, n.3). In one simple
“reflection” at a significant “distance of several years” from his journaling on tour, Boswell
establishes Johnson’s approval of both to his personal experience on tour and the later
publication of the Tour itself. The praise that Boswell recounts in these moments credential his
ethos as an author eleven years later when he publishes the Tour. By depicting Johnson in
approbation of Boswell’s Hebrides journalizing, Boswell represents his own ethos as a credible,
reliable biographer not only of Johnson’s travel through the Hebrides, but of his entire life. Much
like he had ranked the personal journal over the researched historical portions of Boswell’s
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Account of Corsica, Johnson also authorizes Boswell’s journal-based approach to relaying
personal experiences in a public setting or with a public figure. In these important
representations, Johnson is endorsing Boswell’s intimate approach to biography, which he would
later claim to have innovated in arranging a rhetoric of self for Johnson. Boswell takes Johnson’s
approval his journalistic ethos as a confirmation of his ability to mediate Johnson’s selfhood in
the Life.
Johnson’s approval of Boswell’s journalistic complexity, however, was not an
unqualified sanction of Boswell’s biographical project. Although Johnson took pleasure in
reading Boswell’s descriptions of his own eccentricity, he tempered his praise of the journal with
one crucial caveat: “‘Sir, said he, it is not written in a slovenly manner. It might be printed, were
the subject fit for printing’” (Life v.226-7).58 The question of fitness is a matter of intimacy and
accuracy. What makes Boswell’s “subject” unfit “for printing” and so fascinating to Johnson as a
private reader is the intimate details it collects. It displayed peculiarities characteristic of Johnson
that could only be experienced in a first-hand experience of the self. Boswell, for instance, first
interprets Johnson’s habit of speaking to himself by noting that “[i]t is in vain to try to find a
meaning in every one of his particularities, which, I suppose, are mere habits, contracted by
chance . . . His speaking to himself . . . is a common habit with studious men accustomed to deep
thinking” (Life v.306). Then gives an example of the curious habit: “Dr. Johnson is often uttering
pious ejaculations, when he appears to be talking to himself; for sometimes his voice grows
stronger, and parts of the Lord’s Prayer are heard. I have sat beside him with more than ordinary
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John B. Radner argues that Johnson actively sought to keep the intimate unfitness of his peculiarities out of print:
Johnson’s “working to curb Boswell’s wish to publish Johnsonian material while Johnson was still alive, suggest[s]
his discomfort at being circumscribed by Boswell’s narrative and losing control of his public image” (“Johnson’s
Role” 323-4). Boswell’s journal, then, appeared after Johnson’s death, when Johnson’s “public image” could only
be debated and established by biographers. The image Boswell crafts from his journal account is one of many that
enter the biographical fray and lay claim to an image of Johnson.
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reverence on such occasions” (Life v.307). Boswell comments how “remarkable [it is] that Dr.
Johnson should have read this account of some of his own peculiar habits, without saying any
thing on the subject” (Life v.307 n.2). This editorial gloss anticipates criticisms of his revelatory,
eye-witness representations of Johnson. Although Johnson questions whether the journal is “fit
to be published,” Boswell published it and thus made it fit. Getting Johnson’s ostensible approval
of Boswell as a good journalist if not auteur is a necessary step in credentialing Boswell’s ethos;
giving himself permission to go beyond Johnson’s censure establishes the authority of his ethos
as his own man beyond Johnson. Without both halves of this equation, Boswell would not have
been fit to mediate Johnson’s selfhood.

Mediating the Private Facts of Selfhood through an Intimate Ethos
The public, biographical ethos that Boswell establishes distances himself from the
personal details he includes in his journal of traveling to the Hebrides with Johnson. In the Life,
later, he would close the distance. His method for establishing an ethos as Johnson’s intimate
defers to the inductive empiricism that Thomas Sprat assigns the natural philosophers Royal
Society, to “regard the least, and the plainest things, and those that may appear at first the most
inconsiderable; as well as the greatest Curiosities” (90). “Every thing relative to so great a man,”
Boswell asserted, “is worth remembering,” but “remembering” and mediating selfhood through
those memories required more delicacy than Boswell could muster in this first attempt to
represent Johnson in the Journal (Life v.19). Many readers found the Tour so indelicate that
Boswell’s editor, Edmund Malone, suggested that he temper his portrayals of Johnson’s
appearance and his character: “[w]ith respect to the Character of your Journal, if you retain it, it
certainly should be amplified, and his uniform piety and virtue enlarged upon. Pray omit your . . .
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bow wough entirely” (Correspondence 301). His ethos here, however empirical and attentive to
the plainest and greatest aspects of Johnson, strained his audience’s expectations for biographical
writing, challenging what Backsheider recognizes as a “contract the biographer has established
with the reader. More than a bridge, it is the primary signal of the writer’s relationship to readers
and to content” (10). Boswell develops this “contract” to innovate the biographical form with a
rhetoric of self that gives his audience more intimate access to the person than ever before.
Dr. William Adams, Johnson’s friend and former tutor at Pembroke College
acknowledges the tension Boswell’s ethos establishes between the distance of the public author
to the subject and the intimate details that invite readers to “remember” all of the things “relative
to so great a man” as Johnson: “you have depicted our Friend so perfectly to my Fancy in every
attitude, every scene and situation, that I have thought myself in the company, and of the party
almost throughout . . . I wish indeed some few gross expressions had been softened, and a few of
our Hero’s foibles had been a little more shaded; but it is useful to see the weakness incident to
great minds” (Correspondence 101). Adams gentle criticism highlights this tension between the
public Johnson and the private life as he gently criticizes Boswell’s mediation of their mutual
friend in the Tour. Though Boswell exceeded Adams’ expectations for drafting a rhetoric of self,
he ultimately recognizes the value of Boswell’s project, to preserve everything relative to
Johnson’s celebrity, and what Johnson’s “foibles” and “gross expressions” offer readers to
understand about Johnson and themselves.
To demonstrate how his personal experience with Johnson enables him to better mediate
Johnson, Boswell gathers unflattering details alongside those that Johnson might have regard fit
for printing in the Tour, the “inconsiderable” and the “greatest curiosities.” Such details can only
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be garnered through intimate experience with the subject.59 Boswell relates Johnson’s opinion
that “we inherit dispositions from our parents,” which in itself is a neutral observation, but
Boswell adds Johnson’s private disclosure: ‘I inherited, (said he,) a vile melancholy from my
father, which has made me mad all my life, at least not sober’—Lady M’Leod wondered he
should tell this” (Life v.214-5). Lady M’Leod’s wonder at Johnson’s admission matches the
audience’s wonder that Boswell himself “should tell this” and reveal Johnson’s opinion of his
own mental instability. Boswell introduces Lady M’Leod’s wonder as a proxy for his own. She
provides cover for the breach of public and private by bringing it to the attention of the reader
and by laying the fault at Johnson, whose excessive candor (rather than Boswell’s prying) leads
Lady M’Leod to wonder. Boswell preserves his ethos as the biographer by offering up this proxy
for audience surprise and their potential to be scandalized by his frankness and intimacy.
Similarly, Boswell shows Johnson’s fury at being left behind on horseback: “I wished to
get on, to see how we were to be lodged, and how we were to get a boat; all which I thought I
could be settle myself, without his having any trouble,” but Boswell reports that Johnson “called
me back with a tremendous shout, and was really in a passion with me for leaving him . . . His
extraordinary warmth confounded me” (Life v.145). Boswell is an active participant in Johnson’s
travel, seeking to mediate Johnson’s own traveling experience in lodging and passage, and in the
same manner Lady M’Leod’s preserved his ethos, his confession that Johnson’s “extraordinary
warmth confounded” him rather than his own blame in abandoning Johnson who was, at best, a
clumsy equestrian. Boswell admits no blame, only confusion, so that the reader must observe the
exchange, adopt Boswell’s confusion, and evaluate the only established experience the scene
depicts: Johnson’s abandonment. By depicting Johnson’s private selfhood as depressive and
59

One of Johnson’s prescriptions for biographer exhorts biographers to look past the sort of information that “might
be collected from publick papers” in order to write a biography that goes beyond a “chronological series of actions
or preferments” (Rambler III.322). Boswell moves past develops a model that depends on even closer observation.
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choleric risks breaking the delicate contract that Backsheider describes between the selfhood the
biographer represents, the biographer, and the audience.
The details of Boswell’s experience with Johnson on the Journal, the intimate aspect of
his ethos, seemingly threaten his credibility as a biographer. Was his journalistic research simply
prying that demanded Johnson’s review and revision? Was his participation in Johnson’s lived
experience less about engaging a selfhood intimately than baiting it, to contrive experimentally
an set of experiences rather than observing them judiciously? Hester Thrale Piozzi or Peter
Pindar lambasted Boswell for inserting himself so fully as biographer and proof of Johnson’s
life. While Boswell’s published, biographical ethos is still developing from the author of the
Account to the biographer of the Life, Boswell is using his own experiences, however
unbecoming, to mediate Johnson’s selfhood. Exhibiting his reputation for carousing, Boswell
describes staying up after Johnson went to bed and drinking with friends until “[w]e were cordial
and merry to a high degree,” such a high degree Boswell has “no recollection, with any
accuracy,” of “what passed” (Life v.258). Boswell lists Johnson’s response the next day:
I awaked at noon, with a severe head-ach. I was much vexed that I should have
been guilty of such a riot, and afraid of a reproof from Dr. Johnson. I though it
very inconsistent with the conduction which I ought to maintain, while the
companion of the Rambler. About one he came into my room, and accosted me,
“What, drunk yet?”—His tone of voice was not that of severe upbraiding; so I
was relieved a little.—“Sir, (said I,) they kept me up.”—He answered, “No, you
kept them up, you drunken dog:”—This he said with good-humoured English
pleasantry. Soon afterwards . . . [my] friends assembled around my bed . . . and
insisted I should take a dram.—“Ay, said Dr. Johnson, fill him drunk again. Do it
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in the morning, that we may laugh at him all day. It is a poor thing for a fellow to
get drunk at night, and sculk to bed, and let his friends have no sport.”—Finding
him thus jocular, I became quite easy; and when I offered to get up, he very goodnaturedly said, “You need be in no such hurry now.” (Life v.258-9).
By depicting himself as a man who gets so drunk that he can have “no recollection” of what
passed “with any accuracy,” Boswell seems to undermine the competence of the professional
author or biographer’s ethos: a biographer with no memories is useless. But even his blackout
drinking becomes the occasion for recollecting a story in the morning about Johnson’s teasing
kindness, which redeems the episode. Such intimate details about the biographer rather than the
subject alone also close the gap between the objective, distant role of the biographical ethos and
its intimate, private side that Boswell projected in his Corsican account. Boswell’s foibles help to
offset Johnson’s and create an occasion to show a sympathetic Johnson where Boswell feared he
would find a judgmental one.
Given Boswell’s almost scandalous self-representation in this anecdote, it is easy to miss
his development of Johnson’s character. Boswell makes no attempt, after all, to recall or relate
the happenings of the previous night’s drunkenness, but rather gives a precise account of the next
morning, when Johnson has again become the focal point of the narrative. Boswell uses this
unflinching depiction of a single, embarrassing event to mediate Johnson’s pontificating on
social practices, particularly in the “Rambler.” Boswell’s fear of judgment stands in for reader
expectations as Boswell expects a “reproof” and “severe upbraiding” as a consequence of his
faux pas. Boswell has applied the mistake he recognizes to most readers’ expectations, who
expect the author “to be sealed by an irrevocable sentence as soon as any work of his hath
passed” public scrutiny, thereby conflating the selfhood of the author with the author’s writing
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(Hypochondriack II.22.313). Adopting this mistaken approach, however, positions Boswell to
meet readers on the terms of their common expectations and to revise them. Acknowledging and
evoking such expectations in his fear of a reproof, Boswell sets himself up to invert the
moralizing that readers anticipate. Rather than the Rambler’s heavy-handed severity, Boswell’s
private experience reveals a Johnson who defies expectations. Instead of the familiar, public
austerity of the Rambler, Johnson answers Boswell with “pleasantry,” joking with his companion
at bedside as an intimate friend. The severity of Johnson’s own public ethos as the Rambler gives
way to Boswell’s ethos as a hungover journal writer. Without Boswell’s descriptions of
Johnson’s “jocular” tone and its “good-humoured English pleasantry,” however, Johnson’s
words might, on their own, convey the sort of moralistic “upbraiding” Boswell feared. It is the
combination of Johnson’s action and Boswell’s mediation that produces the rhetoric of self.
With the Tour, Boswell has not yet achieved the ethos of a biographer who can
simultaneously mediate selfhood at a remove from it while citing personal experiences that
define it. In the last edition of the Tour that Boswell revised, the third edition 1786, the fledging
biographer added an explanation for the inclusion of this anecdote. While its primary function
was to address the censure of his literary and personal critics, it clarified how his role as a
mediator for Johnson had functioned in the Hebrides and the later publication:
My ingenuously relating this occasional instance of intemperance has I
find been made the subject both of serious criticism and ludicrous banter. With
the banterers I shall not trouble myself, but I wonder that those who pretend to the
appellation of serious criticks should not have had sagacity enough to perceive
that here, as in every other part of the present work, my principal object was to
delineate Dr. Johnson’s manners and character. In justice to him, I would not omit
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an anecdote, which, though in some degree to my disadvantage, exhibits in so
strong a light the indulgence and good humour with which he could treat those
excesses of his friends, of which he highly disapproved.
In some other instances, the criticks have been equally wrong as to the true
motive of my recording particulars, the objections to which I saw as clearly as
they. (Life v.259, n.1)
Beyond downplaying the severity of his hangover, “an occasional instance of intemperance,”
Boswell does not seek to defend or justify it. Rather than focus on himself, he focuses on his
choice to include this candid anecdote in his representation of Johnson. Boswell stresses his
purposefulness in choosing to admit the incident into the Tour, despite the obvious “objections”
to it, which Boswell “saw as clearly” as his “criticks.”60 The anecdote Boswell presents depicts a
symbiotic relationship between Boswell and Johnson in which Boswell’s ethos as a lush
becomes a fact of Johnson’s biographical representation, which Boswell uses to express the
“indulgence and good humour with which Johnson could treat those excesses of his friends, of
which he highly disapproved.”
While Boswell’s ethos is second to Johnson’s selfhood, the “principle object” of the
Tour, they cohere in the symbiotic relationship Boswell designs for them, each becoming clearer
60

As a public mediator of Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell grudgingly claims that his approach has been misunderstood.
His representation of Johnson in the Tour and his revelations about Johnson’s private life were misunderstood as
scandalous rather than edifying: “[b]ut it seems I judged to well of the world; for though I could scarcely believe it, I
have undoubtedly been informed, that many persons, especially in distant quarters, not penetrating enough into
Johnson’s character, so as to understand his mode of treating his friends, have arraigned my judgement, instead
seeing that I was sensible of all that they could observe” (Life i.3). The problem in Boswell’s judgment is that he
expected a more intimate knowledge of Johnson to provide a baseline for understanding the personal selfhood
Boswell represents. Since his audience’s understanding is “not penetrating enough into Johnson’s character” and
certainly not so penetrating “as to understand his mode in treating his friends,” Boswell has to negotiate the contract
between his audience, his ethos, and the rhetoric of self that his ethos helps to arrange. What rankles Boswell in
particular is that in some criticisms, the audience of his Tour has implied he is not as “sensible of all that they could
observe,” even though he has selected and arranged details to represent Johnson as plainly as possible. Boswell has
broaches these concerns at the outset of the Life to prepare readers for the more expansive degree of intimacy his
public ethos will use in supplying private details from his own experiences and from others in order to provide a
“penetrating” rhetoric of self for Johnson.
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through their exchanges with the other. Boswell is hardly a supernumerary figure in the Tour. He
is not silent in representing Johnson, nor does he act as a passive background for Johnson’s
selfhood. Since a print representation of Johnson is Boswell’s principle object and his ethos is as
much a print construction as Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell applies his ethos as a print fact. He is
not simply playing the foil to Johnson. The open, candid facts of Boswell’s ethos in the Tour
provide a context that engages Johnson and provides a practical rationale for the exercise of
Johnson’s character including his foibles. In the anecdote of Boswell’s hangover, Boswell’s
public ethos uses the intimate facts of his private self like an experiment through which an
audience can induce Johnson’s character.
As the first of three considerations in which Boswell had to situate his ethos to be
Johnson’s biographer in the Life, he maintained an ethos that could act as a public, print fact,
particularly after the publication of his Account of Corsica and the Journal of a Tour to the
Hebrides. He structured his ethos in response to his audience’s needs to maintain his contractual
relationship between the expectations he established for them as biographer and their reaction to
how well he gratified those expectations. In his Dedication to Sir Joshua Reynolds in the Life of
Johnson, Boswell admits, “In my ‘Tour,’ I was almost unboundedly open in my
communications; and from my eagerness to display the wonderful fertility and readiness of
Johnson’s wit, freely shewed to the world its dexterity, even when I was myself the object of it. I
trusted that I should be liberally understood” (Life i.3). The language of his observation gestures
to the symbiotic relationship between Boswell’s two print constructions in the Tour, his public
ethos as biographer and the mediating function of Boswell’s private ethos.
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Authorizing Boswell’s Public Ethos through Periodical Print
That Boswell could render the private experiences of Samuel Johnson public was not
enough to prove his ethos as a biographer who could arrange Samuel Johnson, the acclaimed
author, into a compelling rhetoric of self. He needed to be a great writer himself to be able to
deliver another great writer in print. In his Account of Corsica, Boswell makes plain his desire
for literary fame: “[h]e who publishes a book, affecting not to be an authour, and professing an
indifference for literary fame, may possibly impose upon many people such an idea of his
consequences as he wishes may be received. For my part, I should be proud to be known as an
authour; and I have an ardent ambition for literary fame; for of all possessions I should imagine
literary fame to be the most valuable” (Corsica 14). The value of the “literary fame” that
Boswell seeks rests largely on the author’s self-portrayal and willingness “to be known,” to
establish his authority. Johnson had obtained this distinction with the publication and successful
reception of his poetry, his periodical pieces, his biographies, as well as his Dictionary of the
English Language. His public self and its literary fame presented particular challenges to
Boswell’s projection of his own public, authorial ethos. Boswell had to counterbalance the
authority of his ethos against Johnson’s in print to authorize himself as a valid mediator
Johnson’s selfhood, rather than unknown taking up a presumptuous task. Whereas the whole of
Boswell’s written works could not outweigh Johnson’s in volume or public esteem, his
periodical Hypochondriak essays in the London Journal and especially his Journal of a Tour to
the Hebrides demonstrate an aptitude within certain genres where Johnson excelled, his Rambler,
Idler, and Adventurer periodicals and his own narrative of his travels with Boswell, A Journey to
the Western Island of Scotland. The display of a literary ethos with an analogous understanding
to aspects of Johnson’s own would credential Boswell’s inclusion of potentially embarrassing,
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yet revelatory private details of Johnson’s life, but it would also authorize Boswell’s print ethos
as a reliable biographer for the public, literary Johnson.
In his Hypochondriak, Boswell shows himself operating within the conventions of the
periodical essay that Johnson helped to develop with the prominence of his Rambler. For
Boswell, developing a biographical ethos through a periodical persona was less directly the
development of the biographer and more the development of a reputation that worthy of playing
biographer. Boswell acknowledges that the sort of Johnsonian periodical ethos he seeks to don
demonstrated regard for the audience, its pleasure, and its ability to judge whether “the writer has
broke his promise” as a journalist and moralist (Rambler III.7). The promise Johnson’s Rambler
makes is “to endeavour the entertainment of my countrymen by a short essay . . . that I hope not
much to tire those whom I shall not please; and if I am not commended for the beauty of my
works, to be at least pardoned for their brevity. But whether my expectations are most fixed on
pardon or praise, I think it not necessary to discover; for . . . I find them . . . nearly
equiponderant” (Rambler III.7). The attention Johnson pays his audience acknowledges the
repetitiousness of any periodical performance, illustrating one of the important traits of the
periodical ethos that Richmond P. Bond outlined: the ethos of the periodical “sheet is, first, the
creature of periodicity . . . The periodic persona must not neglect the situation of . . . [the] reader
either individual or corporate . . . [who] will suffer frequent or occasional interruption in . . .
attendance on the experiences and observations” of that particular periodical ethos (113). The
focus of Johnson’s Ramblerian ethos on the care a writer must take in addressing an audience
instills periodical reflection with an exigence and relevance that engages readers.
Johnson excelled so far as an author in the periodical tradition as to become a benchmark
for eighteenth-century essayists. Boswell does not aspire to surpass Johnson’s accomplishments.
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He does, however, operate within the periodical genre to demonstrate a facility with the form
that qualifies his ethos to address the public, print aspects of Johnson’s selfhood biographically.
Johnson’s Rambler shows an initial concern for addressing readers in a manner befitting the
periodical form within the context of other, more established contexts, the epic, poetic, historical,
and biographical (Rambler III.4-5). In the first paper of the Hypochondriack, on the other hand,
Boswell’s periodical ethos recounts a brief history of the periodical form itself, noting its
“British origin . . . in London . . . in Queen Anne’s reign” and its continental popularity, in which
“the most celebrated English periodical papers have been translated into foreign languages . . .
[and] several nations on the continent have produced original works of that species”
(Hypochondriack I.106). Rather than frame the periodical within broader, topical contexts,
Boswell chooses to outline of the periodical’s history, a move that illustrates he is conversant
with the form and with Johnson’s place in its development. Unlike Johnson, Boswell explicitly
addresses the situation of his reading audience, noting that the form lends itself both to the “most
studious who can at times run over only a few pages; and it is better if they can have in that
space something entire and unbroken” and to the “great proportion of readers [who] can never
fix their attention on any thing more than short essays” (Hypochondriak I.105). Nevertheless,
Boswell’s understanding of a periodical audience recalls Johnson’s own attention to the form’s
direct responsiveness to its audience. While both seem like the general attention to ethos that
Boswell commits to in his Account of Corsica, the periodicity of the genre puts very specific
restraints on the each author and the ethos he adopts for the essayist. Boswell shows his ethos to
be as familiar with the limitations of the genre as Johnson.
The most recognizable periodical convention is the effect of the periodical namesake, its
ethos as a character, on the topics and judgment illustrated in each issue. It makes Boswell’s
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emulation of Johnson’s periodical precedent even more important for demonstrating the
appropriate literary aptitude for taking up a biographical subject like Johnson.61 One of the
earliest precedents, Richard Steele’s Tatler, sought to comment on coffee-house gossip, manners,
and taste. He and Joseph Addison created the Spectator and used that ethos to apply a scientific
mode of objective observation to comment upon taste and character. Even Edward Cave’s ethos,
the Sylvanus Urbanus of the Gentleman’s Magazine, conveys the breadth of the magazine’s
coverage, its capacity to encompass and disperse the news from the suburban, “sylvan”
provinces as ably as the urban environs of London. Bond notes that the ethos of a periodical
persona must present a likeable continuity in order to be convincing: a periodical persona “must
be an interesting individual . . . with enough personality to attract and to preserve . . . [a] band of
followers,” in order to “have a long and good life” (114). In order for Boswell to balance his
ethos as a biographer of Johnson, he had to create a periodical ethos that, while different from
Johnson’s, maintained the same consistent, regular likeability to gain the fixity of a “long and
good life.” The ethos was itself to be observed by the audience and also, by association, the
topics raised by the periodical ethos.
Following the precedent of the Tatler and the Spectator, Johnson establishes an ethos and
a plan in the first essay of his periodical, the Rambler. Johnson’s Rambler philosophizes about
wide-ranging social and aesthetic topics, with a moralistic tone. In introducing the periodical and
its figurehead, Johnson’s Rambler only adopts a first person voice six times in the entire essay, in
a single paragraph near the end (III.1.7). The Rambler that Johnson creates does “not aspire to
the status of a hero, for he is not the leading character of the piece, which may contain no such
figure at all . . . Though he must be in a credible position to report or remark, he must not
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Coming to evince this sort literary aptitude would also set Boswell up to apply himself and his intimate details as
facts in the Tour that would define Johnson.
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oppressively call attention to his person or his situation” (Bond 114). By putting on the
Rambler’s ethos and adopting a third person voice that reflects on the relationship between
writers and readers, Johnson foregrounds the social and moral reasoning he broaches in the
Rambler. The ethos of the Rambler that Johnson adopts commentates with a removed,
deliberative register that considers universal maxims and reasons through philosophical
observations; it “maintain[s] the center road between the definite and the indefinite” so that he
can “wear his character mask to speak his lines with fictive sincerity and reasonable authority, . .
. [and] promote his purpose, be it literary, social, political, philosophical” (Bond 114). This
register has a moralistic distancing effect that presents abstract issues objectively for the
audience’s reflection.
Boswell was not ignorant of these constraints to purpose and tone, even before donning
the periodical ethos of the Hypochondriack. In an undated proposal for a periodical paper,
transcribed and translated by James H. Caudle, Boswell weighs what title to give the periodical
he proposed but never pursued:
I wanted to have a title which was perfectly Scots[.] Several such occurred to me.
First, The Town Guard Soldier, but I am a man of a quiet disposition, and their
Lochaber Axes make me shiver all over with fear, and my plan of moral
reformation is more gentle than harrying bawdy houses, or arresting drunken
people off the street in the night time. Secondly The Cadie. And indeed they are a
group of as sharp and clever fallows as you will find any where, and a short paper
is the only sort that a Cadie would write. Bur after all the thought I could take, I
determined that The Chimney-Sweep was the best title, for a periodical Paper to be
published in Auld Reekie.” (Yale MS M 214, Caudle’s emendations)
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Each title is a character that would bring a distinct but Scottish ethos to the project. In the first
instance, the character of a town guard soldier shapes the tenor of the “moral reformation”
Boswell wants his periodical to effect, moving from “gentle” to publicly violent. In the second,
the ethos of the cadie, which the OED defines as “a lad or man who waits about on the lookout
for chance employment as a messenger, errand boy, errand-porter, chair-man, odd-job-man,”
would lend brevity to the periodical that would be characteristic of an errand boy’s message,
presumably too brief to convey the moral reform Boswell projects. His final decision, the
chimney-sweep, evokes an ethos that could clean the chimneys which gave Edinburgh the
nickname Auld Reekie and, by analogy, cleanse and reform the morals of the Scottish
readership. Boswell’s musings on the title and character of a proposed periodical, like his
reflection upon the predicament of an author and the author’s ethos at the head of his account of
Corsica indicates a private consideration of how his ethos might engage the conventions of the
periodical tradition in which Addison’s, Steele’s, and Johnson’s own periodicals flourished. The
directness of a speaker choosing a self to adopt as an ethos, however, lacks the subtlety of
Johnson’s Rambler, an ethos that rarely makes any statement in the first person at the outset of
the journal and demonstrates a clear preference for reasoning through implication.
In his Hypochondriack, Boswell shows that he has a more developed mastery of
Johnson’s periodical technique, which puts off the clumsy straightforwardness of his private
manuscript projects. Boswell’s cavalier, manuscript consideration of different voices for the
Scottish periodical he proposes is much more limited and provincial and, on the whole, less
sophisticated than the ethos of Hypochondriack he adopts. His Hypochondriack maintains the
first person speaker. Boswell merges the title, the ethos, and the function of his periodical when
he states “I flatter myself that the Hypochondriack may be agreeably received as a periodical
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essayist in England, where the malady known by the denomination of melancholy,
hypochondria, spleen or vapours, has been long supposed almost universal” (Hypochondriack
I.106). Boswell acknowledges that his topic is shaped to the needs of his readers who are
stereotypically known for their melancholy because his “general purpose will be to divert
Hypochondriacks of every degree, from dwelling on their uneasiness” (Hypochondriack I.109).
At the same time, Boswell’s periodical persona does not want readers “who upon hearing that a
professed Hypochondriack is coming out, will wish to join company with me, merely from a
prospect of dismal sociality” (Hypochondriack I.110). Boswell’s plan in his first paper uses
conversational tone to speak singly and directly to hypochondriaks, so that he might “divert”
them from their “uneasiness,” much like Johnson’s Rambler assumes a tone that encourages
readers to reflect and meditate on the topics his ethos expounds. Boswell’s technical facility with
this aspect of the periodical form shows him to be on footing with Johnson and, thus, better able
to write Johnson’s public life.
Boswell also uses his Hypochondriack’s ethos to situate his literary authority within the
periodical tradition of Johnson’s periodicals. He has, as Allan Ingram notes, “the considerable
advantage of writing within a highly developed tradition of periodical literature” (111).
Boswell’s Hypochondriack explains that “I have suffered much of the fretfulness, the gloom, and
the despair that can torment a thinking being; and the time has been that I could no more have
believed it possible for me to write even such a paper as this, than I can now believe it possible
for me to write a Spectator or a Rambler,” even though he is “now attained to tranquility and
cheerfulness in the general tenor of my existence” (Hypochondriack I.108-9). While Boswell’s
Hypochondriack concedes a lower position in a hierarchy of periodical publications he outlines,
he situates himself squarely within that tradition, even to the point of citing the “Spectator[’s]
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remarks” in an explanation of the “first appearance” of the his own periodical (Hypochondriack
I.109). Nevertheless, Ingram points out that “Boswell takes something from both branches by
addressing the private individual upon a very personal subject, but concentrating upon the
practical aspect of how that subject relates to society. And voice of the club-man of the
Spectator, and of the preacher in The Rambler, becomes familiarised into the open-hearted tones
of a friend and a confidant” (111). While Boswell applies some of Johnson’s periodical
techniques obliquely to his own newspaper publication, he also directly aligns his periodical
within the print practices of the eighteenth century.
His deployment of hypochondria’s popularity in eighteenth-century public discourse is a
precedent for his treatment of Johnson’s popularity, which allows him to evoke a biographical
ethos capable of representing Johnson’s publicity in the Life. Boswell also creates an apt persona
for his periodical, one with a timely, literary charge that evinces a greater degree of fluency with
the periodical than the tone of his ethos or the periodical’s position within its larger generic
context. Clark Lawlor has explored the relationship between Boswell and Johnson and
melancholy or hypochondria, and Lawlor points out that, in the eighteenth century, “[l]iterary
men might . . . find melancholy fashionable, but this was by no means a universal attitude, and
by no means unambiguously expressed” (42). Johnson perceived the melancholic malady a
source of social and literary “dysfunction,” but for Boswell, hypochondria often correlated to
“extraordinary abilities, especially creative genius” (Lawlor 42). By deploying hypochondria as
the defining attribute of his periodical ethos, Boswell directly associates his persona and his
periodical writing with contemporary trends surrounding the “fashionable” disorder. Boswell,
however, is careful to negotiate the potential.
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What is most at stake for Boswell in displaying a generic competence in the periodical is
the literary reputation he sought for himself and the opportunity it affords. He closes the first
paper of his own periodical by stating, “I acknowledge I cannot help feeling a satisfaction
compounded between vanity and benevolence (Hypochondriack I.110). The literary authority
that the Hypochondriack grants Boswell puts him in league with Johnson as a periodical writer.62
Being in Johnson’s league partially qualifies Boswell’s ethos as a biographer in the Life: he is an
author whose understanding of Johnson’s public experience extends throughout personal
interactions with Johnson and personal competence with the forms of Johnson’s print authority.
While Boswell’s periodical writing does develop the form in the long wake of Steele, Addison,
and Johnson, it does not compete with its formal precedents, but Boswell’s stake in the Journal
of a Tour to the Hebrides, however, is much more equally competitive. While Boswell is
establishing his ability to mediate Johnson personally in the Tour, he is also challenging the
authority of Johnson’s authorial persona in A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland. Their
divergent accounts of a shared trip to the Hebrides matched them as companions in both
experiences and in print.
The collaborative nature of their travels gave their writing a competitive focal point.
Radner notes that their records on their journey through the Hebrides were so collaborative that
each would regularly share his notes with the other (“Narrative Control” 68-9). The nature of this
collaboration proved to be more beneficial to Johnson than to Boswell: “[e]ven when he
[Johnson] was not writing against Boswell by constructing versions of what had happened that
were at odds with Boswell’s . . . he was consciously writing apart from Boswell, though always
aware of what had been written in Boswell’s journal and his own notebook” (Radner, “Narrative
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Moreover, Boswell’s literary Hypochondriak connects his periodical obliquely to Johnson’s own struggles with
hypochondria and melancholy.
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Control” 70). Once he would have returned to London and was in the process of drafting his
Journey, Johnson would have drawn on Boswell’s account even more, since “Boswell supplied
key materials” (Radner, “Narrative Control” 60). Johnson published his Journey to the Western
Islands of Scotland in 1775; Boswell would not be able to publish his Tour to the Hebrides until
1785, the year after Johnson’s death.
Boswell’s inability to publish before Johnson’s death was a direct result of Johnson’s
interventions. He explicitly discouraged Boswell from publishing his journal, offering instead to
help Boswell edit what might be fit for the public, even though Boswell sought to print his
journal account as a companion piece to Johnson’s travelogue (Radner, “Narrative Control” 756). Boswell challenged Johnson’s authority in small, private ways, showing his journal account
to members of Johnson’s circle, Hester Thrale and Joshua Reynold. Ultimately Boswell decided
not to publish, “realizing that printing his collaboratively produced account of the trip—a text
that combined admiration with occasional disapproval and partially established Boswell’s
authority by noting Johnson’s limitations—would risk aborting the larger biographical project”
(Radner, “Narrative Control” 76). In the case of the periodical form, Boswell knew that he could
not fully challenge Johnson’s print authority, only gesture to an understanding of it. Only
through representations of a single, shared, extended experience in his own home country (and
following the death of Johnson) could Boswell match his own print authority and observations of
Scotland against Johnson’s. Boswell’s stake in matching Johnson’s print authority is the
development of an ethos with a print output that would credential it to understand Johnson’s own
and, thus, take up the challenge of representing author biographically. Through the Tour,
Boswell developed the print credentials to arrange a rhetoric of self for Johnson in the “larger
biographical project.”
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In this light, Boswell’s decision to publish his Tour does not challenge Johnson’s living
authority as a friend or mentor, but rather Johnson’s print authority, however belated. It moves
his defiance from Johnson’s private circle of friends to the larger, public audience. In publishing,
Boswell demonstrates his ability to edit his work and determine what “might be printed” and
what was “fit for printing,” like Johnson in publishing his own account, without any editorial
advice from Boswell (Life v.227). Boswell’s fitness for situating Johnson in Scotland in the Tour
was answerable as a later publication to Johnson’s account of the Scottish situation. Johnson’s
ethos is empirical, relaying the observations of a detached traveler in a foreign place. His account
of the Hebrides is spatial: he arranges the sections of his travelogue under twenty-nine headings,
and place names that mark the significant stops on the trip he and Boswell made. But a spatial
arrangement effaces his role as an observer, privileging the observations instead. Within this
spatial framework, Johnson remarks on the state of Scotland and particularly the Highlanders,
pointing out that “[e]difices, either standing or ruined, are the chief records of an illiterate
nation” (Journey 73). Johnson pulled the observer out to so that a viewer could see the full scope
of Scottish space at a distance, but Boswell’s account of their trip returned the observer to
Johnson’s side, viewing Johnson even more than the place.
Likewise, Johnson considers stereotypes about the idylls of country living and the
realities of poverty associated with Scotland: “It is generally supposed, that life is longer in
places where there are few opportunities of luxury; but I found no instance here of extraordinary
longevity. A cottager grows old over his oaten cakes, like a citizen over a turtle feast. He is
indeed seldom incommoded by corpulence. Poverty preserves him from sinking under the
burden of himself, but he escapes no other injury of time” (Journey 84). The authority of
Johnson’s observations rests on his characteristic mode of generalizing, of applying universal
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frames—illiteracy, poverty, and the pastoral—to specific people or places in order render their
particularity applicable to all readers. Boswell’s Tour, on the other hand, is a public re-mastering
of the experience provided by their travel.
While Boswell’s Tour complements Johnson’s account in many ways, Boswell
overwrites the terms for understanding the trip from a decade earlier, which consequently shapes
Boswell’s print ethos in relation to Johnson’s. While Boswell’s account also accounts for travel
through the physical space of the Hebrides, his table of contents, for instance, outlines a move
through social space: “August 28. Fort George. Sir Adolphus Oughton. Contest between
Warburton and Lowth. Dinner at Sir Eyre Coote’s. Arabs and English soldiers compared. The
Stage. Mr. Garrick, Mrs. Cibber, Mrs. Pritchard, Mrs. Clive. Inverness” (Life v.7). Boswell’s
travelogue focuses its direction on encounters with the specific people that he and Johnson meet
in those places and their topics of conversation. Thus, Boswell appeals to a more biographical
mode that filters the trip through interpersonal interaction rather than the singular interpretations
of an individual observer like Johnson. The shared experience of the Hebrides allows Boswell to
offer a print perspective on terms that are equal to those which frame Johnson’s interpretation of
the trip. It allows him to put his ethos on par with Johnson’s in order to qualify himself to play
biographer in the Life.
While Boswell and Johnson are in Ostig in Sky, Johnson expounds on the responsible
rule of a group of people. While he notes that some social and legal curbs were necessary to
avoid future uprisings after the Jacobite Rebellion, his treatment of the political subjugation of
Scotland attacks the broad goals English policy and its general, public effects on the Scottish. He
reasons that the subjection of the Scottish Highlanders following the Rebellion obligates the
English to maintain and support their subjects, arguing:
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The supreme power in any community has the right of debarring every individual,
and every subordinate society from self-defence, only because the supreme power
is able to defend them; and therefore where the governor cannot act, he must trust
the subject to act for himself . . . Laws that place the subjects in such a state,
contravene the first principles of the compact of authority: they exact obedience,
and yield no protect. (Journey 90-1)
Johnson reads the waste and poverty that he witnesses on his trip as the logical consequences of
heavy-handed political and legal practices. His “opinionated reflections inspire an open-ended
discussion about the merits of Scotland” that, Kathleen Haldane Grenier asserts, drew attention
to Scotland that eventually increased tourism there: his insights, organized spatially, yielded
interest into Scotland as a place (17).63
Boswell gives an account that is at once complementary to and divergent from Johnson’s
interpretation of the Highlander’s condition: he balances his authority against Johnson’s with an
anecdote of Prince Charles Edward’s flight after the Battle of Culloden, which ended Edward’s
short-lived Jacobite Rebellion. Just as Johnson drew his expertise for critiquing the political state
of Scotland from his brief observations with Boswell, so Boswell derived his expertise to filter
the political turmoil of the Jacobite uprising and Rebellion from the first-hand accounts of the
people he and Johnson met on their trip. He claims his account is derived from what Flora
McDonald “told us, and from what I was told by others personally concerned, and from a paper
of information which Rasay [who they visited] was so good as to send me” (Life v.187). His
expertise comes from his personal interaction with other people, as well as, he seems to suggest,
his own Scottish rearing.
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Pat Rogers gives credit to Boswell as well as Johnson, but notes that Boswell’s project, to examine Johnson more
clearly, is different from Johnson’s project, to understand Scotland thoroughly (216-9, 225).
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Rather than generalize about the state of English policy and its effects on the Highlands
at large, Boswell translates the plight of Scotland and its Highlanders alongside the consequences
of the Rebellion into Charles Edwards’s flight from English troops. His flight creates a network
between his supporters and, rather than representing Scotland as a generalized populace, Boswell
traces the connections Charles Edwards’s flight makes between lairds and lowly soldiers, giving
faces and personalities to the populace (Life v.187-205). Boswell derives opinions from this
human network that echo Johnson’s own analysis of the policies applied to subjugate the
Scottish: “[h]owever convinced I am of the justice of that principle, which holds allegiance and
protection to be reciprocal . . . I am not satisfied with the cold sentiment which would confine the
exertions of the subject within the strict line of duty. I would have every breast animated with
fervour of loyalty; with that generous attachment which delights in doing somewhat more than is
required, and makes ‘service perfect freedom’” (Life v.204). Whereas Johnson’s analysis of the
post-Rebellion Highlands allows him to abstract an understanding about reciprocity in
governance, protection, and obedience, Boswell’s reading of the Highlanders in relation to a
person allows him to focus on loyalty from an embodied perspective, which he emphasizes with
tropes that situate loyalty in the person, in an “animated,” warm “breast” and within the larger,
reciprocal context of authority. The different means through which they draw similar conclusions
from a single, shared, three month experience in their corresponding publications balances
Boswell’s authority against Johnson’s: Johnson focused the on physical place, but Boswell
emphasized their personal relationship within that place, two halves of a whole like the historical
and personal split Boswell had applied to his account of Corsica. Their shared vision of one trip,
one set of lived experience, sanctions the public authority of Boswell’s ethos to comment on a
public author of Johnson’s prominence. Boswell’s understanding of the periodical form within
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the context that Johnson’s own periodical prowess had established, as well as Boswell’s
authoritative account of a trip the two men shared demonstrate Boswell’s ability to address the
public aspect of Johnson’s authorial selfhood.

“Scottifying” Johnson
To show that he could adopt an ethos capable of taking on the “presumptuous task” of
writing taking on the life of Johnson, Boswell first had to show himself capable of mediating the
personal life of Johnson against the fact of the ethos he created; second, Boswell had to
credential an ethos that could claim the authority to understand Johnson’s public selfhood (Life
i.25). Having established an ethos that could claim a distinctive understanding of Johnson’s
public and private self, Boswell had to establish his ethos as a biographer that could capitalize on
his intimate understanding of Johnson as a person and a public figure. In the advertisement to the
first edition of the Life, Boswell expresses his “satisfaction in the consciousness, that by
recording so considerable a portion of the wisdom and wit of ‘the brightest ornament of the
eighteenth century,’. . . [he had] largely provided for the instruction and entertainment of
mankind” (Life i.9). Boswell’s goal was to translate the life of Johnson into “instruction and
entertainment” for his readers. He conceived a life of Johnson for a readership beyond small
reading communities in London or in Edinburgh; he sought a national audience.
Boswell’s lofty goal requires an ethos that would go beyond the public and private
authority he cultivated through twenty years of acquaintance with Johnson. Before he can
translate Johnson fully for his readers, Boswell must reconcile Johnson to a smaller audience
during their trip to the Hebrides: their mutual trip through Scotland allowed Boswell to take up
these challenges by targeting a smaller audience, a trial run for the rhetoric of self he would
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arrange. Thus, the lairds and common people of Scotland become a test case for Boswell’s ethos
and its ability to present his Johnson’s selfhood to a contained audience. It is a test that Boswell
records in the Tour, and its success became a precedent for the Life. Though Boswell’s writing
positioned him to play Johnson’s biographer, his Tour is the ultimate trying ground for proving
the efficacy of his ethos at representing Johnson’s intimate self. In addition to the challenges he
faced in the account of Corsica and periodical, Boswell faces three challenges in the Tour to
qualify his biographical attempts as a task not presumptuous, but instead befitting his ethos: first,
his ethos must show itself capable of engaging Johnson’s private selfhood; it must balance
Johnson’s private selfhood against an extant, public understanding of that selfhood; most
importantly, Boswell must also demonstrate his ability to make Johnson’s selfhood new.
In the Tour, Boswell demonstrates his ability to reconcile the public Johnson to Scotland.
At the outset, Boswell concedes Johnson’s well-known, public aversion to the Scottish, even
though it threatens viability of the Scottish ethos he creates for himself: how could an object of
Johnson’s public and published derision presume to mediate Johnson reliably? Likewise,
Boswell cites Johnson’s poem “London” as an instance of Johnson’s “prejudice against Scotland
[which] was announced almost as soon as he began to appear in the world of letters” (Life v.19).
In his Dictionary of the English Language, Johnson defines oats scathingly as a “grain, which in
England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports the people.” The various uses of
oats, for Johnson, imply that Scottish people are bestial, on par with British animals. The
popularity of the Dictionary with the eighteenth-century reading public had firmly associated the
notion with opinions of Johnson. Boswell’s explanation recasts Johnson’s “prejudice” as being
characteristically classical and result of a man who deeply identifies with an ideal of
Englishness: “like the ancient Greeks and Romans, he allowed himself to look upon all nations
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but his own as barbarians . . . he thought their [Scottish] success in England rather exceeded the
due proportion of their real merit; and because he could not but see in them that nationality . . .
He was indeed, if I may be allowed the phrase, at bottom much of a John Bull; much of a blunt
true-born Englishman” (Life v.20). In this interpretation, Boswell’s Johnson marks a nation and
its prejudices more than the man himself, so that Boswell’s ethos must address the challenge of
mediating public celebrity.
Rather than allowing Johnson simply to pass through Scotland, Boswell puts the “John
Bull, blunt true-born Englishman” in direct conversation with it. In order for Boswell to depict a
biographical ethos that could manage Johnson, he had to dislocate Johnson from London:
Boswell confessed that “[t]o see Dr. Johnson in any new situation is always an interesting object
to me” (Life v.132). In Scotland, Boswell “insisted on scottifying his [Johnson’s] palate” (179)
by introducing to Johnson’s “true-born English” tastes to Scottish culture, its food, language, and
history. Boswell sought to change, quite literally, Johnson’s tastes and, in turn, his opinion of the
Scottish. Ultimately, “scottifying” Johnson lent authority to Boswell’s ability to rearrange
Johnson, to make him a fit biographical subject, a didactic rhetoric of self. Pierre Bourdieu has
theorized that taste, as the ability to draw distinctions, is the “source of the system of distinctive
features which cannot fail to be perceived as a systematic expression of a particular class of
conditions of existence, i.e. as a distinctive lifestyle” by people who themselves bear an
internalized understanding of the relational properties of the “classification system” (175). Eating
oats, for instance, marks the Scottish lifestyle as distinctly un-English and, therefore, classifiably
inferior to a true-born Englishman like the public Johnson: “[t]aste classifies, and it classifies the
classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the
distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in
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which their position to the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed” (Bourdieu 5-6).
Boswell’s scottification of Johnson is an attempt to adjust Johnson’s “classification system” so
that Johnson no longer regards Scotland as the “vulgar” and the “ugly.” The unfamiliar details
that appear as Boswell’s ethos situate Johnson’s selfhood within a new context grow increasingly
more Scottish, leading to a selfhood for a Johnson that can accommodate English and Scottish
sympathies and that makes the rhetoric of self that Boswell arranges much less presumptuous.
At the beginning of the Tour, Boswell establishes a baseline for understanding the
Johnson that his ethos will recast in course of the trip: “Dr. Samuel Johnson’s character,
religious, moral, political, and literary, nay his figure and manner, are, I believe, more generally
known than those of almost any man; yet it may not be superfluous here to attempt a sketch of
him” (Life v.16-7). Boswell’s “sketch” adds on what is known by presenting several unflattering
details: Johnson’s size was “approaching to the gigantic, and grown unwieldy from corpulency”;
that his “countenance was . . . somewhat disfigured by the scars of” scrofula; that “[h]is head,
and sometimes also his body, shook with a kind of motion like the effect of a palsy . . . [as if]
frequently disturbed by cramps, or convulsive contractions” (Life v.18). By making these aspects
of Johnson’s physique so distinct, Boswell drew attention away from what was commonly
known about Johnson’s “figure and manner.” His restructuring of Johnson’s appearance is
completed by his description of Johnson’s attire: he was clad in boots and a heavy brown
overcoat and carried a staff of English oak (Life v.19). Johnson’s uncharacteristic outfit in the
Tour, at attire better suited to the elements and exploration than the streets of London, reflects his
remove from the nation’s center to its wild fringes. This remove enables Boswell not only to
represent Johnson in a manner contrary to the expectations many had for the public author, but it
also sets Boswell up to restructure Johnson’s selfhood.
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Such a remove was necessary for Boswell to rewrite Johnson. He had to separate
Johnson’s public self from its “elevated state of philosophical dignity” (Life v.14). Dislocating
Johnson from “the felicity of a London life” (Life v.14) allowed Boswell to throw unprecedented
aspects of Johnson’s character into stark contrast with the familiar, austere, melancholic moralist
his writings portrayed. Public expectations for Johnson were derived from his print persona, an
authorial ethos that readers applied to Johnson’s person. Boswell refers to Johnson alternately in
the Tour as a poet or dictionary-writer (Life v.47), “our Socrates” (Life v.21), “the Rambler”
(Life v.146), “Dr. Samuel Johnson!” (Life v.144). It was only in Scotland that Boswell could
reorganize these public character markers so that Johnson, the social philosopher, might be seen
dandling a young, married Scottish lass on his knee—“toying with a Highland beauty!”—or
throwing a glass of lemonade out the window, after a “bad specimen of Scottish cleanliness”
(Life v.261, 21). Only in Scotland could Boswell catch the great lexicographer making up words
in conversation like “peregrinity” or “depeditation” and laughingly admitting “that he had not
made [up] above three or four in his Dictionary” (Life v.130). The spatial remove from urbane
London to wild Scotland decontextualized and magnified Johnson’s eccentricities so that
Boswell would rewrite them in the Life. Thus magnified, Johnson’s eccentricities present
Boswell with a wealth of additional details that he can arrange as Johnson’s selfhood.
Boswell’s ethos within this context exerts a control over Johnson’s selfhood that Johnson
initially resists. Boswell reports Johnson’s unwillingness to taste “speldings,” which are “fish
(generally whitings) salted and dried in a particular manner, being dipped in the sea and dried in
the Sun, and eaten by the Scots by way of relish . . . With difficulty, I prevailed with him
[Johnson] to let a bit of one of them lie in his mouth. He did not like it” (Life v.55). Boswell
represents Johnson’s tastes growing more sympathetic to Scottish culture. In one instance,

190

Boswell shows Johnson drawing from the Scottish lexicon for his critical metaphors: “[h]e
became merry, and observed how little we had either heard or said at Aberdeen: That the
Aberdonians had not started a single mawkin (the Scottish word for hare) for us to pursue” (Life
v.96). Likewise, Johnson’s fascination with the Scottish language leads him, shortly after hearing
a song in Erse, to suggest that he and Boswell buy the “rugged island” they see “off the coast of
Scalpa” to “found a good school, and an episcopal church, . . . and have a printing-press, where
he [Johnson] would print all the Erse that could be found” (Life v.162). The Johnson that would
try speldings or draw on a Scottish vocabulary for critical analysis is a Johnson made possible by
Boswell’s ethos and the setting that separated Johnson from the familiar. The Johnson that
Boswell mediates in the Tour can increasingly accommodate Scottish sympathies alongside his
John Bull character.
Boswell most clearly depicts Johnson’s increasingly sympathetic taste for Scottish culture
in his increasing willingness to try on different modes of Highland dress and behavior. In his
record of their stay with Flora Mcdonald, Boswell establishes the historical and social
significance of “celebrated” space he and Johnson share:
Dr. Johnson’s bed was the very bed in which the grandson of the unfortunate
King James the Second lay, on one of the nights after the failure of his rash
attempt in 1745-6, while he was eluding the pursuit of the emissaries of the
government, which offered thirty thousand pounds as a reward for apprehending
him. To see Dr. Samuel Johnson lying in that bed, in the isle of Sky, in the house
of Miss Flora Mcdonald, struck me with such a group of ideas as it is not easy for
words to describe, as they passed through the mind. (Life v.185-6)
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Boswell represents himself as dumbstruck with the “group of ideas” that “passed through the
mind,” mediating Johnson’s actions as a first-hand observer for the reader. By offering no words,
he offers readers the chance to imagine them for themselves. His ethos invites speculation on the
significance of Johnson lying in the bed of the Young Pretender, but Johnson himself provides an
answer that acknowledges the larger cultural situation in which he participates: “[h]e smiled, and
said, ‘I have no ambitious thoughts in it’” (Life v.186). Johnson’s joke is an oblique nod to the
cultural and historical significance of his physical situation, yet he has “no ambitious thoughts in
it,” neither the bed nor the role of Charles Edward. The image itself, as Boswell’s ethos
witnesses it, resituates Johnson from the authority of London as a major metropolitan center of
authority to the cultural and historical authority of Scotland. Boswell’s wordless ethos interprets
breaks Johnson down and reconfigures him as subject to Scottish history.
Boswell shows Johnson’s increasing sympathy for the Scottish, when he playfully dons
the role of a Highlander: “Dr. Johnson . . . shewed . . . the spirit of a Highland . . . indeed, he has
shewn it during the whole of our Tour.—One night, in Col, he strutted about the room with a
broad-sword and target and made a formidable appearance” (Life v.324). Johnson’s performance
of a martial, Highland pride is as striking as Boswell’s direct attempts to “scottify” the English
poet into “the image of a venerable Senachi” (Life v.324). This “venerable” image recalls a lost
role among the Highlanders that, Johnson explains in his Journey had not “existed in some
centuries” (Journey 112). The Highlanders esteemed the role nonetheless. Johnson’s definition
explains that the term “signified ‘the man of talk,’ or of conversation . . . a historian, whose
office was to tell truth, or a story-teller” (112). In this way, Boswell casts Johnson in the role of a
historian, a preserver of history and culture. To render Johnson as a senachi is to make Johnson
responsible for all of Scottish history and culture. Boswell admits that at one point in their
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travels, he “took the liberty to put a large blue bonnet on his [Johnson’s] head . . . he seemed
much pleased to assume the appearance of an ancient Caledonian” (Life v.324-5). Boswell’s
ethos “took the liberty” to force a Scottish role on Johnson much more forcibly than he had when
he coaxed Johnson into almost tasting spelding. His rewriting of Johnson in this instance,
however, was much more successful. While he did not like his taste earlier taste of Scottish
culture, Johnson gradually warmed to it through contact and was “pleased to assume the
appearance of an ancient Caledonian.”
Boswell’s direct attempts to reconcile Johnson’s English self to Scotland could not be
completely successful, yet as he made Johnson more sympathetic to Scotland, he helped
Scotland grow more familiar with Johnson, and in the process, Boswell demonstrates an ethos
that could make Johnson sympathetic in its ability to structure a compelling rhetoric of self.
Boswell reports that Johnson was ceremonially welcomed to Aberdeen and “present[ed] with the
freedom of the town” by the “magistrates in the town-hall,” where the people cheered “‘Doctor
Johnson! Doctor Johnson!’” (Life v.90). In observing what Boswell calls “the usual custom,”
Johnson kept the “burgess-ticket . . . in his hat, which he wore as he walked along the street”
(Life v.90-1). Displaying his burgess-ticket, the “freedom of the town,” announced Johnson as a
citizen of Aberdeen. The formality of this encounter gives way to a much more socially engaging
encounter after a month in Scotland. On the Isle of Skye, Boswell reports that, not only was
Johnson “quite social and easy amongst” the people, but despite not drinking “fermented liquor .
. . [h]is conviviality engaged them so much, that they seemed eager to show their attention to
him, and vied with each other in crying out, with a strong Celtick pronunciation, ‘Toctor
Shonson, Toctor Shonson, your health!” (Life v.261). Picturing the increasing sympathies the
Scottish and Johnson shared, as Katherine Haldane Grenier argues, ultimately “mapped
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Scotland” in way that introduced it to a world of travelers and tourists (39). In essence, Boswell
has bridged a cultural gap—he has proven himself ambassador to both Scotland and, especially,
to Johnson in Scotland.
The significance of this cultural work for establishing Boswell’s own ethos is the
personal work it does to redress Boswell and Johnson’s infamous first meeting in Tom Davies’
bookshop. It is a context that clarifies the questions of nationality, literary celebrity, and selfhood
that Boswell seeks to address with his own ethos:
Mr. Davies having perceived him through the glass-door in the room in which we
were sitting, advancing towards us,—he announced his aweful approach to me,
somewhat in the manner of an actor in the part of Horatio, when he addresses
Hamlet on the appearance of his father’s ghost, “Look, my Lord, it comes” . . .
Mr. Davies mentioned my name, and respectfully introduced me to him. I was
much agitated; and recollecting his prejudices against the Scotch, of which I had
heard so much, I said to Davies, “Don’t tell him where I come from.”—“From
Scotland,” cried Davies, roguishly. “Mr. Johnson, (said I) I do indeed come from
Scotland, but I cannot help it.” I am willing to flatter myself that I meant this as
light pleasantry to sooth and conciliate him, and not as an humiliating abasement
at the expence of my country. But however that might be, this speech was
somewhat unlucky; for with that quickness of wit for which he was so
remarkable, he . . . retorted, “That, Sir, I find, is what a great many of your
countrymen cannon help.” This stroke stunned me a good deal. (Life i.392).
Johnson skewers Boswell so tidily that their first encounter might seem to render Boswell’s
biographical task presumptuous. But the contrast between the Johnson of 1763 versus that of
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1773 shows reconciling British history through the figure of the great John Bull “English”
writer—who Boswell links to the greatest of English writers through Hamlet—now loves
Scotland and its languages, too. It is an literary act of union that proves that Boswell is up to the
biographical task, mediating Johnson’s national proclivities, literary celebrity, and selfhood,
“that quickness of wit for which he was so remarkable.” The final test of how useful Boswell’s
Tour was in establishing an ethos that could sort Johnsoniana from ephemera into an enduring
rhetoric of self was how frequently he cannabalizes choice moments from the Tour. Topically,
they naturally suit the Life. At the very outset of the Life, Boswell cites Johnson’s comment
about his melancholic disposition as a character marker that would run throughout Johnson’s life,
out of its chronological context (Life v.214-5). But it recalls Boswell’s ethos and the contrasts it
has allowed him to draw between Johnson’s lived experience and his own interventions in it.
Boswell was a friend who lacked the literary repute to contain the detail of Johnson’s
public and private selfhood. In his Account of Corsica, Boswell established the fixed role an
ethos could play for an author. In arranging Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell wielded his ethos as a
fact that engaged Johnson’s private character and made it increasingly evident. Likewise,
Boswell showed his ethos to be proficient in attempting to interpret and represent Johnson’s
public reputation and authority In his Hypochondriack, Boswell made plain his ability to operate
within periodical conventions Johnson had established through his own publications; in his
representation of the trip to Scotland he shared with Johnson, Boswell matched his own print
ethos against Johnson’s. The authority of Boswell’s ethos for is most evident in his handling of
Johnson in the Tour to the Hebrides: “Boswell retained the structure of the journal, writing under
date lines, with introduction and conclusion added to give a narrative frame which emphasizes
the potential conflict between the Scots and the ‘John Bull . . . true-born Englishman’ and finally
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stresses the success of the venture, thus throwing into relief Boswell’s social skill in ‘handling’
Johnson and his literary skill in writing him up” (McGowan 136).By establishing an ethos whose
biographical undertaking was not presumptuous, but rather apropos, Boswell situated himself to
arrange Johnson’s selfhood rhetorically within it history and character, but most importantly,
Boswell’s ethos made possible his most unique contribution to the canon of eighteenth-century
biography: an approach that put the audience directly in conversation with the rhetoric of self
and established a more intimate relationship. Boswell’s ethos would come to arrange a rhetoric
of self that would locate Johnson in print and experience, but which would bend these
eighteenth-century biographical patterns to deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic
reader to view Johnson’s print life ethically, spectating a rhetorical selfhood that invited all
readers (the Caledonian and John-Bull English in particular, perhaps) to learn about sociability
and values from the Life of Johnson.
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Chapter 4—Arranging and Innovating Biography:
The Rhetoric of Self and Conversation

Whatever public anticipation had followed James Boswell’s initial advertisement of a
forthcoming biography of Samuel Johnson in 1785 was in danger of flagging by the time he
finally published it in 1791. Out of fear that he might have missed his literary moment, Boswell
defended his slow progress by appealing to the comprehensiveness of his biographical endeavor.
New material for the Life kept presenting itself, which he felt obliged to incorporate.64 Six years
later, he delivered on the promise of his advertisement voluminously. Boswell’s Life of Johnson
sprawled on the late eighteenth-century literary scene: its ostensible messiness—a collection of
facts, letters, poetry, prose, first-hand accounts, anecdotes, excerpts, and conversation—barely
achieves coherence under the running header that groups the clutter diachronically under each
passing Aetat. to Aetat. of Samuel Johnson’s life. The contemporary reader must come to terms
with Boswell’s organizational scheme: “I do it chronologically,” he reported in a letter to
William Percy, “giving year by year his publications if there were any, his letters, his
conversations, and every thing else that I can collect,” so that “[r]eaders will as near as may be
accompany Johnson in his progress, and as it were see each scene as it happened”
(Correspondence 206). Paradoxically, the wait that Boswell forced on his readers was, in fact,
for the sake of his readers, whose understanding of Johnson would ultimately benefit from his
biographical exhaustiveness.
Faced with the breadth of detail that had stalled the Life, eighteenth-century readers
cultivated a personal connection with Boswell’s Johnson in the accumulated bulk. Capel Lofft
64

Early in his project, for instance, Boswell explains his delay to Hugh Blair by noting that he sought to check
materials against Hawkin’s biography of Johnson and, especially, in order to allow “time for the accession of
materials of which I have received a great addition” (Correspondence 180).
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acknowledges that, upon first seeing Boswell’s biography, the “eye may be startled . . . at the
first glance of what appears to be two heavy volumes: but beyond this nothing heavy will be
found, in any sense in which the Fancy of the Understanding complain of heaviness. I should
have seen a third, fourth, fifth or as many more . . . with impressions very distant from those of
discouragement or the prospect of fatigue” (Correspondence 316). The benefit of this
“heaviness” for the eighteenth-century reader was that it offered an array of points to access
Johnson or to censure Boswell’s representation. The Reverend Samuel Parr notes that, “[a]midst
such a multiplicity of facts, and such a variety of subjects, different readers will contend for
different rules of selection . . . But, in my opinion, the best rule is the most comprehensive”
(Correspondence 348). However, the abundance of details, which invite a personal knowledge of
Johnson’s selfhood, could prove to be a double-edged sword. The Johnson that Hester Piozzi
recognized in the glut of Boswell’s biographical detail left her “laughing & crying by turns for
two Days . . . if Johnson was to me the back Friend he [Boswell] has represented—let it cure me
of ever making Friendship more with any human Being” (Thraliana 809-811). Hester Thrale
Piozzi, who knew Johnson intimately and suffered greatly when their friendship ruptured over
her remarriage, finds herself restored to Johnson with such affective intensity through Boswell’s
Life that it surpasses any actual friendship she might yet have. It is in the expansive degree of
detail, carefully collected and curated, that readers find a relationship to Johnson in Boswell’s
Life.
This emphasis on biographical detail does not assign preeminence to narrative or its
chronology, but instead the effect of Boswell’s accumulating details on the reader. The tradition
of inductive empiricism depends on the observations of discreet details that related, repeated
experimentation comprise; observing them as a set, the scientist induces patterns that become
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scientific principles. In the context Boswell develops his biography through “an accumulation of
intelligence from various points, by which his character is more fully understood and illustrated”
(Life i.29-30). In a letter dated Sunday, February 24, 1788—the second year he was earnestly
composing the Life—Boswell explains to William Temple “I am absolutely certain that my mode
of Biography which gives not only a History of Johnson’s visible progress through the World,
and of his Publications, but a View of his mind, in his Letters, and Conversations is the most
perfect that can be conceived, and will be more of a Life than any Work that has ever yet
appeared” (Correspondence 208). His letter follows the general pattern of the justification he
makes for his method in the biography (Life i.29-30): Boswell here regards his method as “the
most perfect that can be conceived” for relaying “Johnson’s visible progress through the world.”
In the tradition of eighteenth-century biography, he locates the visible Johnson in the breadth of
Johnson’s “publications” and “letters,” just as Johnson had distilled the character of Savage from
his poetry and Goldsmith invited the reader to construct the character of Nash through his
correspondence. But Boswell’s innovation is an extreme shift toward an intimate, internal model
of selfhood that does not translate experience into selfhood through the objective mode of earlier
biographers. Rather than objective translation, Boswell method mediates lived experience
through his own and his formal responsibilities as a biographer. As “more of a Life than any
work” prior, Boswell’s biography evinces a liveliness derived from a drifting accumulation of
detail rather than a regular, chronological, narrative-centric approach.
Boswell intimates that his own means for biographical arrangement will surpass the
expectations eighteenth-century readers had of the biographical tradition, even as he deploys the
strategies of Johnson and Goldsmith. Boswell is as possessive of the method, “my mode” he
stresses to William Temple, as he is of the life it will depict. Boswell sought to develop an

199

innovative method that would situate Johnson’s selfhood within social networks of personal
acquaintance, credentialed by documentation, and in so doing would recast readers’ expectations
and their approach to understanding selfhood. Readers come to know Johnson more intimately
than previous biographies had made possible; the Johnson that Boswell delivered might be a
personal, print friend. In this chapter, I will argue that Boswell presented a Johnson who was
more sympathetic to readers than earlier biographical selfhoods, not only through cumulative
research and compositional strategies, but also by inviting the reader to play a role as a tacit
participant in Johnson’s private conversations, staging their presentation so that the reader
experiences the moment of the conversation. Whereas Johnson and Goldsmith engaged readers
in the documentation of experience, Boswell invites them to live it. Such participation signifies a
more intimate understanding of Johnson, of a print selfhood that Boswell has fashioned to stand
in for Johnson. Through Boswell’s rhetoric of self, the reader comes to engage the biographical
selfhood as if it were the man himself.
In order to create an intimate rhetoric of self that can engage the reader’s sympathies so
personally, Boswell relies first on a research methodology that draws both on the inductive
epistemology advocated by the Royal Society and the variable practices for credentialing
knowledge in eighteenth-century print culture. Boswell distinguishes himself by locating
Johnson’s history beyond publications or his own personal journal account, accumulating instead
the anecdotes and information he locates from Johnson’s own familiar acquaintance. The public,
authorial Samuel Johnson familiar to a community of readers becomes, almost literally, every
reader’s personal Johnson, a selfhood which they can engage as an acquaintance through the
recollections of his lived acquaintance. Second, Boswell composes an intimate rhetoric of self in
the Life by arranging the voluminous facts of Johnson’s history within a rhetorical framework
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that establishes what he regards as authentic, Johnsonian character in order to facilitate the
readers’ sympathy as spectators of Johnson. A more complete representation of selfhood teaches
Boswell’s audience how to read Johnson’s selfhood anew. Finally and most innovatively,
Boswell acts as an interlocutor who encourages Johnson’s conversation, and his ethos as
Johnson’s friend and biographer ultimately invites readers to view Johnson’s conversations in
print and participate in them sympathetically, thus engaging Boswell’s Johnson more intimately.
A print representation of selfhood predicated on the documentation of public and private
experience which deploys a new ethics of reading: structuring the discrete details, intimate
recollections, and documentary proof of Johnson’s lived experience into a persona from which
readers can draw conclusions sympathetically based on their own observations and which,
finally, they can apply to their own experience.
Long after 20th-century scholars stopped arguing it in general, the literary tussle between
the Boswellians and Johnsonians for scholarly ownership of Johnson has directed discussions of
the Life, Boswell, and Johnson. The primary context for academic attention to the Life has been
framed and reframed by the questions of Boswell’s factuality in representing Johnson and the
degree of fictionality that impinges on the print persona. Since Frederick A. Pottle edited and
introduced the London Journal 1762-1763 of Boswell’s private papers, scholars have sought to
reconcile the “historical solidity” that Boswell “succeeded in achieving” against, on the other
hand, his “unusual powers or imagination” (14). In this academic context, questions of what is
biographically true versus what is fictitious spurred Donald Greene to attack the accuracy,
veracity, and overall reliability of Boswell’s representation—his attempts to exonerate the lived
life of Johnson against Boswell’s biographical Life argued that Boswell’s journals demonstrated
what he regarded as a damning distance between the life and Life of Johnson, a fiction of the
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facts that Pottle finds in the journals. In distinguishing between fact and fiction, Greene is
essentially distinguishing genres. Autobiography is more factual, while biography, or at least just
Boswell’s, is more fictional: “for all that Johnson’s words are supposed to remain central to it,
the work is dominated by Boswell—naturally enough, when so much of it comes from Boswell’s
journals, which after all were intended to record Boswell’s life, not Johnson’s”
(“Autobiography” 58). He notes further that “it is hard to find passages in the Life, often ones
which have been influential in creating the modern image of Johnson, which have been
drastically altered from the text of the journal, presumably as the result of such extraneous
motives as fondness for an opinion or fidelity to a party” (“Autobiography” 56). Greene offers
“A Reading Course in Autobiography” as an antidote to the potentially fallacious practices of
biographers, a logic that assumes the representation of a life by a biographer is much more
suspect than people’s representations of themselves. This is an old schism in eighteenth-century
studies, but the context it has created perpetuates critical approaches to Boswell’s fictitiousness
or historicity.
Within this academic setting, the two general lines of inquiry have developed various
approaches to Boswell’s surplus of detail. Greg Clingham outlines the rift between scholarship
framed by questions of Boswell’s representational art versus his biographical factuality:
“Boswell scholars can be divided into two main groups,” one that “takes Boswell’s dramatic
artifice and fictional techniques for granted, and discusses the Life as self-contained, selfconsistent, and self-reflexive” and another that “shares the first group’s admiration for Boswell’s
dramatizing powers, but also claims that he is factually accurate and authentic,” invoking this
“‘supreme gift of dramatization’ in order to defend him [Boswell] against questions of his factual
accuracy” (212). Setting these two approaches aside, Clingham opts to read Boswell a self-
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fashioning biography and “unbroken circle of psychological striving for realization and the
constant threat of dissolution” (226). Boswell as the biographer, in this reading, is a Boswell
becoming, at the same time he knows Johnson and fashions Johnson into a biographical entity:
“in making his portrait of Johnson, and playing himself off against this man whom Boswell had
invested with all his own ideals, the biographer is trying to articular himself, to make real a life
too often given to fictionalizing” (222). Clingham’s stake is in the relational aspects between the
biographer and his subject and the act of writing that the Life reveals, rather than the biographical
writing itself and how fictional or factual it might be.
The former group of scholars has downplayed Boswell’s historicity in favor of his
artistry, privileging the literary and psychological merits of the Life. They generally set it aside to
look at the literary effects Boswell creates. William Siebenschuh argues that Boswell deploys
literary techniques to present the facts of Johnson’s life out of necessity, since “Boswell clearly
did not understand and therefore could not categorize what he was seeing” when he observed and
recorded his Johnson (Techniques 93). His literary presentation of Johnson is compensatory, an
artistry to fill in representational gaps. Likewise, many scholars have taken a cue from Boswell’s
reference to Johnson as a Homeric hero in the advertisement to the second edition and have
sought to locate the pattern of a literary hero in the Life. Boswell himself alludes to the Homeric
hero as a justification for “this extensive biographical work, however inferior in its nature, may
in one respect be assimilated to the ODYSSEY. Amidst a thousand entertaining and instructive
episodes the HERO is never long out of sight; for they are all in some degree connected to him”
(Life i.12). William Dowling reads Boswell’s Johnson as a literary creation, an eighteenthcentury original like Tobias Smollet’s Matthew Bramble (Hero 127). This literary character is “a
hero in an unheroic world” whose burden is to carry and reconcile the high traditions of an
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earlier age to uninspired, contemporary practice (Hero 2). Donna Heiland takes Dowling’s
interpretation further, so that Johnson’s status as literature is his status as a god of the times,
ritualistically pulled apart to reinvigorate the culture (202). In this reading, the facts Boswell
presents as Johnson’s life are, rather, facts that define the eighteenth century.
My contention is that biographical fact cannot be purely isolated as the fact of a life, but
rather can only be understood as the fact of the tradition that the life represents. Boswell, then, is
implicitly unaccountable for problems with accuracy in the details specific to Johnson’s life.
With a similar attention to Boswell’s artistry rather than his factuality, Ralph W. Rader takes a
different tack, arguing that the Life is a biography of something more evanescent than
documentable lived experience: it is a biographical record of Johnson’s character and, thus, not
accountable to the strict rules of historical writing (8). Some scholars have posited psychological
approaches, with particular attention to the role biography played in bolstering Boswell’s own
psychological distress following the death of his sometimes mentor and friend.65 In this critical
conversation, the relationship between Boswell and Johnson feeds the connection between
factuality and fictionality, reinvigorating both with a combined psychological purpose.
The claims about biography that these approaches advance are all warranted by attempts
to reconcile Boswell’s biographical facts and representation artistry, brushing aside the research
and facts in favor of the organizational patterns. This methodology raises productive questions of
the effects Boswell’s representation might create—what comes of reading Johnson as a hero? As
a map of character? Or as a bulwark to Boswell’s own bouts with profound sadness or, even, the
reader’s? Yet all of these approaches, either to factuality or artistry, focused on points prior to the
publication of the Life—the relationship between Boswell and Johnson or Johnson and the
65

Allan Ingram focuses on its effect on Boswell, suggesting that “contemplation of Johnson’s image may be seen as
an antidote to the nothingness of the increasingly melancholy world of Boswell’s imagination,” which he tried to
master by creating an image of his mentor that allowed him to create an image of himself (190).
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biography—end squarely in the sprawl of the Life’s details, facts, opinions, anecdotes, letters,
and general biographical accumulation. These sorts of modern critical approaches derive from
modern standards of biography, which themselves developed from historically from the
eighteenth-century onward. Although it remains the most recognizable, eighteenth-century point
on the genre’s trajectory, Boswell’s Life of Johnson is most remarkable for its enduring
modernity. For instance, Boswell’s attention to research, unparalleled by earlier biographers, is a
given, a requirement for modern biographical credibility, his bulk of detail notwithstanding.
Likewise, Boswell’s attempt to picture Johnson honestly, alternately gruff or kind and
opinionated or rational, is a representational starting point in current biography. A modern
biography seeks to crack the veneer of selfhood that assumption creates and delve into what is
admirable or repellent, but ultimately most telling about a person. And Boswell’s drive to
incorporate character as a fact among the mass of biographical detail he presents is an attempt to
balance personality and lived experience.66 The Life does not strike a perfect balance, nor does it
provide an entirely authentic depiction, despite Boswell’s comprehensive research. Rather, it is
emergent, developmental and, more importantly, squarely situated in an eighteenth-century
republic of letters.
To approach Boswell’s Johnson as an eighteenth-century rhetoric of self is to begin from
the other end of the biographical enterprise, privileging the reader rather than the form,
biographer, or even the biographical persona that concentrates most modern biographical study.
Instead, it is a focus on the reader and how the reader is affected by the rhetoric of Johnson’s
66

Donald Greene once critiqued Boswell’s Life on generic standards he had culled from contemporary biographies.
He leveled a “damaging charge” against Boswell, finding him guilty of the “gross misfeasance or nonfeasance, of a
biographer’s first duty, to try to provide a reasonably complete and continuous narrative of his subject’s life”
(“Pretty” 118). While narrative continuity is an expectation for modern biography, Boswell de-emphasizes such
continuity in order to create a rhetoric of self for Johnson that readers can know intimately. Seeking to reconcile
Boswell’s Life against modern instantiations of biography neglects its influential role as one of the historical
interstices in the development of the biographical form.

205

self, a person cast in print who engages readers and invites them to draw ethical conclusions
about the self sympathetically based on their own observations. This educational ethic of reading
allows readers of the Life to apply the lessons they learn from Boswell’s Johnson to their own
experience and, as a result, to engage a larger discussion of social and ethical truths.

Arranging the Accumulations of Johnson’s Selfhood
In the Advertisement to the First Edition of the Life, Boswell again stresses the challenge
of managing the rhetorical complexity of arranging the life of Johnson: “the nature of the work . .
. as it consists of innumerable detached particulars, all which, even the most minute, I have
spared no pains to ascertain with a scrupulous authenticity, has occasioned a degree of trouble
far beyond that of other species of composition” (Life i.6-7). In these assertions, Boswell makes
two claims about the composition of the biography. First, he has composed it of “innumerable
detached particulars.” Second, Boswell’s method of arranging these innumerable, detached
particulars so that they cohere in a representation of selfhood “has occasioned a degree of trouble
far beyond that of other species of composition.” Arranging the facts he had compiled into an
accurate rhetoric of self that would delineate Johnson’s life distinguishes his methodology from
other popular biographies of Johnson by deemphasizing the overt, organizational control of the
biographer and, in its place, presenting himself as a partial but meticulous observer who has
scientifically researched, tested, and recorded the facts. Historically, Boswell’s assertion
highlights his effort to outmatch his contemporaries’ attempts to present a definitive
representation of Johnson.
In particular, he chose to set his biographical arrangement of Johnson’s life most directly
in conversation with Sir John Hawkins’ dry, comprehensive biographical account, his Life of
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Samuel Johnson, and especially Hester Thrale Piozzi’s more personal account of Johnson, the
Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson. The former he criticized for the “dark uncharitable cast”
it gave to Johnson’s “conduct,” noting that “Hawky is no doubt very malignant”; the latter, for
evincing “no affection for our great friend [Johnson], but merely the attachment of vanity,” a
biographer who “proved herself to be a wicked, false, ungrateful little vixen” (Correspondence
223, 114, 117). Boswell’s accumulation of particulars legitimated his biographical account. In
the process, he presents a life of Johnson that is comprehensive, documented, and in full
empirical view of the reader, who will take part in the experiment as an observer.
Boswell’s compositional maneuvers for arranging his vast accumulation of Johnsoniana
into a representative rhetoric of self derive from larger rhetorical contexts of the period, contexts
which give primacy to a reader’s response. Boswell is part of a relatively young tradition in
eighteenth-century letters that shaped rhetorical study in the eighteenth century, particularly the
latter half. Two key figures of the period, Adam Smith and Hugh Blair, delivered popular
lectures in rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh. Both lecturers espoused a belletristic
approach to rhetoric that emphasized two of the five classical canons of rhetoric: stylistics and
arrangement. For rhetoricians like Adam Smith, belletristic considerations of style held great
significance for Scottish rhetorical theory because they carried a nationalized charge. In their
teaching, rhetoric was the measure of the person, an observable marker of selfhood. For Smith
and Blair (and many Scottish authors of the period), this was at its most basic a distinction
between Scottish and English, rusticity and urbanity. Thomas P. Miller stresses the importance of
rhetorically constructed character when he notes that Scottish rhetoricians sought, in part, to ease
their students’ assimilation into English culture through active engagement with English
discourses, such as rhetoric and commerce (204). Establishing an English print ethos would
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require a concept of Scottish character rhetorically indistinguishable from the English character.
Part of emulating good English character is good English diction and good pronunciation.67 For
Smith, demonstrating “[p]erspicuity requires” language “free from all ambiguity” and, more
importantly, “that the words should be natives (if I may [say] so) of the language we speak in”
(Lectures 1). Smith implies that usage is not native but systematic: a Scottish speaker, then, can
adopt the systems of English usage despite lacking the perceived fluency afforded by English
rearing. Smith’s “common sense” approach trains students to affect a rhetorical character
appropriate to English discourse, “in the manner which best conveys the sentiment, passion, or
affection with which it affects—or he pretends it does affect—him” (Lectures 51). The corollary
is that selfhood, too, could be observed, taught, and adopted. The stylistic concerns like
composition and arrangement that grew out of Smith’s and Blair’s rhetorical concerns were
crucial to Boswell’s representation of Johnson as well—a rhetoric of representation could
separate the bucolic from the cosmopolitan, the province from the country’s center, and the
Scottish from the English. And it could especially mark selfhood. Boswell’s task was to translate
the great Anglican and English icon into fully humane proportions and, in so doing, authorize his
own Scottish identity as capable of comprising and composing the great English writer.
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In a period content to brand provincial, Scottish English with nationalized epithets, lists of so-called Scotticisms
circulated among the Scottish universities and literati, as well as in London. James Beattie’s short, published
dictionary Scotticisms (1779) and Boswell’s shorter, undated, manuscript list of Scotticisms (ms. 260) evidence a
sensibility concerned primarily with adaptability, cultivated by a practical understanding of language and usage. In
his journals, the young Boswell notes his displeasure at seeing familiar Scottish faces in the London crowd: “[t]o tell
the plain truth, I was vexed at their coming[,] for to see just the plain hamely fife family hurt my grand ideas of
London” (Turnbull 21-2). Gordon Turnbull notes that “hamely” is Scots for “‘homely’, in the sense of ‘familiar’,
‘ordinary’, shading slightly over into ‘rough, coarse, blunt’” (351 n.15). Boswell’s diction indicates his own social
distinctions between “grand” idea of cosmopolitan London and his “hamely” Scotland. At this time, too, Irish
Thomas Sheridan moved from acting on the London to educating students in proper English elocution as a means of
correcting flaws in usage, particularly provincial usage. In the Life, Boswell cites the example of one of Sheridan’s
students, Alex Wedderburne, because “it affords animating encouragement to other gentlemen of North-Britian to
try their fortunes in the southern part of the Island, where they may hope to gratify their utmost ambition . . . now
that we are one people by the Union” (i.387).
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Much like Smith, Blair’s emphasis on style, likewise, probed what was definitively
English about Englishness through his attention to English literature like Addison and Steele’s
Spectator. For Blair, the best style is so precise and perspicuous that it does not hamper
understanding. It guides it fluidly, naturally. The degree to which a composition maintains both
traits determines the level of propriety it demonstrates: style “is a picture of the ideas which rise
in the mind . . . [it] is nothing else, than that sort of expression which our thoughts most readily
assume” (Blair 99). Since the writing style is, for Blair, definitive of the character of the writer,
Blair concludes that “different countries have been noted for their peculiarities of Style, suited
their different temper and genius” and provides example of those correlations between style and
national identity (99). Tellingly, the Scottish are not among the nations or cultures he mentions
in this lecture to Scottish students at the University of Edinburgh, but they must have been aware
of the lens turned on their national character and writing by British or cosmopolitan London
culture. As a consequence, Barbara Warnick explains, stylistic decisions in Blair’s theorizing
“should be adjusted to the taste and habits of the host culture; what suited ancient society was no
longer appropriate in the eloquence of the modern period,” and she characterizes this model as a
“global view of propriety” (71). For Boswell, writing about Johnson in English, arrangement in
composition would have proven a delicate, crucial task.
Within the context of a belletristic approach to English that sought to remove traces of
native Scottish from the discourse, Boswell would have been acutely aware of rhetorical modes
of arrangement and their importance in mediating his relationship with Johnson. In the Journal
Tour to the Hebrides, Boswell seeks to depict himself man of English civility and also a Scottish
laird; indeed, the whole trip through Scotland, passing largely from Scottish man to Scottish man
who exhibits an Anglicized sensibility sets a larger context for Boswell’s attempt to reconcile his
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Scottish origins to his English aspiration. He delights in relaying Johnson’s observation that
“[t]he Irish mix better with the English than the Scotch do; their language is nearer to English . . .
[and] they have not that extreme nationality which we find in the Scotch” blends the national and
linguistic to the point he can compliment Boswell for being the “most unscottified of your
countrymen. You are almost the only instance of a Scotchman that I have known, who did not at
every other sentence bring in some other Scotchman” (Life ii.242). Echoes of Blair and Smith’s
impetus for inculcating a belletristic rhetoric to their Scottish students can be heard in Johnson’s
assumptions: language, but mostly dialect, signify “nationality” and national identity, such that
language can determine character. Boswell himself began a list of Scotticisms and Scottish
words (Boswell Collection ms. 260). Johnson even encouraged him to continue compiling words
so that they might form the basis for a book (Boswell, Life ii.91-2). Boswell could hardly have
failed to recognize his place in the contemporary context of rhetorical theory and the role it much
place in arranging facts into Johnson’s selfhood. More to the point, Boswell acted in this
politicized and nationalized rhetorical field in the composition of the Life.
In an undated, manuscript essay, Boswell articulates an approach to composition and
arrangement that expresses similar sentiments to the belletristic rhetoric advocated by
eighteenth-century Scottish universities, emphasizing style and arrangement. One of Blair’s
assumptions, for instance, is that “[k]nowledge and science must furnish the materials that form
the body and substance of any valuable composition. Rhetoric serves to add the polish; and we
know that none but firm and solid bodies can be polished well” (4). In this configuration, the
sources of biographical selfhood come from empirical “knowledge” and scientific fact.
Boswell’s process for locating the facts of Johnson’s self evidences an empirical methodology—
facts obtained from Johnson’s publications, the observations of Johnson’s acquaintance, as well
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as Boswell’s own personal observations and journal record. Similar to Blair, Boswell stresses
that
Writing or Composition in an age of learning or knowledge must be in a great
measure arranging and colouring & shaping & polishing in various ways other
peoples [sic] thoughts[.] So it is called Composition condo et compono quea mox
depromere possim.68 Some original thoughts will be intermixed sometimes;
sometimes not. I doubt if there be a single original thought in all Dr. Hugh Blair's
Sermons yet they are beautiful compositions. (ms. 69.3)
Boswell’s emphasis is less on scientific knowledge or originality, but rather how material can be
arranged to “beautiful” effect. For Boswell, the excess of facts and information “in an age of
learning or knowledge” requires rhetorical arrangement to give them order. Arrangement is even
more important than the originality of fact. His emphasis on arrangement is another instance
where his Scottish origins, paradoxically, trump the questions of authority that his Life posed. By
making arrangement (a key article in the Scottish Enlightenment school of rhetoric) his priority,
he de-emphasizes the questions of fact surrounding the great Dr. Johnson and thus the questions
of Boswell’s fitness. Blair and Boswell both regard rhetoric and arrangement as refining source
material. For Blair, belletristic “composition serves to add the polish” (4). Boswell, too, holds
belletristic arrangement makes the “colouring & shaping & polishing” (ms. 69.3). Essentially,
they both advocate a careful rhetorical treatment of facts to improve them by improving their
presentation.
In their constructions, belletristic rhetoric metaphorically becomes a rhetoric of the body.
They anchor the observable, verbal self onto rhetoric. Blair asserts that rhetoric can only improve
68

The transcribers note to manuscript 69.3 correct Boswell’s citation to “condo et compono quea quod mox
depromere possim” (emphasis and strikethrough, mine). Boswell is citing Horace’s Epistles I.1.12, translated by H.
Rushton Fairclough thus: “I am putting by and setting in order the stores on which I may someday draw” (251).
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a sound body of ideas or facts: “none but firm and solid bodies can be polished well” (4). Only a
sound body can be improved rhetorically.
“Would it not be ridiculous squeamish affectation to say I will no more use
thoughts which have been in other peoples [sic] minds than eat meat which has
been in other peoples [sic] mouths. We cannot help receiving other peoples [sic]
thoughts with whom we are brought near enough to communicate either in
conversation or by reading what they write no more than we can help inhaling
breath which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company [,] a
disgusting idea no doubt. We must receive other peoples [sic] thoughts both crude
& well digested. Impertinent rude people will belch vile thoughts in our face. (ms.
69.3)
Receiving “other people’s thoughts” through “conversation or by reading what they write”
strengthens a body of facts or ideas. Metaphorically, Boswell compares this process of
strengthening a composition to ingestion or inhalation, an involuntary incorporation of
additional, diverse ideas, both “crude and well digested,” to arrange, color, shape, and polish. In
Boswell’s formulation, a composition is a body that rhetoric orders, arranging and shaping it and
giving it color and definition. His comparison is particularly apt in light of his biographical
methodology, which digests source accounts of Johnson to arrange as a life of Johnson into a
“beautiful composition” (ms. 69.3), a rhetoric of self that collects lived experiences and character
traits within the body of the biography as life.
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Composing Johnson’s Selfhood Textually
In order to render palatable the extensive documentation of Johnson’s life he had
amassed, Boswell had to shape and polish his research by giving the details a continuity that
would make it possible for them to cohere as a single print self. The perception of a natural
regularity conveyed through Boswell’s formal organization of Johnson’s contradictory qualities
has such a regularizing effect on the variety of material he collected. Divergent points of view
and inconsistent accounts of Johnson are unified as a singular life, setting fixed boundaries for
what will be considered Johnsonian, so that Johnson could be observed objectively and
empirically by the sympathetic reader. The most obvious boundary that Boswell establishes for
Johnson’s selfhood is the extensive correspondence that connects Johnson to the larger society
that framed his life. Unlike the ways Johnson had used Savage’s correspondence to fill in gaps
for Savage’s experience or to give testament to his character, Boswell uses Johnson’s
connections to establish the man in a larger social context. His social circle included the political
theorists, painters, poets of the Literary Club, populated by the likes of Edmund Burke, Sir
Joshua Reynolds, and Dr. Oliver Goldsmith. Beyond that, Johnson’s acquaintance included
Hester Thrale Piozzi and the Scottish philosopher James Beattie, and he was an avowed, lifelong
fan of his friend, the novel Charlotte Lennox, as well as the playwright Hannah More. This is by
no means a comprehensive list; rather, it is evidence of the challenge Boswell faced in
structuring Johnson’s network as a comprehensive print person. Likewise, Boswell situates
Johnson’s experiences paratextually, unifying the accumulated details of Johnson’s life
chronologically under headings that mark each year in the life of Johnson, but also
asynchronously with footnotes that make connections across time in the span of Johnson’s life.
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Boswell’s arrangement depends on textual and paratextual strategies that definitively
mark the Johnsonian boundaries so that readers can observe him objectively in order to read his
selfhood sympathetically. Epistemologically, the move from empirical objectivity to affective
sympathy is Lockean. It requires widespread facts that allow for empirical observation of
experience. More than a simple list of facts, this move also requires a recognizable humanity, an
arrangement that shifts the readers’ focus from mere fact to observations of a selfhood made up
facts. A reader’s perceptions allowed for an empirical appraisal of self that would allow and
sympathetic fellow-feeling, an accurate exchange of sentiments. For the eighteenth-century
reader, sympathy is socially and philosophically charged: in his Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Adam Smith posits sympathy as model for morality and sociability based on observing and
sympathetically responding to others (17). This scientific approach allows sympathy to be seated
in the body and in the imagination of spectators who witnesses another person and
sympathetically imagine themselves in that person’s position (Theory 27-9, 31-4). Boswell
encourages this response by rhetorical procedures, but it is up to the reader to respond. Letters
with a definite addressee and author provide points of social contact that situate Johnson and, to
a large degree, dramatize his opinions over time, as letter sequences between Johnson and
Boswell, Hester Thrale Piozzi, and Boswell’s wife demonstrate. Readers of The Life enter into
that play of social relations as spectators, but Boswell also wants them to become part of the
experiment. His thorough though hardly exhaustive table of contents and footnotes move a
reader’s attention across the text outside of the linear narrative of the Life to provide a frame of
scientific mastery over Johnson’s selfhood, while letters provide more gentle and rhetorically
approachable opportunities for sympathy with Johnson, a sympathy that will in turn shape the
reader. To inductively apprehend Johnson’s selfhood from Boswell’s massive accumulation, his
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biographical ordering notwithstanding, readers must have choices within the various points of
view evident in each anecdote, recollection, publication, letter or other material that Boswell
incorporated into the biography. Letters constitute one of the more significant and rhetorically
consistent strategies for inviting readers to participate in The Life and the life of Johnson.
Including letters was a normative practice in eighteenth-century biography, growing out
of seventeenth-century life writing and appearing most notably in Johnson’s recounting of
Richard Savage’s life. In the latter part of the William Mason’s Memoirs of the Life and Writings
of Thomas Gray alternated short prose sections narrating life events against much longer
epistolary sequences. Boswell claims that he has chosen “to adopt and enlarge upon the excellent
plan of Mr. Mason” in structuring his own biographical representation of Johnson (Life i.29). In
analyzing Boswell’s letter placement, Bruce Redford emphasizes “the care that went into
positioning the letters so as to gloss, punctuate, or advance the narrative” and argues that
Boswell uses the letters to three ends: to present the letters with a “disposition” sympathetic to
Johnson, to vary the forms of letter to represent various attributes of Johnson’s self, and to
manage multiple “epistolary sequence[s]” that “can include as many as ten to fifteen letters”
(Designing 124). The self-consciousness with which Boswell includes and edits epistolary
sequences in the Life emphasizes the methodology of Boswell’s didactic Johnson, a biographical
self who engages and, when read properly, transforms readers.
Protocols of civility demanded letters on a variety of occasions and at frequencies that
confirmed the social bond between writers.69 Although civility has a basis in extemporaneous,
interpersonal interaction, it exerts a clear influence on eighteenth-century conversation and letter
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Johnson’s letters typically bear the marks of civility common to the art of letter writing in the eighteenth century,
since “[l]etter-writers satisfied decorum by sending letters on ‘proper’ occasions, [and] using ‘correct’ forms of
address and . . . they also regulated politeness by testing its compatibility with negligence, warmth and zeal” (Brant
4).
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writing with clear protocols. These forms of civility set the boundaries for social interaction, and
Boswell uses them to show the boundaries Johnson variously respected and broke. Toward that
end, Boswell situates collections of letters at irregular intervals in the Life which balance
Johnson’s notorious incivility. Speaking of a previous night’s conversation, Boswell once
confirmed for Johnson that he “tossed and gored several persons” (Life ii.66). Boswell himself
complained of being “tossed . . . sometimes,” which he regarded as particularly uncivil in the
company of “enemies” (Life iii.338). Boswell used Johnson’s letters as a means of balancing and
arranging Johnson’s social self as sociable yet curiously aggressive or negligent at times. When
he makes his compliments, for instance, he often apologizes for his negligence in writing to the
addressee, gesturing toward apology so that he can simultaneously stress his high regard,
ameliorate his inattention to the addressee, and segue smoothly into news of himself. It is an
epistolary commonplace characterized by self-interest, but also civility.
A clear example of this strategy occurs in a letter to his friend and long-time personal
physician, Dr. Thomas Lawrence Johnson writes: “At a time when all your friends ought to show
their kindness, and with a character which ought to make all that know you your friends, you
may wonder that you have yet heard nothing from me. I have been hindered by a vexatious and
incessant cough, for which within these ten days I have been bled once, fasted four or five times,
taken physick five times, and opiates, I think, six. This day it seems to remit” (Life iii.419). The
“time when all . . . friends ought to show their kindness” that Johnson discreetly references here
is the death of Lawrence’s wife. In this extreme instance, Johnson authenticates his inability to
write with the specific details of his own suffering, whereby he apprises his physician of his own
sickness, demonstrating the sociable, civil means of conveying sympathy. As a personal doctor,
Lawrence would have been particularly reconciled to Johnson’s inattention by his own
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familiarity with Johnson’s medical history. While Johnson seems to give primacy to the
sufferings of Lawrence over his own and emphasize his civil regard for his friend, he also gives
attention to his own suffering. Such letter structures overwrite Johnson’s reputation for being illmannered with civil practices common to any writer.
Similarly, Johnson is bound to the epistolary form through the social network it
establishes and maintains. Johnson often communicates with his acquaintance indirectly through
an addressee. Such second-hand communication evokes the social practices associated with what
Clare Brant labels “personal” rather than “private” letters: “‘personal’ . . . recognizes the
significance of letters to individuals and to relationships . . . [since] eighteenth-century familiar
letters, which were . . . voluntarily circulated beyond the addressee” (5).70 Relaying this strategy
in the letters he selects for the Life allows Boswell to contextualize Johnson within a civil, social
network among his acquaintances. But it also depicts Johnson’s negotiation of the social
obligations necessary for maintaining this network particularly in the manner he manages
personal correspondence with the members of his circle. Boswell includes a letter to Johnson’s
servant, Francis Barber, in which Johnson instructs Barber to “[m]ake my compliments to Mr.
Ellis, and Mrs. Clapp, and Mr. Smith” (Life ii.116). Thus Johnson maintains his social network
with three people by virtue of his communication with a single addressee. But the more
interesting dimension of this sociality is that Barber is black, and Johnson is extending his
sociability/authority through him, which means Ellis, Clapp, and Smith have to accept Barber as
well as Johnson.
Johnson reflected on the popular practice of publishing private letters, telling Boswell
that “[i]t is now become so much the fashion to publish letters, that in order to avoid it, I put as
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Brant also notes that, quite often, “many correspondents did not want or expect their exchanges to be disclosed to
others, but ‘personal’ should be understood to anticipate discretion” (5).

217

little into mine as I can” (Life iv.102). Johnson’s aversion to the publicity of the public letter
stresses the availability of the self in personal correspondence, hence he “put as little into mine
as I can” by resorting to brief letters. Yet Boswell’s choice to include Johnson’s documented
words makes a private Johnson available outside of his circle, one that will counter the “goring”
doctor with a more gentle portrait of civil and even kind exchanges, however brief. Boswell
organizes the letters to shape a Johnson who can interpret civility but also to be held accountable
to it.
In ordering Johnson through epistolary text, Boswell gains control over his formidable
subject through letter sequences, which allow him to frame events through relaying a variety of
stories intended to reflect Johnson’s character. His careful placement of letter sequences
bookends diverse topical sections, ranging from accounts of Johnson’s publications to his
conversation and commentary, and it gives them a distinct, forward motion. A famous example
of a letter narrative in the Life is the interaction between Johnson and Boswell’s wife. A subtle,
somewhat jocular conflict between the two arises when Boswell and Johnson make their tour of
the Hebrides. At Boswell’s house, the peculiarities that often characterize Johnson prove, as
Boswell explains in a footnote, disagreeable to Boswell’s wife. Johnson kept “irregular hours”
and displayed “uncouth habits, such as turning the heads of candles downwards, when they did
not burn bright enough, and letting the wax drop upon the carpet”; coupled with the extreme
attention her husband always devotes to Johnson, Johnson’s strange habits leave her ill at ease
(Life ii.269). In a letter dated 27 November 1773, Johnson notes: “I know Mrs. Boswell wished
me well to go; her wishes have not been disappointed” (Life ii.268-9). The next letter that
Boswell includes in this sequence is a reply from Johnson to Mrs. Boswell, dated 16 May 1776,
in which he tells her that “[t]he only thing in which I have the honor to agree with you is, in
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loving him; and while we are so much of a mind in a matter of so much importance, our other
quarrels will, I hope, produce no great bitterness” (Life iii.86). In subsequent letters to Boswell,
Johnson asks his friend always to pay his regards to Mrs. Boswell, so that by 24 February 1777,
Boswell tells Johnson “my wife is much honored by what you say of her. She begs you may
accept of her best compliments . . . [and] is to send you some marmalade of oranges of her own
making,” noting tongue-in-cheek, that it is important to “[b]eware . . . of a reconciled enemy”
(Life iii.108-9). Johnson writes asking that Boswell “[t]ell Mrs. Boswell that I shall taste her
marmalade cautiously at first,” and when it proves harmless he will take it “as a pledge of firm . .
. unalterable kindness,” so he can definitely conclude that “[s]he is, after all, a dear, dear lady”
(Life iii.109). Eventually, the letters reveal that Johnson and Boswell’s wife are reconciled
enough that they occasionally correspond.
As much as she is incorporated into Johnson’s social circle through correspondence, this
epistolary sequence documents and makes observable a social Johnson, situated in the context of
his social obligations and acquaintance. The narrative thread these letter sequences picture gives
consistency to disparate details Boswell accumulates as a life. Their rhetorical structure also
offers the advantage of picturing a Johnson constantly capable of change, responsive to social
situations, and able to reconcile himself to a social “enemy” like Mrs. Boswell. Boswell’s use of
Johnson’s correspondence makes Johnson more observable and, thus, more sympathetic to the
spectating reader. Rhetorically, Boswell’s arrangement of epistolary sequences allows for a more
intimate Johnson with more didactic potential for the ethical reader.
Epistolary time gives the narrative direction, which sometimes plays against the
chronological ordering of the annual divisions of Boswell’s material with marginal glosses that
frame Johnson’s experiences with the year and his age. Boswell’s method of applying a narrative
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linearity to Johnson’s experiences is distinctive from other biographies of the period, which
embed the dates and ages within the biographical narrative, rather than glossing them. Johnson’s
and Goldsmith’s biographies embed the dates, as do other biographies of Johnson, like
Hawkins’s or Piozzi’s collection of anecdotes. While it might be a concession to utility—shorter
biographies would not have required a means of managing Boswell’s surplus—Boswell’s
marginal glosses mark the passage of Johnson’s life and stabilize the experimental framework of
the Life with clear temporal markers. The 1791 edition of Boswell’s Life follows a dedication
and an advertisement with an alphabetical table of contents that is fourteen pages long. What
Boswell terms a table of contents is actually a topical index. That it opens the biography
foregrounds the rhetorical structuring of Johnson’s life, connecting in the same table Johnson’s
acquaintance, travels, opinions, and publications. Likewise, the footnote establishes continuity
within the text outside of the chronological ordering of events, so that it represents a balanced,
consistent Johnson. Unlike the sequential, chronological progression of the letters, the marginal
glosses, or the forward-looking table of contents, the narrative movement of Boswell’s footnotes
is alternately forward or backward. By reaching in multiple directions across the text, Boswell
gives more continuity to the people and social contacts that drift in and out of the Life around
Johnson. In contrast to the dizzying context of conversations and scenes, of participants and
settings, such nominal structuring cannot entirely contain Johnson’s character, but can give it
temporal form and scientific precision.
Edward Gibbon’s presence, for instance, is emphasized by a discussion between Boswell
and Johnson regarding how history should be relayed and reported. Though Gibbon is present
and has presumably been working on his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
he offers no comment because, as Boswell suggests, “[h]e probably did not trust himself with
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JOHNSON” (Life ii.366). The italicized word “trust” and its footnote, “See p. 348,” point back to
a previous segment of the Life in which Gibbon makes a quiet riposte to Johnson’s comment that
he would not trust himself in the presence of a black bear:. Johnson said “We are told, that the
black bear is innocent; but I should not like to trust myself with him.” What Gibbon whispers to
the side, Boswell glosses later in the life: Gibbon says, “I should not like to trust myself with
you” (Life ii.348). Such paratextual arrangements situate Johnson referentially within the
boundaries that Boswell establishes. In the former instance, he becomes a critic of the historical
writing Gibbon chooses not to defend. In the latter, his character is associated with the purported
innocence of the “black bear” (Life ii.348). Boswell’s footnotes connect dissimilar aspects of
Johnson’s character but also draw connections over the course of the Life. By binding Johnson in
footnotes, Boswell creates a boundary for containing Johnson’s experience that runs against the
ostensibly chronological structure of the biography, projecting Johnson’s selfhood backward
across the course of the Life.
Likewise, Boswell situates Johnson within social networks that also cycle through
Johnson’s lived experience. Boswell notes, “[o]n Sunday, April 1, I dined with him [Johnson] at
Mr. Thrale’s, with Sir Phillip Jennings Clerk and Mr. Perkins, who had the superintendence of
Mr. Thrale’s brewery, with a salary of five hundred pounds a year” (Life iv.80). His reference to
Perkins is connected to an earlier letter in the Life from Johnson to Perkins, which is itself
footnoted with an additional anecdote of an interaction between Johnson, Perkins and Mrs.
Thrale. The latter footnote focuses on Perkins’s maintenance of Henry Thrales’s brewery, his
hospitality, and Johnson’s regard for the man (Life ii.286). Not only does this footnote connect
Johnson to a social network, as in his epistolary greetings to various friends, but it gives
continuity to the network that fixes Johnson within the social formation of friends, acquaintances

221

and rivals interweaving throughout and networked by the text, like the epistolary sequences. This
footnote connects the social formations most characteristic of the Life, “the quantity it contains
of Johnson’s conversation; which is universally acknowledged to have been eminently
instructive and entertaining . . . [and] will best display his character” (Life i.31). Boswell’s
footnotes undergird the Life and provide a standard for gauging how characteristically
Johnsonian any action Johnson performs might be.
The selfhood, which Boswell can link at various points in the biography, makes a
behavioral continuity possible while rendering others improbable or uncharacteristic. In this
accumulation and arrangement of details, then, Boswell gives us a scientifically verifiable
Johnson, shaped by rhetorical practices to unfold as a series of experiments from which the
reader can gather useful and edifying evidence. This rhetorical context for sympathy provides a
scientific, physiological, and ethical means to gauge whether the Johnson experiment is working.
Once they, like Boswell, are “impregnated with the Johnsonian æther,” the truth of this
Johnsonian self will be evident in even more intimate and personal effects on the reader (Life
i.421). The efficacy of the experiment is that it draws in the reader to the experiment itself.
While Boswell does fix Johnson’s experience implicitly through textual organization, he
also explicitly arranges Johnson’s selfhood by exerting the ethos of a biographer and friend.
Boswell’s authorial control in arranging letter sequences, chronological markers, footnotes does
not foreground his role as a biographer, but his self-definition as an autobiographical witness to
Johnson’s life does. As in his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides, Boswell acts an interlocutor for
the reader, though much less obviously obtrusive. Boswell’s personal commentary and first-hand
experience asserts a different role than Johnson’s familiarity played in his representation of his
friend, Richard Savage. Johnson used Savage’s biography to render his own personal
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recollections of Savage into documentation, represented objectively so that it could be
documented as fact by other readers or researchers. He sought to document his opinion into
public record. Boswell, on the other hand, takes his long-standing, personal familiarity with
Johnson’s opinions to authorize his own interpretations of Johnson’s preferences as fact. These
facts become part of the mass of details Boswell accumulates.
In one instance, Boswell reads Johnson’s opinions on contemporary novels, noting that
Johnson “always appeared” to have an “unreasonable prejudice,” for the prose aesthetic of
Samuel Richardson to that of Henry Fielding (Life ii.49). Johnson’s prejudice has become so
familiar as to be axiomatic to Boswell, who recalls that “[i]n comparing those two writers, he
used this expression; ‘that there was as great a difference between them as between a man who
knew how a watch was made, and a man who could tell the hour by looking on the dial-plate’”
(Life ii.49). Boswell contains Johnson’s self by reducing Johnson’s aesthetic to a single,
manageable assertion that he can overwrite on its own analogical terms: “I cannot help being of
the opinion, that the neat watches of Fielding are as well constructed as the large clocks of
Richardson, and that his dial-plates are brighter” (Life ii.49). Boswell’s intrusive commentary
seems at odds with the original purview of his project. His response to and interpretation of
Johnson, however, serve to further define what should be considered Johnsonian.
First, the contrast between Boswell’s answer and the “Johnsonian” one highlights the
schema Boswell has established: Boswell, as autobiographical counterpoint, clarifies the
biographical Johnson, who remains the locus of scientific truth, a pattern Watson and Holmes
will re-enact some 100 years later. Second, Boswell’s answer repeats Johnson’s opinion for
interpretation by a larger reading audience. Boswell not only articulates his own tastes against
Johnson’s, but he sets public taste in contrast with “Johnson’s excessive and unaccountable
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depreciation of one of the best writers that England has produced,” since “‘Tom Jones’ has stood
the test of publick opinion” (Life ii.175). Such personal, interpretive commentary on the part of
the biographer often follows a dialog or anecdote. Boswell, an intimate interlocutor for Johnson,
moves the personal Johnson back into the public realm, subject to public observation and
consideration.
The premise of Boswell’s biographical approach, “that minute particulars are frequently
characteristick,” obligates him not only to organize Johnson for interpretation, but also to train
the public in how it should interpret the man, as he set out to do in the biographical experiment
of his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides (Life i.33).71 Boswell is most directly instructive about
how Johnson should be read when he inserts his autobiographical accounts into the Life. Boswell
critiques Tom Davies’ attempt “in a bald manner” at a bon mot he himself witnessed in Davies’
shop: Boswell recalls that Davies “made . . . [him] say, ‘I was born in Scotland,’ instead of ‘I
come from Scotland;’ so that Johnson saying, ‘That, Sir, is what a great many of your
countrymen cannot help,’ had no point, or even meaning: and that upon this being mentioned to
Mr. Fitzherbert, he observed, ‘It is not every man that can carry a bon mot” (Life ii.350-1). The
contrast Boswell carefully emphasizes between Davies’ and Johnson’s delivery of the bon mot
demonstrates the linguistic and sarcastic facility Johnson makes plain in his first encounter with
Boswell.72 The vagueness of Boswell’s demonstrative “this” suggests two possible antecedents:
in the immediate context of the anecdote, “this” refers to the contrast between Davies’ and
Johnson’s ability to carry a bon mot; in the larger context of biography, “this” refers to Boswell’s
and Davie’s retellings of Boswell’s first encounter with Johnson, which puts each man in the
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At the outset of the biography, Boswell positions his interpretation of Johnson as corrective to the “literary
gossiping” of Sir John Hawkins’ and Hester Piozzi’s earlier interpretations (Life i.26-8).
72
To emphasize his own credibility as Johnson’s biographer, Boswell cites, Mr. Fitzherbert, who “observed, ‘It is
not every man that can carry a bon mot’” (Life ii.350).
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position to deliver Johnson’s bon mot convincingly. Thus the comment serves both to stress
Johnson’s selfhood, particularly as Boswell’s schema represents it, and to show that Boswell’s
capacity for recollection on this autobiographical matter authorizes him to organize Johnson’s
self. His interventions as an interlocutor are not merely a retelling, but rather an arrangement of
Johnson that makes him more observable and more sympathetic.

Composing Johnson’s Selfhood Intimately
Coming as it did at the end of the century, Boswell’s biography directly inherited the
criteria for biographical arrangement shaped by the emergence of the form earlier in the
eighteenth century with precedents like Johnson’s life of Savage or Goldsmith’s biography of
Nash, but it went further. Boswell’s epistolary, paratextual, and interpretive rhetorical
arrangement develops a fuller, more accurate, view of Johnson that Boswell promises from the
outset. The selfhood he portrays allows “readers to become better acquainted with him than even
most of those were who actually knew him” from a sympathetic perspective of Johnson’s
experience (Life i.29). Boswell’s longtime friend, the Reverend William Johnson Temple,
congratulated the biographer on his accomplishment: “[p]erhaps no man was ever so perfectly
painted as you have painted your hero. You have given us him in every point of view and
exhibited him under every shade and under every colour. We think we see him and hear him and
are equally entertained whether he contend for Truth or for Victory” (Correspondence 328).
Temple’s compliment takes for granted or, at least, makes no mention of Boswell’s table of
contents, marginal glosses, or footnotes, but rather focuses on the depth and fullness of “every
shade” and “every colour” with which Boswell “perfectly painted” his representation of Johnson.
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To fashion Johnson’s experience into a life that readers can observe and engage with as
though they “think they see Johnson and hear him,” Boswell adopts a proto-psychological
approach. His more empirically-scientific, documentary record supports this illusion of
psychological depth that seeks to explore Johnson’s selfhood more intimately. In order to create
the “points of view” that Temple praises for making the Johnson of the Life visible and audible
for readers, however, Boswell cannot depend simply on his variety of source material or the
paratextual methods. Instead, Boswell must employ two additional, structural interventions that
allow the reader to better observe Johnson’s character. First, Boswell also creates a matrix of
character traits in order to connect different points of Johnson’s character across the Life. Second
and more famously, Boswell includes Johnson’s conversation, relaying it like a script that invites
the reader to view Johnson’s talk as an intimate performance with Johnson’s personal
acquaintance.
Since it informs the memorable events and anecdotes that comprise much of Johnson’s
life, this character matrix blends in to the narrative trajectory of the Life. It organically bridges
disparate events and seemingly irreconcilable comments than the superimposed textual and
paratextual apparatus of Boswell’s biographical arrangement. The character matrix consists of a
set of ten psychological traits—Boswell refers to them in the Life with proto-psychological terms
such as “qualities” (iv.426), “spirit,” “temper,” “powers of the mind” (i.39)—that manifest
themselves to varying strengths depending on their context, in relation to each other or to the
events of Johnson’s life. These set of ten traits give an empirical orientation to Boswell’s
unquantifiable notions of “spirit,” “temper,” and “powers.” The character matrix has a scientific
sense of accuracy.
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For Boswell’s readers, it also conveys a slight, fleeting sense of familiarity. Boswell’s
systemization of his subject’s character is novel. In the biographical tradition of the eighteenthcentury, the standard for systemizing treatments of the author’s life was Johnson’s. Boswell
situated his system of establishing a character matrix in Johnson’s childhood and adolescence.
Jack Lynch argues that, prior to Boswell, Johnson’s biography evinced a system focused on the
early years of an author’s life, characterized by its treatment of childhood, education and its
specific circumstances, and proof of future literary promise (137-8). Lynch argues that this
system of self is the “‘signature’ of Johnsonian biography” and evident in the majors
biographical treatments of Johnson’s own life by Piozzi, Hawkins, and Boswell (140). He points
out that Johnson’s “contribution has gone largely unremarked . . . because we . . . are heirs to
Johnson’s conception about what is important in an early life . . . [and] in some of the ways in
which lives formed characters” (141). Modern biography’s debt to Johnson’s biographical
methodology is the degree to which it can be taken for granted. Lynch argues, however, that
Boswell recognized the predominance of the Johnsonian biographical standard: “Boswell would
have felt the originality of . . . more acutely than we do today.” (141). The crucial difference
between the categories Lynch attributes to Johnson’s biographies and that Boswell structured in
the Life is Johnson’s focus on external circumstances that can be objectively observed. Boswell,
well aware of Johnson’s innovations to the form, departs from this focus by putting Johnson’s
interiority into objective view for sympathetic engagement.
The interiority that Boswell arranges into a character matrix is made up of ten traits
begin, first, with Johnson’s melancholic “general sensation of gloomy wretchedness” (Life i.35);
his devotion to Christianity and general piety (38); his famous, “jealous independence of spirit
and impetuosity of temper” (39); “the power of his memory” (39); his literary ambition and
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precocity (40); his definitive physical attributes that threatened to deform his powers of
observation (41-3);73 his love of learning (43-6); his intellectual “superiority” (47-8); his “great
ambition to excel” (48), and an alienation that would drive him to be sociable with a younger set
throughout his life (48-9). Boswell uses these traits to create a matrix within which he can situate
and interpret the facts of Johnson’s life. To complement the character matrix, the intimacy of
observing such conversations puts readers in conversation (often through Boswell’s eyes) with
the major cultural topics of the day inundating them with Johnson’s opinion, which has the effect
of having “Johnsonised the land” as Boswell exults in the second edition of the biography (Life
i.13). This character matrix and the depiction of private conversation develop a more intimate
print selfhood through which readers like Temple can feel like they know Johnson personally
and find themselves “equally entertained whether Johnson contends for truth or victory” and
equally instructed.
Near the close of the Life, Boswell acknowledges the biographer’s burden, the task of
connecting experiences and reconciling the many facets of the self. The challenge that Boswell
faces is reconciling oppositions: “[m]an is, in general, made up of contradictory qualities; and
these will ever shew themselves in strange succession, where a consistency in appearance at
least, if not in reality, has not been attained by long habits of philosophical discipline. In
proportion to the native vigour of the mind, the contradictory qualities will be the more
prominent, and more difficult to be adjusted” (Life iv.426). The strong “native vigor” of
Johnson’s mind resulted in stronger “contradictions” that could more contradictory for their
inability to “adjust” to each other. Quite unlike the figures in character writing from the
73

Johnson’s ungainly figure and tendency to mutter to himself led William Hogarth, who “perceived a person
standing at a window in the room, shaking his head, and rolling himself in a strange ridiculous manner” in response
to a conversation in the main part of the room and consequently “concluded that he was an ideot” (Life i.146-7).
Hogarth misjudged Johnson’s character, when the person he supposed to be an “ideot” “stalked forwards . . . [and]
displayed such a power of eloquence, that Hogarth looked at him with astonishment” (Life i.147).
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Spectator, Rambler, or even Goldsmith’s Nash who exhibit at most a few unique, overriding
character traits manifest in all of other their actions and sayings, Johnson was full of
“contradictory qualities.” His departure from early models of life writing, Boswell claims, more
accurately reflects the tendency in “human nature” to embody contradiction (Life iv.426). The
character matrix Boswell establishes provides a complex, Lockean framework that gives
Johnson’s selfhood continuity over time and throughout different places, even though the mass
of materials he collected for the Life show disparate aspects of Johnson’s character. Johnson, at
“different times, . . . seemed to be a different man, in some respects; not, however, in any great
or essential article upon which he had fully employed his mind, and settled certain principles of
duty, but only in his manners, and in the display of argument and fancy in his talk” (iv.426).
Although Boswell downplays the degree of inconsistency evident in Johnson’s character at the
end of the Life, he takes pains throughout to distinguish between moments that are distinctly
Johnsonian and moments that, though aberrant, are becoming of Johnson’s print person.
The matrix of character traits establishes the traits that are characteristically Johnsonian
so that occasional incongruities add depth to Johnson’s representation and balance Johnson’s
selfhood as a more organic, entire life. By arranging the dominant attributes of Johnson’s
character and giving attention to their incongruity, Boswell puts his readers in a position to read
Johnson’s life more sympathetically than would be possible through epistolary evidence or
paratextual apparatus alone. It is a representational move from the disparate, public character
toward the more intimate qualities of Johnson. Rhetorically, it invites Boswell’s readers to make
didactic reconciliations of the contradictions in Johnson’s character at “different times” in the
Life, when he “seemed to be a different man.”
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Boswell’s specific, proto-psychological traits also create a matrix outside of the
chronological structure of the biography. Boswell first gives an account of his empirical
methodology to justify his inclusion of the personal and private details of Johnson’s life he
relates. In the section of the Life spanning the sixteen years from Johnson’s birth in 1709 to
1725, Boswell locates ten specific traits that he traces throughout the events of Johnson’s life and
conversation. These traits reveal the perpetuity of a recognizable self-consciousness, which
readers come to identify as characteristically Johnsonian as the Life progressed. In establishing
the matrix of traits from the outset, Boswell creates a baseline to which he can return throughout
the course of the biography to lend continuity to Johnson’s varied actions, sayings, and
behaviors. The most productive traits to examine in context are the three that predominate the
Life: Johnson’s melancholic tendency, his fervent religiosity, and his love of learning. In the
context of each other, these character traits demonstrate how Boswell arranges a consistent self
for Johnson, even though he is not always consistently religious, melancholic, or studious.
The first foundational character trait Boswell locates as a marker of Johnson’s later life is
the melancholic disposition Johnson acquired from his father, Michael Johnson (Life i.35). It
would make an appearance in as the “constitutional indolence” that halted his work on
translating A Voyage to Abyssinia and in his account of his lifelong madness to the Lady McLeod
when traveling to the Hebrides with Boswell (Life i.87, v.215). Evident in Boswell’s choice to
prioritize Johnson’s melancholy is an indication of a normative cultural value, one of the
predominant character types of the day: the melancholic genius. Boswell associates Johnson with
a popular contemporary text on melancholy by Dr. George Cheyne, The English Malady, which
Johnson twice recommended Boswell read in order to treat his own melancholic tendencies (Life
i.65). Clark Lawlor’s anachronistic examination of melancholy’s cultural implications
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throughout the eighteenth century notes that Johnson “had a clear sense of himself as more
grievously affected than the majority of depressives,” which gave him a literary and artistic
advantage in the culture” (41). In attaching this character trait to Johnson foremost, Boswell
locates a dominant characteristic of Johnson to which all of the character traits were subject to
varying degrees: “To Boswell . . . Johnson’s malady was not a threat to his overall sanity, and
possibly part of his genius . . . Depressives are often credited with extraordinary abilities,
especially creative genius” (Lawlor 42). By foregrounding this trait and its implications for
Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell establishes a frame for Johnson, the sort of genius embodied by and
evident in the actions of a social philosopher, critic, and author. The “grievous affect,” likewise,
casts Johnson’s selfhood in more recognizable and ready sympathetic relationship to the reader.
A characteristic melancholy is fundamental to any representation of Johnson’s character
in Boswell’s arrangement. At the end of the Life, Boswell blames Johnson’s melancholy for his
“sallies of impatience and passion at any time . . . and allowance must be made for his uttering
hasty and satirical sallies, even against his best friends” (Life iv.427). Throughout the Life,
however, Johnson’s melancholy plays different roles. In 1729 when he was twenty, Johnson’s
melancholy drew toward a Lockean reflexivity: “upon the first violent attack of this disorder,
strove to overcome it by forcible exertions. He frequently walked . . . and tried many other
expedients, but all in vain,” and Boswell notes that “[h]is expression concerning it to me was, ‘I
did not then know how to manage it’” (Life i.64). For Johnson, melancholy requires a degree of
introspective self-management that defines selfhood. Boswell describes Johnson’s treatment as a
means of self-management. He drafted a diagnosis of his mental state in Latin so thorough that it
impressed a doctor of his acquaintance (Life i.65). Not only does Johnson’s melancholy shape
the man, but it also allows the man to shape himself: scientifically, through self-observation,
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experimentation, and self-diagnosis, Johnson’s selfhood is given definition by the melancholic
character Boswell assigns.
The melancholy that Boswell attributes to Johnson did not only direct his attention
inward, as a means of self-definition, but also directed his attention outward, as Johnson makes
plain in his advice to Boswell, advice that he cites from Robert Burton.74 In letter dated October
27, 1779, Johnson enjoins Boswell to follow the “great direction which Burton has left to men
disordered like you . . . Be not solitary; be not idle: which I would thus modify;—If you are idle,
be not solitary; if you are solitary, be not idle” in order to “keep away the black dog that worries
you at home” (Life iii.414). Likewise, he advises Boswell to “[f]ix your thoughts upon your
business, fill your intervals with company, and sunshine will again break on your mind” (Life
ii.423). Each piece of advice assumes that melancholy is a trait that does not bind Johnson in the
static, deterministic manner that Theophrastan characters are bound by a single trait. The
expectations readers had for Theophrastan character or their contemporary, periodical essays,
assigned a particular character trait to a persona, not to psychologize a character trait, but rather
to humanize it, as Oliver Goldsmith humanizes the public reputation of Richard Nash in his
biography, turning his characteristic affectation into the character of the king. J. W. Smeed
explains that, in these constructions, the external attribute the traditional character type exhibits
gives indication of and insight into what it means to be driven by a singular character attribute
(4). Unlike character writing that assigns a single, definitive characteristic to a particular
character, biographical writing depends on a complex arrangement of the characteristics most
definitive of a self. For the biographer, a singular character trait can lend definition and
continuity to a rhetoric of self, in part like the Lockean definition of the self—the perpetuation of
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Johnson once acknowledged to Boswell that “Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy . . . was the only book that ever
took him out of bed two hours sooner than he wished to rise” (Life ii.121).
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self-consciousness. But Locke’s definition requires a self-consciousness and the characteristics
that mark it to persist over time, whereas the character of Theophrastan character writing of the
short, eighteenth-century periodical piece exists situationally. In the matrix that Boswell
establishes, a set of character traits create a context that lasts over the course of Johnson’s life.
Johnson’s melancholy, by contrast, is a trait that is part of a matrix, which invites a
dynamic response from Johnson’s selfhood. He is not definitively melancholic, but he has been
melancholic; he is affected by his melancholy, but he knows how to counter it and ultimately to
balance it. The advice Johnson offers Boswell reveals the intervention of another of the ten traits,
Johnson’s love to study (Life i.43-6). By showing Johnson applying studiousness to resolve
melancholy, Boswell creates a context that invites a reader to draw conclusions about Johnson
that inform their own understanding of themselves, their own characteristics in flux in relation to
each other and the larger context of the Life. Rhetorically, Boswell’s arrangement juxtaposes
traits that frame Johnson’s selfhood, even though their juxtaposition is not chronological. In
Boswell’s Johnson, the reader sees the “human nature” that Boswell ascribes to the fundamental
contradiction in selfhood. A view of the contradictions marks an increasingly modern,
psychological sense of self that sets Boswell’s apart from the eighteenth-century precedents.
Johnson’s suggestion for treating melancholy gives his characteristic melancholy a
different context in relation to the other ten traits Boswell establishes at the outset of the
biography, Johnson’s impulse toward education and learning (Life i.43-6). This attribute
becomes evident in Johnson’s love of study even as a young man, ranging from teachers like
Dame Oliver, who once gave Johnson “a present of gingerbread” and told him that he “was the
best scholar she ever had” to teachers like Mr. Hawkins, “a man . . . very skillful in his little
way,” or Mr. Hunter, the headmaster who, as Johnson later recalls, “beat us unmercifully; and he
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did not distinguish between ignorance and negligence” (Life i.42, 43). As a contrast to Johnson’s
later love of learning, these recollections might seem unremarkable, but their import lies in the
significance Boswell assigns them in order to establish the character trait in Johnson. The value
Johnson places on learning endures the range of contexts in which it occurs early in his life, such
that he later asserts that the overly-strict discipline of Mr. Hunter made his great learning
possible: he comments “[m]y master whipt me very well. Without that, Sir, I should have done
nothing” (Life i.45-6). This combination of study and adversity lends itself as a natural check to
Johnson’s melancholy, revealing his selfhood as something located between both.
Within this character matrix between melancholy and study, melancholy becomes an
adversity that can be addressed by study, since “a boy at school was the happiest of human
beings” (Life i.451). The study itself, he suggests, is less important than the quality of being
studious: a person troubled by “constitutional melancholy” should, according to Johnson, “take a
course of chymistry, or a course of rope-dancing, or a course of any thing to which he is inclined
at the time. Let him contrive to have as many retreats for his mind as he can, as many things to
which it can fly from itself” (Life ii.440). Two qualities of the ten Boswell establishes set in
context with one another rings of Goldsmith’s Nash—is Beau Nash to be remembered or
understood as the leading fop of Bath or as its feckless, foolish monarch? Does Boswell mean for
Johnson to be a glowering depressive or a distracted scholar or simply a bit of both? The
character matrix Boswell sets up at the outset of the life, however, introduces other
considerations that complicate a reader’s understanding of Johnson’s selfhood, which challenge
the reader to draw hard conclusions from indeterminate facts. Boswell shows Johnson’s
constitutional melancholy as trait checked but, ironically, complemented by Johnson’s
religiosity, a quality that Boswell ascribes to Johnson’s mother, to whom “must be ascribed those
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early impressions of religion . . . from which the world afterwards derived so much benefit” (Life
i.38). The public benefit of Johnson’s religious character for the “world” is evident in his
writings—Boswell, after all, reads the Rambler as work of great moral and religious acumen—
but is especially evident in Johnson’s personal meditations and prayers, documents in which
Boswell situates Johnson’s piety.
Boswell cites almost twenty prayers that Johnson recorded in his personal Prayers and
Meditations throughout the Life. He notes that at the outset of 1777, for instance, “Johnson
suffered much from a state of mind ‘unsettled and perplexed,’ and from that constitutional
gloom,” even though Boswell suggests that “Johnson . . . at this time suffered less than usual
from despondency” (Life v.98 and n. 1). He cites a prayer Johnson composed on Easter that year:
“Defend me from the violent incursion of evil thoughts, and enable me to form and keep
resolutions as may conduce to the discharge of duties which Providence shall appoint me, and so
help me by thy Holy Spirit, that my heart may sure there be fixed where true joys are to be
found, and that I may serve Thee with pure affection and a cheerful mind” (Johnson, Diaries
265). Boswell cites this prayer to demonstrate an instance of Johnson’s piety: Johnson’s prayer
indicates a religious character that is both humble and dutiful. But it also indicates his selfhood
most clearly within the matrix created by the conflict between two different character traits that
Boswell has established to frame Johnson. The humility and duty that mark Johnson’s piety
provide a check to melancholy and its “violent incursion of evil thoughts.” The character that
Boswell ascribes to his Johnson is not merely the speculative, but rather the practical moralist,
who applies belief to the challenges his life and selfhood present.
As a check to his melancholy, Johnson’s religiosity paradoxically exacerbates it. Boswell
locates Johnson’s print character in the tension between these traits. Boswell lumps together a
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list of Johnson’s religious meditations in December 1784 of the Life, a month before Johnson’s
death, to illustrate the dual roles that religiosity played in defining Johnson’s character, both the
“distress of mind” and the “penitence of Johnson . . . in his devout approaches to his Maker”
(Life iv.398). At various points in his life, Johnson had prayed “that I may not have been created
to be finally destroyed” and that God “[g]ive me such a sense of my own wickedness as may
produce true contrition and effectual repentance” (Life iv.397). Johnson’s prayers illustrate a
cycle in which he abrades his conscience with a heightened sense of his own wrongdoing
towards a particular notion of Christian repentance that requires a sincere and often severe selfexamination in order to beg forgiveness for all of the sins he observed. Johnson invests this
anxiety over a “true contrition and effectual repentance” during life “so that when I shall be
called into another state, I may be received among the sinners to whom sorrow and reformation
have obtained pardon” (Life iv.397-8). The fear of death and the hope of “pardon” drive this
cycle of religious thinking which offers a sense of solace, particularly to melancholic reflections,
balanced by a constant anxiety that, paradoxically, drives melancholic reflection. Katherine
Kickel examines the formulaic practices that Johnson evokes in his prayers and mediations,
noting how his prayer and meditation evolves from stricter Catholic and Anglican meditative
models to practices more suited to his selfhood: “[f]or Johnson, meditation is a self-sustaining,
self-consolatory tool as much as it is a rigorous, discursive self-examination . . . [that] allows him
to take leave of himself by reminding him of the unknowableness of God’s plan and by
subsuming him in the notion of Providence.” (53). Johnson must dwell intensely on his
shortcomings and failures in order take leave of itself and find consolation in religiosity. It is a
“meditative method” that depends on “sympathetic and psychological models” which are
“extemporaneous, intimate, and consolatory” (Kickle 54). The meditative process situates
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Johnson’s selfhood at the intersection of what must be a melancholic self-examination and its
religious check. Such intersections typify the selfhood that Boswell situates in the complex
matrix of ten character traits that he establishes for Johnson and indicate a Lockean selfreflexiveness mediated through documented reflections, to which Johnson can return for future
self-reflection.
While he does locate Johnson’s selfhood within the matrix of character attributes he
assigns to Johnson at the outset of the Life, Boswell qualifies their expression. Johnson’s
melancholy and religiosity play against each other, given to a variable, flexible exertion rather
than the deterministic treatment of character in older forms of life writing. While Boswell often
locates instances of Johnson’s religiosity, he is quick to note when Johnson’s strict practice
failed. He cites a list Johnson proposed in his Prayers and Meditations in order to improve
himself and “form a scheme of life” that might correct his mistake in “[h]aving lived hitherto in
perpetual neglect of publick worship & though for some years past not without a habitual
reverence for the Sabbath yet without that attention to its religious duties which Christianity
requires” (Diaries 56). Yet Boswell heads Johnson’s list for religious improvement with
Johnson’s last comment following the list: “[t]his study was not pursued” (Life i.303). Somewhat
later in the life, Boswell also notes that Johnson sought to make a “change of outward things”
and prayed, “[g]rant me the grace of thy Holy Spirit, that the course which I am not beginning
may proceed according to thy laws, and end in the enjoyment of thy favor,” but in the end, “did
not, in fact, make any external or visible change” (Life i.350).75 Boswell locates Johnson’s
selfhood within these instances of his piety, and also demonstrates that Johnson’s selfhood is not
75

Editor George Birkbeck Hill traces what Boswell could not discern, concluding that the change Johnson sought
was in his economy—Johnson had incurred some debt that required him to move and write in order to cover his
expenses (Life i.350 n.3). Though Johnson’s problem might seem more secular than religious, it is more significant
that Johnson appealed to his faith in helping to resolve his financial complications. Boswell’s observation prioritizes
this impulse over its application to finances.
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rigidly attached or defined by a unique character trait. Johnson’s selfhood is clarified by his
religiosity not because of his perfect piety but in his ultimate failure to adhere to the goals he
established for himself and his practice of religion. He is capable of containing the religious
character without being determined by it, as he would have been in the Theophrastan model that
Goldsmith had adopted in relaying the life of Nash.
The depiction of variability rather than firm resolve in Johnson’s religious character
makes Boswell’s Johnson vulnerable to damning interpretation. Inconstancy in faith and
religious practice would, for instance, render Johnson a hypocritical moralist, a hollow Mr.
Rambler. Boswell is quick to acknowledge the importance of resolving this tension by the end of
the Life, and he is “conscious that this is the most difficult and dangerous part of my work, and I
cannot but be very anxious concerning it. I trust that I have got through it, preserving at once my
regard to truth,—to my friend—, and to the interests of virtue and religion. Nor can I apprehend
that more harm can ensue from the knowledge of the irregularity of Johnson, guarded as I have
stated it” (Life iv.398). To reconcile Johnson’s “irregularity” against the “interests of virtue and
religion,” Boswell implies the character matrix that allows different character traits to coexist
and contradict each other to deepen and clarify Johnson’s selfhood, and he reminds the reader
that “[i]t is of essential consequence to keep in view, that there was in this excellent man’s
conduct no false principle of commutation, no deliberate indulgence in sin, in consideration of a
counterbalance of duty. His offending, and his repenting, were distinct and separate” (Life
iv.398). The tension between “offending” and “repenting” evidences an intersection between an
“indulgence in sin” that comes naturally to Johnson rather than deliberately, as well as a selfconscious habit of repentance that is “distinct and separate” but equally as characteristic of
Johnson’s self.
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The impetus to defend his Johnson against charges of inconstancy or immorality derives
from two reasons crucial to Boswell’s biographical project. First, Boswell promises a
methodology from the outset that will present the ten character traits at play so that Johnson’s
selfhood is variable but also coherent, evident “from various points, by which his character is
more fully understood and illustrated” (Life i.30). Inconstancy would undermine the productive
tension between an authentically Johnsonian selfhood that can accommodate conflicting
character traits, and it would suggest a singularity of character as if Boswell had reduced Johnson
to caricature. Boswell’s defense, then, reaffirms his model and protects his Johnson against
misreading and misattributions, so that the “character of SAMUEL JOHNSONS has, I trust, been
so developed in the course of this work, that they who have honoured it with a perusal, may be
considered as well acquainted with him” (Life iv.424-5). The terms Boswell sets for
acquaintance depend on a distinct variability in character traits which readers can recognize as
Johnsonsian, even when they are at odds with each other in Johnson’s behaviors and actions.
Second, Boswell’s impulse to defend his method against inconstancy and immorality
highlights how Boswell’s model fosters the reader’s intimate “acquaintance” with Johnson’s
selfhood. It is a defense of the tension between contradictory character traits, which results in a
didactic productivity, a Johnsonizing capability. Charges of inconstancy or immorality would
imply an inaccuracy that would undermine the Johnsonian quality of Boswell’s rhetoric of self
and, in turn, its didactic potential: a reader cannot locate a Johnsonian character to emulate
without an accurate model of Johnson. In fact, the charge of inaccuracy is Boswell’s most
damning criticism of John Hawkins and Hester Piozzi’s biographical accounts of Johnson. He
recalls Johnson’s censure of outright falsehood, though it might seem to be harmless inaccuracy,
in a review of the “Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope,” and he notes that if Johnson
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“[h]ad . . . lived to read what Sir John Hawkins and Mrs. Piozzi have related concerning himself,
how much would he have found his observation illustrated” (Life iii.229-30). The inaccuracy he
finds in their account is tantamount to a lie, contrary to the in inconstancy and immorality, which
threatens to mislead a reader and marks the biographers as utterly ignorant of Johnson’s
conversation. Boswell notes that Johnson “inculcated upon all his friends the importance of
perpetual vigilance against the slightest degrees of falsehood; the effect of which . . . has been,
that all who were of his school are distinguished for a love of truth and accuracy” (Life iii.22930). As a member of Johnson’s conversational “school,” Boswell arranges a rhetoric of self more
accurate than others, immune to charges of inconstancy and immorality. Boswell justifies the
importance of accuracy by citing what Johnson censures outright as falsehood or inaccuracy.
What Boswell deems Johnson’s school, the conversations among like-minded friends and
followers with Johnson, demands that the didactic quality of Johnson’s public works meet the
diversity of character traits that try his principles and engage the reader more intimately than
older life writing or the biographical approaches from earlier in the eighteenth century. The
matrix of character traits makes the morally towering, public icon Johnson a fallible human on
whom the trials and difficulties of his constitution could nonetheless provide an arena in which
to prove his credibility and the success of Boswell’s task of making Johnson whole. Moreover,
Boswell’s depiction of contradictory quality of Johnson’s personal traits and flaws gives an
intimate continuity past the simple paratextual or epistolary apparatus within which Boswell
situates Johnson’s selfhood. Like the epistolary points of engagement, the character matrix
invites readerly sympathy that involves them in the Johnson project, potentially “Johnsonizing”
them. Boswell’s defense of the character matrix he presents is a defense of the distinctly
sympathetic turn in his representation of selfhood, which invites readers to explore what could be
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known about Johnson in order to determine what they could understand about his character and,
sympathetically, about themselves. The didactic upshot of Boswell’s intimate representation of
Johnson’s conversation is that readers are connected together in a larger discussion of social
truths, the larger goal of the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self.

Johnson’s School: Truth and Victory in a Conversational Locus
The most didactic aspect of the selfhood that Boswell arranges for Johnson in the Life is
the conversational record. It might be easy to take Boswell’s biographical approach to task for
the disparity between his records of Johnson’s lived experience and his recounting of his own
experiences with Johnson’s conversation, but that would be to miss the masterful dialectic he
created. Boswell, after all, evokes the “Johnsonian æther” rather than a Johnsonian exactitude
which “strongly impregnated” his “mind” as a biographer to shape how he would represent
Johnson’s conversation and selfhood (Life i.421). Boswell’s biography is undeniably meticulous
in its fact finding according to the scientific standards of observation and publication instituted
by the Royal Society, but Boswell’s great affective accomplishment was to connect readers to
Johnson’s character through his conversation in order to Johnsonise them. Boswell probes
beyond the careful architecture of fact, timeframe, and proof in detail to bring readers the chance
to commune with Johnson. Where Hawkins was too distanced and Piozzi too problematically
chatty, Boswell surpasses these problems in a work of magisterial research to earn for himself
and to give to his readers the right to “meet” Johnson.
The latter twenty-one years of the Life are based more directly on Boswell’s own
interactions with Johnson after their first encounter. In this section, chronological distinctions
become almost irrelevant, giving way to Johnson’s conversational and literary performances.
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After the dated precision, the conversational flow provides the rhetorical effect of arriving,
finally, at the “real” Johnson. Boswell met Johnson in 1763 and visited him and corresponded
with him intermittently until his death in 1784 at age 75: the bulk of Johnson’s life comprises
roughly a fifth of Boswell’s Life. Boswell’s explanation of his method, however, balances such
criticism against the sympathetic exchange that his biography allows between the reader and
Johnson’s selfhood. Boswell recognizes the “the objections which may be made to the
minuteness on some occasions of . . . [his] detail of Johnson’s conversation, and how happily it is
adapted for the petty exercise of ridicule, by men of superficial understanding and ludicrous
fancy” (Life i.33, 31). As a biographical method, recording “the conversation of a celebrated
man, if his talents have been exerted in conversation, will best display his character” is empirical,
allowing the reader to construct a character from the matrix of traits revealed through “minute
particulars” of his speech and life (Life i. 31, 33). For this reason, Boswell occasionally
apologizes to his audience for an imperfect recollection of Johnson’s conversation (Life iii.39).76
But even that apology is a gesture to something more real than fact, to the experimental,
sympathetic encounter with Johnson the man. The tension between empirical fact and affective,
sympathetic exchange fundamentally shapes the Life.
Given how prominent and definitive of the Life conversation proves to be, an easy
criticism is to argue that the Life depends too much on recollection and interpretation rather than
precise transcription that might insure accuracy and veracity. From a practical perspective, John
J. Burke, Jr. reminds that such challenges to Boswell’s precision essentially hold him
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In this instance of Boswell’s apology, he notes that since his “record upon this occasion does great injust to
Johnson’s expression, which was forcible and brilliant, that Mr. Cradock [a participant in the conversation]
whispered me, ‘O that his words were written in a book!’” (Life iii.39). Though Mr. Cradock is hardly a presence in
the Life, Boswell cites his comment as a tacit endorsement of his biographical project: if a man who would be littleremembered save for Boswell’s recollection can recognize the value of Johnson’s conversation, any reader of any
consequence might be expected to do the same.
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accountable to an impossible task, since perfect transcription of conversation and communicative
gestures would be impossible (70). Likewise, Paul J. Korshin suggests as well that a strict
attention of transcriptional accuracy did not concern early readers or the speakers who Boswell
includes: “few if any of the people whose conversations Boswell created for the Life are known
to have complained about their accuracy” (186). He finds a corollary in the “speeches that
Johnson wrote for members of Parliament and which the Gentleman’s Magazine published as
‘Debates in the Senate of Magna Lilliputia’ [which] actually happened, too, just not the way
Johnson invented them. No members or the Lords or Commons were ever recorded as objecting
to the invention of their speeches” (186). Korshin’s reading points to the significance of an
appreciation for the conversation outside the pale of strict (and impossible) precision.
Boswell subjected the Johnsonian æther to other, more didactic rules of authenticity that
precise transcripts of conversation. William R. Siebenschuh answers such criticisms with the
rhetorical outcome that guides Boswell’s technique. Johnson’s conversations, he demonstrates,
“are always important in some greater context, and because their importance lies outside
themselves in the truth about Johnson they represent. In the Life, it is Boswell’s interpretation of
Johnson’s character that we are seeing . . . it is what he stands for, not just what he looked or
sounded like” (Fictional 83). Korshin’s and Siebenschuh’s defenses of Boswell’s conversational
record privilege the role of the reader in determining Boswell’s accuracy at recreating
conversation in Johnson’s school. For the reader, the conversational practices and topics that
become evident in Boswell’s portrayal hold more significance than a spoken exactitude in the
ways they invite the reader to participate.
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The school of Johnson that Boswell depicts is a discursive school, and the didactic effect
of spectating and judging Johnson’s selfhood depends on a reader’s personal participation with
the conversational Johnson:
I am justified in preserving rather too many of Johnson’s sayings, than too few;
especially as from the diversity of dispositions it cannot be known with certainty
beforehand, whether what may seem trifling to some, and perhaps to the collector
himself, may not be most agreeable to many; and the greater number that an
authour can please in any degree, the more pleasure does there arise to a
benevolent mind. (Life i.33-4)
The “diversity of dispositions” that leads readers to take pleasure in different aspects of
Johnson’s character, even from seemingly “trifling” sayings, emphasizes the importance that
Boswell places on a sympathetic exchange that occurs when the reader is in the presence of
Johnson at a conversational locus. In this sympathetic exchange between readers and Johnson’s
character in this experience, Boswell achieves a didactic effect that William Johnson Temple
recognizes: “We think we see him and hear him and are equally entertained whether he contend
for Truth or for Victory” (Correspondence 328). In these two manners of contention, for “truth”
and for “victory,” Johnson educates the reader, who enters the intimate circle of Johnson’s
conversational acquaintance. First, in talking for victory, Johnson exhibits a conversational
model that emphasizes victory as, most important, thinking, reasoning, and arguing for oneself.
The model depends on a specific set of values that Boswell records in the conversation: it is
intimate, so that spectating readers can engage Johnson’s print person; it is substantive, ripe for
inquiry and contention, developing the strength of argument necessary for participation; it is
open to different perspectives, which invites voices to participate; and it depends on civility.
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Second, in speaking for truth, he invites them to apply the lessons they learn in arguing for
victory to evaluate Johnson’s own evaluations as a member of the larger public. The intimate
conversation that frames talking for victory builds toward participation in larger public
discourses surrounding truth. The conversational model works like the reading habits of private
reader who, through reading, becomes part of a larger, discursive community of readers. Thus
Boswell advances the eighteenth-century biographical process established by Johnson and
Goldsmith, developing their spectatorial model and didactic impetus into a more intimate, more
engaging, and more truthful representation of selfhood in print. Simply put, Boswell makes the
process of biographical didacticism more intimate by portraying a talking Johnson who speaks
with and to the reader.
The effectiveness of Boswell’s didacticism depends on the degree that his biography can
close the distance between this observing audience and the Johnson of the Life. Boswell’s
obligation to this methodological imperative is evident in a manuscript77 where he notes that
“[w]e cannot help receiving other peoples [sic] thoughts with whom we are brought near enough
to communicate either in conversation or by reading what they write no more than we can help
inhaling breath which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company . . . We must
receive other peoples [sic] thoughts both crude & well digested” (Boswell ms. 69.3). His
representation must put readers “near enough” to Johnson to incorporate Johnson’s character into
their own, by “inhaling” his character, “receiving” it, “digesting” it and ultimately, coming to
think it for themselves. Boswell’s composition of his Johnson and its arrangement allow readers
not only to spectate the selfhood, but especially to internalize it and be “Johnsonised” by it (Life
i.13). Boswell closes the distance between the spectating reader and the biographical character
matrix in which Johnson’s selfhood can be discovered by setting the reader in Johnson’s
77

I have cited manuscript ms. M 69:3 previously on page 204 of this dissertation.
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presence, a position that has to be earned and that only takes on its power through the empirical
scaffolding of the Life.
Methodologically, Boswell faces a biographical paradox of maintaining continuity
through diverse conversational contexts: over drinks and dinner at Johnson’s favorite pub, the
Mitre, or in Johnson’s sitting room at his home, and in the sitting room at Tom Davies’ shop, or
in Henry Thrale’s drawing room, as well as other locations. Siebenschuh has linked Boswell’s
recollection of these physical sites as memory markers, tricks he used to make a mental note of
what he would add to his journals and, in revision, to the Life, noting that “Johnsonian episodes”
are framed by “Boswell’s habitual method of minimally anchoring . . . substantial conversations .
. . in space and time,” but also by associating “familiar small group[s of] particular people . . .
with points of view and conversational topics habitual to them” (“Crop” 101, 102). Boswell’s
scanty attention to location and his translation of speakers into conversational topics emphasizes
the conversational focus of the episodes and gives them a continuity that is more accessible for
readers who could only participate in the conversations biographically, slipping in and out of the
exchanges, since they cannot meet Johnson face-to-face through print. More significant is the
“illusion. . . throughout the biographical story” which William C. Dowling recognizes: “that the
Life includes its imaginary audience in the conversational scenes, that the audience is present . . .
[n]ot physically present . . . but present within the sphere of consciousness registering and
responding to Johnson’s conversation” (Logos 101). By reading the drama of Johnson’s
conversation rather than simply witnessing it, readers can imagine themselves as part of the
conversation, inserting themselves somewhat voyeuristically, “enabled as it were to see him live,
and to ‘live o’er each scene’ with him, as he actually advanced through the several stages of life”
(Life i.30). The role Boswell casts for his readers is participatory, albeit imagined.
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Not only does Boswell’s task lead him to present a Johnson who can engage the reader in
conversation, but also to fictionalize a reader who can participate through observation and
conversation with that biographical Johnson. Walter Ong has suggested that “[i]f the writer
succeeds in writing, it is generally because he can fictionalize in his imagination an audience that
he has learned to know not from daily life but from earlier writers who were fictionalizing in
their imagination audiences they had learned to know in still earlier writers” (Interfaces 60). The
reader’s role that Boswell scripts through conversations with Johnson is the role of actor, and he
outlines an actor’s role or profession in three essays he published anonymously in the London
Magazine fourteen years before Johnson’s death in 1784. In the second essay of this series,
Boswell interrogates the way in which actors can be the characters they play while still being
themselves, noting that “[i]t is sure not only an object of taste to study theatrical representations,
but it may be a matter of very curious philosophical enquiry. What is the nature of that peculiar
faculty which makes one a good player? It is something more than an imitative art”
(“Profession” 468). Boswell is taking up the questions that John Locke poses in Book II of An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, whether the integrity of the self, a consciousness
aware of itself over time, persists in sleep when it is unconscious of its waking self (2.1.12-25).
Boswell’s focus, however, is on a theatrical self-awareness which can adopt another self while
simultaneously keeping actual selfhood in reserve. This “peculiar faculty” is much “more than an
imitative art.”
In theorizing the role of the player, Boswell imagines the reader in a much more intimate
role than the distant spectating of earlier biography and older print selves. He suggests that “the
nature of that mysterious power by which a player really is the character which he represents,”
even though the player maintains the true self, is “a kind of double feeling. He must assume in a
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strong degree the character which he represents, while at the same time retains the consciousness
of his own character” (“Profession” 469). In order for this “double feeling” to function, the
player “must take full possession as it were of the antichamber of his mind, while his own
character remains in the innermost recess” (“Profession” 470). While Boswell locates this
function in the profession of a player, he is quick to note that it is a regular part of everyday life,
manifesting itself anytime a person must take part in a birthday celebration, tour a person’s
home, or attend a funeral (“Profession” 470). This double feeling then, like Smith’s sympathetic
exchange, hinges on some sense of social obligation and of shaping selfhood to match social
situations. Boswell’s biographical conversation casts the reader in the role of a participant, and
the reader, in turn, acts out the role, while maintaining self-awareness through this “double
feeling.” The reader observes Johnson’s print selfhood, following the expectations of earlier
eighteenth-century biographers, but Boswell makes them participants in the episodic drama of
Johnson’s conversation. Dialogue is crucial to this process, in which the reader imagines him or
herself in conversation with Johnson through Boswell, theatrical double-agent.
The intimacy of conversation positions the reader didactically to follow Johnson in his
reasoning, like a friend or a member of the Literary Club.78 Johnson’s conversation allows
intimate access to the selfhood Boswell presents. When Johnson talks for truth and for victory,
he impresses his selfhood upon the reader, a fictionalized acquaintance and spectator, who is
“brought near enough to communicate either in conversation or by reading” and, through the
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Boswell’s contemporary, William Elford praised Boswell’s conversational representation: “instead of describing
Your characters, You exhibit them to the Reader. He finds himself in their Company, and becomes an Auditor of
Conversations, which have all the dignity of the best moral writings, softn’d by the ease, the wit and the familiarity
of Colloloquial manners” (Correspondence 367). To be a reader is be an auditor, a participant who engages the ideas
that Johnson expresses with the easy “familiarity of colloquial manners.: Paul J. Korshin has suggested that
instances of “true Johnsonian conversation . . . represent a minority, a very small minority of Johnson’s talk” in the
Life, noting that he has “counted about fifty of them in all” (177). John J. Burke has divided Boswell’s records of
conversation into three types, talk, dialog, and conversation, delineating each by how much they invite discourse and
by how many they invite to participate (66). Each type allows readers varying degrees of intimate access to Johnson.
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force, eloquence, and reasonableness of Johnson’s conversation, cannot “help inhaling breath
which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company” (Boswell ms. 69.3).
Johnson’s intimate conversational “breath,” which the reader “inhales” by participation, is least
“crude” and most “well digested” when Johnson talks for victory or for truth. Johnson models a
thought process that teaches readers to reason socially and morally and introduces social and
moral issues into the conversational discourse that moves beyond the pale of personal, aroundthe-table dispute into a larger social discourse. By engaging his Johnson and his readers through
conversation, Boswell effects a larger social and ethical training; he Johnsonizes the land.
The conversational locus around which Boswell places his readers and in which Johnson
can talk for victory has several telling features. Johnson famously draws a distinction between
conversation and mundane talk when he recalls a dinner “in a very pretty company” in which
they “had talk enough, but no conversation; there was nothing discussed” (Life iv.186). The
conversation that Johnson prized and that Boswell opened to readers for their instruction was
elevated above common “talk” as a thorough treatment of substantive topics by able minds. Such
a discursive model required four attributes on the part of the participant:
Talking of conversation . . . [Johnson] said, “There must, in the first place, be
knowledge, there must be materials; in the second place, there must be a
command of words; in the third place, there must be imagination, to place things
in such views as they are not commonly seen in; and in the fourth place, there
must be presence of mind, and a resolution that is not be overcome by failures:
this last is an essential requisite; for want of it many people do not excel in
conversation. (Life iv.166).
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The attributes that Johnson assigns to the participant correlate to the attributes of Boswell’s
readers. The biography makes readers more than spectators. They are silent participants in a
Johnsonian conversation who must bring their own knowledge to bear on the discussions that
Boswell portrays, who can follow the intellectual articulation and rhetorical structuring of the
arguments, who can imagine alternatives to the argument that allow reflection, and who can
persist in following the lines of biographically documented and personally constructed argument,
perhaps to victorious disputation.
Although these skills seem situational, Boswell’s representation of Johnson show them to
fundamental to the practices of self-examination and self-awareness that, upon engaging another
person’s selfhood, makes sympathy didactic. Readers must be able to engage the discursive
model in the biography with the same facility they would approach the conversations in
Johnson’s presence. For the four rules that Johnson establishes to guide conversation,
participants must embody traits: first, conversationalists must be knowledgeable; second, they
must be willing to adopt and consider contrary viewpoints disinterestedly; and, third, the adept
conversationalist who engage Johnson must be civil. Speakers who learn converse at Johnson’s
elbow teach themselves to participate in larger social discourses of the day. They not only talk
for local, conversational victories, but especially to talk for larger social truth within a
conversational discourse that requires personal knowledge, personal disinterest, and civility to
address and answer the larger social questions of the day.
The importance of knowledge and discernment are necessary for engaging the
conversation. And the necessity is best exemplified in Johnson’s relationship with two of the
Literary Club’s members, Edmund Burke and Oliver Goldsmith. Johnson praises Burke who
comes into the biographical account slightly more than Goldsmith, but much less conspicuously:
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“[t]hat fellow calls forth all my powers. Were I to see Burke now, it would kill me,” pointing out
that a conversationalist could “[t]ake up whatever topick . . . [and] he is ready to meet you” (Life
iv.19-20, ii.450). Burke has the knowledge, rhetorical ability, imagination, and tenacity to
challenge Johnson. Goldsmith, on the other hand, is man whose “misfortune . . . in conversation
is thus: he goes on without knowing how he is to get off. His genius is great, but his knowledge
is small” (Life ii.196). Goldsmith’s knowledge disqualifies him for success and, worse still, his
“for ever attempting to shine in conversation: he has not temper for it, he is so much mortified
when he fails” (Life ii.231). Boswell suggests that Goldsmith skill in talking was better suited to
“witty contests” and “often very fortunate when he entered the lists with Johnson himself” (Life
ii.231). Such skill does not qualify him as the sort of conversationalist Johnson had in mind.
Adept at wordplay, but lacking in knowledge, Goldsmith is model of a speaker who cannot talk
for victory.
To gain conversational victory, readers were subject to the conversational locus, a site of
contest that depends on variety and a willingness to consider and adopt different views and
arguments. The ability to consider and adopt opposing views marks a sympathy that Johnson’s
rhetoric of self commands from his readers and, when they inhale his thoughts, intimates into
their practice. Boswell relates an anecdote of a time when Johnson’s bristled at Goldsmith’s wish
“for some additional memories to the LITERARY CLUB, to give it an agreeable variety” (Life
iv. 183). Johnson took this as a personal attack rather than a disputational attack (although
Johnson himself was not above ad hominem arguments), but later relented, acknowledging that
Goldsmith was right:
[W]hen people have lived a great deal together, they know what each of them will
say on every subject. A new understanding, therefore, is desirable; because
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though it may only furnish the same sense upon a question which would have
been furnished by those with we are accustomed to live, yet this sense will have a
different colouring; and colouring is of much effect in every thing else as well as
in painting. (Life iv.183)
Johnson’s depiction of the conversational contest as a “painting” makes it an organic whole that
comes together through speakers “will say on every subject.” It is a self-contained work of art
that derives its beauty from its diversity, the “different colourings” that different speakers
contribute. Johnson’s acknowledgement of Goldsmith is an invitation to participate that,
recorded in the Life, is likewise an invitation for a reader to bring a different “sense” to the
intimacy of conversation. In the contest of the conversational locus, Johnson’s argumentation
models a means of empirically observing other perspectives in order to consider them and
carefully draw judgments about them.79 In this way, readers come into Johnson’s biographical
presence through his conversation in a didactic exchange, which teaches them to move beyond
the record of Johnson’s lived experience and life into their own lives and experience, where they
must enter the larger social discourse.
The contest of conversation in Boswell’s Life requires, additionally, a degree of civility
that perpetuates it by fostering intimacy between participants. In exercising the force and
dexterity of this argumentative acumen, Johnson demonstrates a gruffness that complements and,
sometimes, makes victory possible. Boswell, however, offers an anecdote which models the
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The variety that adds depth to the conversational locus also affords a participant or a reader the opportunity to
consider a variety of opinions. Boswell interprets this approach in Johnson frequently, so that Johnson’s willingness
to argue an opinion “even when he had taken the wrong side,” by adopting an opinion he did not believe, in order
“to shew the force and dexterity of his talents” (Life iv.111). But Johnson’s participation in the contest was not
simply to argue for the sake of argument. Boswell emphasizes an important distinction by pointing out that “[c]are .
. . must be taken to distinguish between Johnson when he ‘talked for victory,’ and Johnson when he had no desire
but to inform and illustrate” (Life iv.111). Johnson, like Boswell’s professional player, is able to hold himself in
reserve to make an argument opposed to his own beliefs and opinions. Johnson’s approach illustrates a productive
playfulness.
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civility that can facilitate the conversation when it carries beyond the boundaries of considered,
social inquiry. Boswell recalls a “dispute pretty late at night, in which Johnson would not give
up, though he had the wrong side, and in short, both kept field. Next morning, when they met in
the breakfasting-room, Dr. Johnson accosted . . . [him]: ‘Sir, I have been thinking on our dispute
last night—You were in the right” (Life iv.192). Boswell glosses this anecdote with an additional
recollection of Johnson’s arguing in the evening and apologizing in the morning: “Sir, I have
found out, upon reflection, that I was both warm and wrong in my argument with you last night;
for the first of which I beg your pardon, and for the second, I thank you for setting me right”
(Life iv.192 n.2). While these scenes are significant as instances contrary to Johnson’s typical
gruffness, their import is the credence they give to the pursuit of truth that victory. Truth
becomes most obvious through conversational victory and consideration, but victory will always
bow to truth. “Keeping the field” must be less important to listeners and readers, even if striving
for victory requires an apology.
The truths that Johnson and the conversationalists subject to disputation in the Life range
from childrearing, hypochondria, luxury, slavery, literature, and beyond.80 In this conversational
locus, Alvin Kernan suggests that “Johnson’s reputation as a talker supports Boswell’s claims for
the effectiveness of this style in that semiprivate world of talk which is located between the fully
public scene of oratory and the totally private scene of reading” (206). Talking for truth is an
exchange from the “public scene” of ideas and social discourse, mediated through the
“semiprivate world” of conversation by Johnson, which is, in turn, facilitated by Boswell’s
record of Johnson where it is transmitted through the “totally private scene of reading.” In
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The smaller talking points that made their way into the larger discourses, Hodge the cat or Johnson’s mysterious
chemical experiments with orange peels, cannot be left out. Their effect, too, adds variety and “colouring” to the
overall appearance of the “painting” in which Johnson locates conversation. In their small way, they invite readers
into a domestic intimacy, where Johnson’s rhetoric of self is stripped of disputatious trappings of talking for victory.
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Boswell’s account, in fact, Johnson argues that “[w]ithout truth there must be a dissolution of
society . . . Society is held together by communication and information” (Life iii.293). Kernan’s
observation points toward intimate conversational practice, exchanging the “communication and
information” that, Johnson’s argues, hold the macrocosm of public life together.
Talking through victory as an inquiry into truth begins to move readers from the intimate
microcosm of table talk into the macrocosm of social discourse. Kernan argues that
conversational move from microcosm to macrocosm is particularly evident in the “pattern of
Johnson’s speaking, talking, and reading [which] offers a lived-out model of the ways that
increased reading was affecting the society and its individual members, and an insight into how
an individual experienced the change and its psychological dynamics” (205). Reading reshaped
society by affecting the “psychological dynamics” of it readers, moving an “individual” reading
experience to social practice. The textual Johnson in conversation engages the psychological
dynamic, teaching readers how to participate in the larger social questions of the late eighteenth
century. The “psychological” and social effect of discussing truth, however, is evident in
Johnson’s famous criteria for the best conversations: “the happiest conversation is that of which
nothing is distinctly remembered but a general effect of pleasing impression” (Life iv.50).
Kernan describes the “lived-out model” that moves from reading to social work by creating a
“general effect of pleasing impression.”
It is a description of a conversation between Johnson and Bishop Percy that might easily
be applied to public discourse. First, they take up a topic, a book, “that cannot defend or explain
itself”—any discussion requires the application of knowledge, rhetoric, imagination, and
perseverance—“but here in the room emotions and tones are felt and responded to immediately.
Submission is made and reinforced with actions when the situation becomes dangerous. And

254

humor finally establishes and maintains a draw in which both antagonists give in, yet don’t
surrender” (209). To argue for victory is to think for oneself, but to argue for truth is an inquiry
that benefits society, semiprivately in a personal conversational locus and publicly. The
didacticism of Boswell’s intimate portrayal of Johnson allows the reader to move from private
observations of Johnson’s print self, to an intimate conversation with Johnson’s observed self, to
an autodidactic, experimental process whereby the reader comes to participate in the larger social
and ethical issues of the moment.
The rhetoric of self that James Boswell writes Samuel Johnson into biographically is a
didactic selfhood that builds on earlier strengths of eighteenth-century biographical models.
Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of print and manuscript culture to arrange the
experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood bound in time, but freed from the
diachronic by a synchronic continuity that makes Johnson’s selfhood seem unchanging and
intimately engaging and available to the reader. Boswell adapts Johnson’s dependence on print
but demonstrates a distinct drive to document Johnson more thoroughly than any biography had
previously documented a person. Using these documents, Boswell fashions an epistolary,
documentary, and paratextual framework for Johnson. Likewise, Boswell moves beyond Oliver
Goldsmith’s depiction of character as a Theophrastan model based on singular character,
preferring instead to make Johnson’s character evident for readers who can discover it with the
matrix of ten character traits he establishes as Johnsonian. Increasingly, the structuring that
Boswell uses invites a reader into a sympathetic exchange with Johnson’s print self.
It is the conversations that Boswell records that most explicitly distinguish Johnson’s
rhetoric of self from other biographical selfhoods. Through conversation, Boswell most fully
achieves his biographical project. In exhibiting Johnson’s lived experience and his character,
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Boswell set himself up to reveal Johnson in his conversation, through which he strove to
“Johnsonise the land.” Reading conversation situates readers to engage through listening and
speaking. Conversation informs social intercourse, which in turn shapes the discursive practices
of the larger society. The reader, who comes to talk and think Johnson by meeting the man in
print, is transformed by this conversation. As a conversational locus, Johnson’s selfhood is less a
thing to be observed than it is a presence, a person, a more intimate biographical subject than any
prior. As Boswell writes, “unless” a man “has the comfort of a friend who will oppose him in
nothing, nay will not trouble him with conversation but just as he appears to wish, watching him
with soft attention, and as much possible preserving an unison with him. In such a state, books,
which have been called silent friends, afford a kindly relief” (Hypochondriack I.148-9). The
comfort Boswell takes in biography is a comfort that, like biographical conversation with
Johnson, moves from the personal to the public: “I have generally found the reading of lives do
me most good, by withdrawing my attention of myself to others, and entertaining me in the most
satisfactory manner with real incidents in the varied course of human existence”
(Hypochondriack I.149). Perhaps the greatest test of the Life of Johnson is the potential Boswell
saw in it for himself, and perhaps this is the test of what Boswell meant for the reader.
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Conclusion

Two Bodies
Eighteenth-century biography emerged in the wide scope of a new science that privileged
experimentation and observation as the primary means for understanding the world and one’s
place in it. The emergence of the biographical form heralded an experiment in understanding the
self that was advanced by a repeated cycle of observation, conclusion, induction, and, most
importantly, personal application. Eighteenth-century biographers conducted this experiment in
print for their readers, applying a variable and adaptable set of rhetorical strategies to arrange
lived experience into a print selfhood that readers would approach ethically, inducing the
character of the subject and evaluating it sympathetically. “Readers are wiser” than “critics and
biographers,” Paula Backscheider explains, because “[t]hey know there will never be a poetics of
biography, and yet there is a there, too . . . and the importance of biography . . . is its
presentness—it is meaningful to the present, the life is, not just was, important” (227). The
“there” that is “there,” in the absence of a formal test for recognizing biography is its effect on
the reader. The effect that defines biography is a print selfhood that remains new and living
every time the book is opened, not just an assemblage of rhetorical strategies, but rather the
“presentness” and coherence of a person a reader can observe there and understand as a living
self that “is important.” When the book is closed, readers come away with an understanding of a
living self they can apply to their own self-understanding.
Biography near the close of the eighteenth century might be seen as a genre devoted
solely to the life of Samuel Johnson and to maintaining his presentness in the years after his
death. More than fifteen biographies marked his life and its passing. The two most prominent
lives, Piozzi’s and Boswell, end with the presentness of Johnson’s physical person. The two
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bodies of Johnson they submit for one final inspection by readers marks the changes in the form
that culminate in Boswell’s innovative rhetoric of self. “It is usual, I know not why, when a
character is given, to begin with a description of the person,” Hester Thrale Piozzi notes, closing
her catalog of anecdotal recollections of Samuel Johnson (Anecdotes 297). Her biographical
account necessitates a closing description and character more than others. It is comprised of
anecdotes from her recollections of the last twenty years of Johnson’s life, which require little
narrative structure, but what is necessary to set up Johnson’s sayings. Piozzi gives her readers a
body capacious enough to contain all of her anecdotes. It is a body that is almost heroic in it
physical excesses, a striking last image of the physical person with whom she would connect her
anecdotal Johnson.
Piozzi’s Anecdotes require the description and character as the last section of the account
the reader sees to recombine the fragmented collection of anecdotes into a singular, coherent
body: Johnson’s “stature was remarkably high, and his limbs exceedingly large: his strength was
more than common I believe, and his activity had been greater I have heard than such a form
gave one reason to expect: his complexion had certainly been fair, a circumstance somewhat
unusual” (297). She idealizes Johnson in the body of a hero, noting that “his sight was near, and
otherwise imperfect; yet his eyes, though of a light-grey colour, were so wild, so piercing, and at
times so fierce, that fear was I believe the first emotion in the hearts of all his beholders” (297).
While she has been following a formula of eighteenth-century biography, Piozzi’s description of
Johnson gives her recollected anecdotes the sort of presentness that Backscheider describes. The
body that Piozzi writes for Johnson is out reach; it is heroic and marked with “wild,” “piercing,”
“fierce” eyes that turn the reader away from a clear view of the present man. By emphasizing
Johnson’s greatness in the body of a hero, the selfhood stands a remove as the biographical
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account closes. Piozzi’s Johnson walks along an earlier biographical tradition: everything about
Johnson ultimately reflects his excellence, in the syllogistic, deductive fashion that makes a
major premise of Johnson’s superlative nature that every saying, action, writing, and behavior
proves. Even though Piozzi does not know why, “it is usual” indeed to portray a selfhood thus,
and it is such portrayals that Boswell turns from in his innovations of the biographical form.
As much as Piozzi turns the reader away from the body of Johnson and a
conceptualization of his selfhood, Boswell points his readers back to the body of Samuel
Johnson to recognize the selfhood embodied there. His Johnson is unchanged from the earlier
print selfhood he presented, “as I do not see any reason to give a different character of my
illustrious friend now, from what I formerly gave, the greatest part of the sketch of him in my
‘Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides,’ is here adopted” (Life iv.425 n.1). The familiarity that
Boswell evokes confers credibility on the physical self he presents and, in turn, an overarching
credibility for the details of the Life that it collects. Yet Boswell’s depiction of Johnson is an
unflattering, almost grotesque image of the man’s physical self:
his appearance was rendered strange and somewhat uncouth, by convulsive
cramps, by the scars of that distemper which it was once imagined the royal touch
could cure, and by a slovenly mode of dress. He had the use only of one eye; yet
so much does mind govern and even supply the deficiency of organs, that his
visual perceptions, as far as they extended, were uncommonly quick and accurate.
So morbid was his temperament, that he never knew the natural joy of a free and
vigorous use of his limbs: when he walked, it was like the struggling gait of one
in fetters; when he rode, he had no command or direction of his horse, but was
carried as if in a balloon. (Life iv.425)

259

The body of Boswell’s Johnson is a scarred, twitchy, unkempt thing, given to tortured and
limited movement. This physicality is much at odds with the vigorous, heroic body Piozzi
invents for her Johnson. Her Johnson, too, looks back at his audience of beholders, but Boswell’s
only invites readers to stare. He does not return their gaze or inspire their fear. If anything,
Boswell’s Johnson is an object to be pitied, marked as it is by physical deformity and a lack of
self-control. It is a description that fronts the presentness of the physical self to put the body into
a sympathetic view. To look at the body of Boswell’s Johnson is to recognize a superlative mind
in a pitiable body and to understand that what made Johnson great is not, as Piozzi makes it
seem, out of reach. This body asserts the importance and meaning of Johnson’s life beyond its
span, the presentness that Boswell’s biography evokes.
Situated at the end of the biography, this physical description underscores the humanity
of the Johnson’s living selfhood and contrasts the greatness that Boswell locates in Johnson
through his writing, conversations, and acquaintance. His circumstances are easier to consider as
“naturally incident to . . . [readers’] state of life” (Johnson, Rambler III.319). Just as importantly,
this physical description of Johnson is a power reminder not only of Boswell’s purpose, but the
project of eighteenth-century biography at large: the arrangement of a rhetoric of self that
embodies lived experience and right social practice. Boswell reconciles the grotesquerie of a
physical self so incongruous with the character, personality, and beliefs he arranges as Johnson:
“[t]hat with his constitution and habits of life he should have lived seventy-five years, is a proof
that an inherent vivida vis is a powerful preservative of the human frame” (Life iv.425). A perfect
segue from the physical self to the character and personality that Boswell describes next, the
question of the “human frame” suggests an important cornerstone for the emergent eighteenthcentury biographical project. Where the human frame is present, the “vivida vis” or animating
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“lively force” is manifest in action, reason, behavior, character; when the human frame is gone,
the lively force that distinguishes a person’s selfhood is lost. The biographical rhetoric of self is a
human frame, a humanizing print frame for containing and conveying the vivida vis, giving it
presentness when the physical frame is absent, even years later. Being in the presence of this
human frame, reading a biography, is to engage an autodidactic process of self-improvement, the
non-coercive project of reading.

The Human Frame
The emergence of a humanizing frame for representing selfhood grew out of the shift
from a deductive to inductive scientific paradigm and a corresponding methodology that
presumed to be more for the people at large than earlier models. The Royal Society’s inductive
epistemology depends on cyclical observations to generate specific facts from which observers
might induce broad scientific truths that could, in turn, be tested and observed again to hone
those scientific truths. It is a process that purports to refine scientific theories by considering an
ever-widening body of facts and details. The methodology values the role of the person in
making scientific meaning: it humanizes science. This model depends on consensus among
multiple observers to credential facts. The Royal Society’s practices depend on human
intervention and incorporate its limitations into a scientific model that lends itself to formulating
an understanding of selfhood, like John Locke’s model of the self and self-understanding. Locke
theorizes a scientific epistemology for the self as a reasoning person who develops through a
reflexive self-consciousness, becoming a spectating self-observer that, as a consequence of
observing multiple details and facts, generates its own distinctive selfhood.
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Within the larger, scientific paradigm, the inductive epistemology is matched by a
rhetoric appropriate to its methodology, one which would make its ideas accessible to all
observers. Just as the inductive epistemology requires the observer or scientist to draw
conclusions from a surfeit of facts, the rhetoric of the inductive paradigm invites a reader to draw
conclusions from facts as well. As a paradigm purportedly for the people, its rhetoric must make
the facts accessible with clear, plain language that stresses the importance of the idea rather than
its expression, which foregrounds the process of drawing conclusions inductively. In its
emphasis on transparency, this rhetorical style attempts to make facts more observable.
The emergence of eighteenth-century biography within this context emulates the core
practices and values that distinguish the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive paradigm
from the older scientific rhetoric of deduction. Novels, too, grew out of the normative scientific
and print standards. The advent of biography and “its status as a respectable literary and didactic
species, providing significant, accepted reading material to a wide (and widening range) or
readers” led to the development of a novelistic selfhood (Hunter 351). While eighteenth-century
novels and biographies share a representational impetus, they are constructed of different
materials: the novel depends on imagined experiences with the stamp of life; biography, on the
lived experiences that can be credentialed as life. Biography’s aesthetic must be real in a way
that is nominal to novelistic realism. The normative standards this scientific model provide made
it possible for biographers to gather as wide a range of facts as possible that could be credited as
the experiences of the person they sought to write. Such credit came from observation—facts
from other people that put the person in observable view of many people. The biography itself
also put the person in view. Eighteenth-century biography developed a rhetoric of self that would
allow a reader to determine selfhood from the facts the biographer presented. This rhetorical
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arrangement, in turn, allowed the biographer to create choices for the readers who observed the
selfhood from a new epistemology and new foundation for representation. The context of an
inductive science that put the onus on the reader to observe and draw conclusions engendered a
literature in which the act of reading opened an opportunity like scientists conducting
experiments, observing and drawing conclusions from the details they saw. But it provided a
human frame that these reader-scientists observed; it was not just an experiment. Readers’
sympathetic identification with human contradictions mark an ethics of reading that cultivated
virtue for the reader in the project of reading biography. Their role of readers was to play the
acquaintance to the biographical selves they read, and, in the process, become part of the
experiment of testing and proving a self.
The most complicated biographical human frame of the eighteenth century was the life
Boswell arranged for Johnson. The rhetoric of self that Boswell writes Johnson into
biographically is a didactic selfhood that builds on earlier strengths of eighteenth-century
biographical models from Johnson himself and Goldsmith, most notably. Boswell sought to
further humanize the rhetoric of self he developed to represent Johnson by cultivating an ethos of
direct friendship and camaraderie with his subject, bending extant eighteenth-century
biographical patterns to deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic reader to view
Johnson’s print life ethically. Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of print and manuscript
culture to arrange the experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood bound in time, but
freed from the diachronic by a synchronic continuity that makes Johnson’s selfhood seem
unchanging and intimately engaging and available to the reader. In the end, it is the
conversations Boswell records that most explicitly distinguish Johnson’s rhetoric of self from
other biographical selfhoods. Through conversation, Boswell most fully achieves his
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biographical project, to “Johnsonise the land” (Life i.13). Reading conversation situates readers
in a conversational locus where the reader not only observes, but especially engages the rhetoric
of self through listening and speaking, the social, human act of talking. The larger consequence
of this intimate biography is a larger social shift in which readers talk with or like Johnson and,
through their observations, comes to think like Johnson as well. In the conversational locus,
Johnson’s selfhood moves from the life observed to a presence, a person, a more intimate
biographical subject than any prior.

Biography Beyond the Eighteenth Century
In an introduction to a journal issue of a/b: Auto/Biography Studies, Elizabeth Podnieks
notes that the “question that obtains from discussing the status of biography today within
scholarly and popular contexts is this: has the attention being paid to biography of late been
enough to redeem its long and embarrassing neglect?” (9). She asserts that modern biographical
study usually vacillates between scholarly and popular extremes, “the market and the academy,”
and argues that, within a context of cultural, social, and representation influences, “the impact of
electronic technologies on the representations of self and the consequent biographical project; . .
. [and] the increasing fusion of academic and popular mandates, apparatus, and approaches to the
life” (5, 12). The modern biographical form develops, as it always has, within the larger social
context that situates selfhood, and while the advent of new media complicates biographical
practice, it illustrates the importance of the contextual framework within which the form the
emerged. The significance is not necessarily the similarities between the two—developments in
modern electronic technologies are no more influential than developments in the earlier media,
print, and the work of the Grub Street hacks is as pervasive in the eighteenth century as it is in
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journalistic blurbs now—but, rather, it is the similarities’ emphasis on material and
epistemological contexts that highlight what has been at the heart of the form’s emergence and
development, the larger contexts for recognizing and distinguishing selfhood.
The emergence of biography in the eighteenth century and its formulation of the
biographical rhetoric of self, a new human frame for representing selfhood through the methods
of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, mark a defining moment in the form. While a
biographical impulse might be located in earlier forms of life writing, biography proper is a
development of the eighteenth century. But it is a genre in a constant state of flux and
development, as responsive to the epistemological shifts and available methods for
representation today as it was in the eighteenth century. A burgeoning print culture and a
scientific epistemology of self gave rise to the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self which
characterized the new form, a human frame that promised the new intimacy of understanding.
We too may be on the cusp of new forms of understanding selves that are similarly revealing,
pedagogical, and detailed, new potential rhetorics of self for a digital age. Boswell’s enduring
lament is that the life of Johnson was no fuller than it was, that “might have been almost entirely
preserved” if Johnson’s acquaintance had “been as diligent and ardent” in recording the facts of
his life as Boswell himself had been (Life i.30). The rhetoric of self Boswell creates can reveal
the Johnson “more completely than any man who has ever lived” (Life i.30). Eighteenth-century
biography is charged with the vivida vis that gives the subject an intimate presentness: readers
can know biographical subjects better than they have ever been known and know ourselves
better, even centuries later, in the process.
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